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ENCIRCLEMENT

BY

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THE formation of a peace front to resist aggression in Europe has caused an outcry in Germany against a so-called policy of 'encirclement'. This pamphlet contrasts similar protests made in pre-war years with those in the present situation, points out the reality of 'encirclement', describes how nearly all European countries are, in fact, 'encircled', and deals with such problems as *Lebensraum* in its political sense.

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WHAT do Germans mean when they complain that Britain is pursuing an *Einkreisungspolitik*, a policy of 'encirclement' towards them? or that we are trying to deny them the *Lebensraum*, the 'living space', to which they, as a great people, have a right? Is there any truth in these charges against us, and, if so, how do we defend what we are doing?

We know, both from the speeches of the German leaders and from the abuse which is showered upon us by the Press which they control, that the German Government desires the German people to believe that these charges are true. In the speech which he made before the Reichstag on 28 April last, the speech in which he defended his action in destroying the independence of Czechoslovakia, Herr Hitler used both these catchwords to drive home his attack on British policy.

'I am now compelled to state,' he said, 'that the policy of England is both unofficially and officially leaving no doubt about the fact that such a conviction [sc. the conviction that an Anglo-German war would never again be possible] is no longer shared in London, and that, on the contrary, the opinion prevails there that no matter in what conflict Germany should some day be entangled, Great Britain would always have to take her stand against Germany. Thus a war against Germany is taken for granted in that country. . . . I have never advanced a claim which might in any way have interfered with

British interests or have become a danger to the Empire and thus have meant any kind of damage to England. I have always kept within the limit of such demands as are intimately connected with Germany's living space and thus the eternal property of the German nation. Since England to-day, both through the press and officially upholds the view that Germany should be opposed under all circumstances, and confirms this by the policy of encirclement known to us, the basis for the Naval Treaty [sc. the Treaty of 1935] has been removed.'

The Urgency of the Question

What makes it so urgent for us to understand these apprehensions which Germans profess to feel to-day is that there is a grave danger that this propaganda may succeed in leading the German people as a whole to believe that peace is endangered to-day by the hostile attitude of their neighbours, and not, as we know to be the case, by the aggressions and the bad faith of their own government. Such a conviction in German minds would be an immeasurable calamity. For even in these days of authoritarian governments, whenever the issue of peace or war is in the balance as it is to-day, the opinion of ordinary men and women about the merits of the cause for which they may be asked to face the horrors of a war is of vital importance; it is, in fact, far more important than it was in the past. It has become more important because a totalitarian war can

hardly be waged at all, and certainly cannot be waged for long, unless these ordinary peacefully inclined people can be induced to support it, practically unanimously, with all the energies and all the resources at their command; and before these ordinary people will give this support, they must have come to believe that war is being forced upon them, that it is not being wantonly provoked by their own government. This limiting factor on the power of a government to lead its people into war applies with equal force to dictatorships and to democracies; in time of war both have to rely on a popular support so whole-hearted and so complete that, except within narrow limits, it cannot be exacted by the methods by which dictatorial governments impose their will in normal times. Where, however, dictatorships and democracies do differ in this matter is in respect of the ease with which they can suppress the true facts of a situation and impose upon their peoples the belief that war is being forced upon them by the machinations of the other side; and that explains the special danger in which we stand at present.

Last September, at the time of Mr. Chamberlain's visit to Munich, the demeanour of the German men and women who turned out into the streets to acclaim him is reported to have

proved beyond any doubt that Germans then were for the most part no less anxious to see peace preserved than we are ourselves; to many of us the evidence of this common desire for peace shared by both peoples seemed the one glimmer of hope left over from those tragic days. There is no reason to suppose that Germans are less anxious for peace to-day than they were last year, and yet we may take it as certain that if they come to believe that they are being ringed round by jealous hostile States bent on their destruction, they will steel themselves to face the sacrifices even of a war which they detest. We in this country may know with absolute certainty, we may even be puzzled to understand how any one can doubt, that, as the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons on 8 June last, 'any suggestion that we wish to isolate Germany, or to stand in the way of natural and legitimate extension of her trade, or to plan some combination against her with the idea of making war upon her, is fantastic.' But what we must realize is that *Einkreisung* and *Lebensraum* are slogans highly charged with emotional content, and that both make their appeal to the most primitive and unreasoning of all the emotions, that of fear. Both evoke the same terrifying picture of implacable enemies, pressing on their victim

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from every side, and bent on choking the life out of his body; if once a nation has been persuaded that this is its predicament, it is more likely to ask itself only how it can escape from the trap by any means that may be at hand, than calmly to examine the question whether it was its own leaders or the jealous outside world that set the trap for it. Here, for instance, is a typical extract from a popular German newspaper which shows the response which all this propaganda about 'encirclement' is intended to evoke in German minds:

'Great Britain is trying to encircle Germany with a new chain. You may deny this or not. The British attempts to try out the Versailles Encirclement policy again are continually reaching a clearer and more definite form. Mr. Chamberlain's most beautiful peace phrases and the cleverest Foreign Office word-twisting will not help to change this fact. Great Britain should therefore be told once more quite clearly what the Führer already stated. . . . Germany is certainly not inclined to watch the British efforts inactively. She is not willing to suffer the same fate which this British encirclement policy prepared for pre-war Germany.'

'Encirclement' before 1914

The reference to pre-War history in the last words here illustrates one of the devices which is being used to add to the persuasive force of the propaganda. If Britain's policy towards Germany can be represented as merely a con-

tinuation of, or a return to, a policy which she has pursued towards Germany once before with bitter results for Germany, it becomes easier to believe in its malevolence to-day. What, then, are the facts of our pre-War relations with Germany, so far as they touch this question?

It is believed that a speech delivered in the Reichstag by von Bülow, then German Chancellor, on 14 November 1906, contained the first public use of the word to describe the situation of Germany in relation to other Powers. That he ever really persuaded himself to believe that the charge of 'encirclement' had any truth in relation to British policy is very unlikely; at any rate, he had before him the repeated and emphatic assurances of successive German Ambassadors in London that it had not. We know, too, from documents which have now been published and whose purport should be known to Germans as well as to us, that Bülow quite deliberately decided to use the charge of 'encirclement' against us in order to overcome the resistance of the German people to the successive expansions of the German Navy which the Kaiser and von Tirpitz had determined to have carried out. In this he was brilliantly successful. Journalists, writers of books, politicians, university

professors, prominent soldiers, poured out year after year a never-ceasing stream of propaganda, and the Navy Bills were passed into law. When war came in 1914 the ground had been so thoroughly prepared that the German nation was practically unanimous in believing that here was the culminating event of a policy long and implacably pursued by Germany's enemies, and by Britain in particular. The Kaiser's *cri de cœur*, when he realized that Britain would join in the war against Germany, has often been quoted, and there is no doubt that it represented the passionate conviction of the German people.

'So the famous encirclement of Germany has now finally become an accomplished fact, despite every effort of our politicians and diplomatists to prevent it. The net has been suddenly thrown over our head, and England sneeringly reaps the most brilliant success of the purely anti-German world policy, which she has persistently pursued and against which we have shown ourselves helpless, as she twists the noose of our political and economic destruction out of our loyalty to Austria, while we squirm isolated in the net. A brilliant achievement which arouses the admiration even of him who is to be destroyed as a result! Edward VII is stronger after his death than I who am still alive.'

That the foreign policy of Britain before the War, whatever it may have been, was the personal policy of King Edward VII is of course

wholly untrue, and no one with even an elementary understanding of the British political system could have believed it. But in fact the whole story of a British *Einkreisungspolitik* before the War is a myth. That Britain deliberately worked for war with Germany because she was alarmed by Germany's growing commercial rivalry is a charge which almost disproves itself when made against a commercial people; a 'nation of shopkeepers' is not so silly as to imagine that even the most successful war can be good for its trade. Britain was driven ever closer to France and then to France's ally Russia in the pre-War years by one thing and one thing alone, by her fear of Germany's intentions; it was Germany's restlessness, her sabre-rattling at one international crisis after another, and above all her naval expansion (which seemed explicable only on the theory that the greatest military Power aspired to become also the greatest naval Power in the world), that welded the Triple Entente together. Even so, so deep-rooted was our detestation of the thought of war with Germany, that it was not until after war had actually begun that France and Russia knew for certain that we should be on their side.

The 'War-guilt' Propaganda

Most Englishmen have probably assumed that just as we ourselves in retrospect are now prepared to admit that we exaggerated Germany's responsibility in the emotional stress of the War, so Germans, after the lapse of a quarter of a century, would now be able to examine the evidence of its causes dispassionately and to revise their views. That, however, is not the case. For since the War the myth of a British pre-War *Einkreisungspolitik* has become the instrument of a new propaganda, that against the so-called 'war-guilt' of Germany. The aim of this propaganda has been to bring about the reversal of the Versailles settlement by destroying what is supposed to be the treaty's only basis, the alleged sole responsibility of Germany for the War. Not only was Germany *not solely* responsible, according to this new myth, she was not responsible at all; on the contrary she was the perfectly innocent victim of a nefarious conspiracy, to the success of which all her post-War difficulties have been due. The vehemence with which this campaign has been carried on in the Press, in the universities, and perhaps most important of all, in the schools, and the vast sums of money that have been spent on it, have received little

attention in this country. In so far as British people have been aware of it at all, they have been inclined, from a very genuine sympathy with German difficulties, to say that it was not unnatural for Germans to wish to salve their wounds and to restore their self-respect by minimizing their own share in causing the War and exaggerating that of their ex-enemies. We have believed that with the healing passage of time, the revival of German prosperity, and the recognition of any legitimate grievances that they might have, this mood of exaggeration would pass harmlessly away. We know now that in this hope we were mistaken. The 'war-guilt' propaganda has very effectively prepared the minds of the great mass of the German people to receive the new charges against us in which they are now being told to believe.

'Encirclement' since 15 March 1939

British 'encirclement' of Germany before the War was a myth deliberately invented. But the 'encirclement' with which we are charged to-day is not a myth in the same sense. Before the War facts were invented or distorted to support the charge; to-day there is no real difference between the Germans and ourselves as regards the *facts* to which the new charge relates, so long as these are considered simply

as facts. Where we differ is in the interpretation of facts which we admit. In our view 'encirclement' is a misleading and tendencious word to apply to those facts, but, subject to that qualification, we do not deny, we justify, the 'encirclement' of Germany to-day.

Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia on 15 March last, Britain has been building up what *we* call a 'peace front'. We have allied ourselves with France and Poland and Turkey; we have guaranteed the independence of Roumania and Greece; we are negotiating for an alliance with Russia; we are spending vast sums of money on our own armaments, and we are using our financial strength to encourage the States with whom we are associated to strengthen theirs. All these things are facts; we do not deny them, on the contrary we want them to be known and their meaning understood. Nor do we deny that the object of these preparations is, firstly to deter Germany from going to war, and secondly, if we fail in that part of our purpose, to ensure that she shall be defeated. 'Encirclement', therefore, if this is what Germans mean by the term, and we know that it is, is certainly no 'myth' to-day, and it would not only be useless, it would be untrue to defend our actions by saying that they are intended to put Germany in no danger. Their

whole purpose is to create a very real danger for Germany—in *certain events*, and if we tell Germans that the danger they foresee is imaginary we shall in fact be telling them the very opposite of what we want them to believe.

On the other hand, when Germans describe our policy towards them as 'encirclement', we have a right to point out that they are using a tendentious word. In that, of course, lies its propaganda value. They are using a word which, though it may be taken on the face of it to be merely a somewhat rhetorical description of a state of facts, suggests, and is intended to suggest, associated ideas of two kinds: it suggests that there is a conspiracy of Powers bent on manœuvring Germany into a specially dangerous position in which she does not attempt to place any of them, that she is being unfairly singled out for a peculiarly hard fate, and it suggests that the motive of this conspiracy is the jealous determination of others to thwart her legitimate development, and not the fear that she has aroused by her own provocative actions. Both these notions which the word 'encirclement' is intended to evoke are false, and in that sense it is still true to say that the 'encirclement' of Germany is a 'myth'. For the truth is that Germany's danger, so far from being of a kind to which she alone is

exposed, is a danger in which many other States stand in the present condition of Europe, and that it is a danger which her own actions have provoked. These are the facts which constitute the real and the sufficient justification of British policy towards Germany to-day.

Encirclement by Germany

Many of the States of Europe are to-day 'encircled.' For Europe to-day contains two groups of Powers, of which it is unfortunately only too true to say, in the words of the seventeenth-century philosopher Hobbes, that they are 'in continual jealousies, and in the state and posture of gladiators, having their weapons pointing and their eyes fixed on one another,' and this, as Hobbes goes on to say, is a 'posture of war'. Each of these groups is trying to strengthen its position relatively to the other by every means open to it in the hope, in the first place, of making its will prevail without actual war, and in the second place, if war should come, of ensuring victory for its own side. Both groups are to this extent acting in precisely the same way, and it is merely an accident of geography that makes it plausible for one, the Axis Powers, to stigmatize the action of the other as 'encirclement'. The Axis Powers happen to be geographically contiguous to one another and to lie

in the centre of Europe, whereas Britain, France and Poland are not contiguous but divided, Britain and France to the west, and Poland to the east, of the Axis. Actually this central position of the Axis Powers, so far from being a weakness of which the other group is taking an unfair advantage, would, in the event of war, be a great source to them of military strength. In any case Germany, or Germany and Italy together, are far from being the only 'encircled' Powers. So long as the European States form, not a concert, but two rival groups, the facts of geography make it inevitable that situations should arise in which States may plausibly, sometimes far more plausibly than Germany in her present position, regard themselves as 'encircled'. Even a cursory glance at the political map of Europe to-day shows that Germany and Italy are themselves the great 'encirclers'. Since the seizures of Czechoslovakia and the Memelland Germany herself is encircling Poland: since the seizure of Albania, Germany and Italy together with Hungary and possibly Bulgaria, are encircling Yugoslavia; last September Germany joined with Poland and Hungary to encircle and actually to partition Czechoslovakia; and of the Great Powers to-day the one that has the best right to complain of 'encirclement' is not

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Germany, but France, for, thanks to the successful aggression of the Axis Powers in Spain, France is now ringed round by three members of the Anti-Comintern Pact. *Einkreisungspolitik* is thus no monopoly of an anti-German group of Powers.

The Justification of British Policy

But in the British view there is a vital distinction between our 'encirclement' of Germany and the 'encirclements' of other States of which Germany is the chief author. 'We admit,' we might say, 'that we are taking certain action towards you which you call "encirclement". We do not admit that that is a fair description of what we are doing, but let that pass; in any case we may remind you that you yourselves are taking very similar action towards France and towards a number of other countries in whose safety we are interested. The vital difference, however, between what *we* are doing and what *you* are doing is that our measures are defensive; we have every reason to fear that *you*, unless you are prevented, intend to impose your will on other independent nations by force, and we are therefore building up a "peace front" against you. *You*, on the other hand, have no reason to entertain any such suspicion with regard to *our* intentions,

and *your* preparations therefore can have only an offensive purpose. If by any chance we have misunderstood your intentions, or if you decide to change them and behave like a good neighbour, you have nothing whatever to fear from our preparations, because in either of those cases none of the engagements into which we have entered will ever come into operation.'

What, then, is the evidence by which we might justify some such explanation of our attitude as this? The evidence on which our belief in Germany's future aggressive intentions rests comes from various sources, and its cumulative effect is overwhelming. But the position, put quite shortly, is simply this: that for some years now Germany has been setting the pace in a race of armament-building, that she has subordinated every other consideration of her economy to the creation of an army and an air force of unprecedented strength, and that when we ask whether, as she would have us believe, these preparations threaten no one, there are only two sources to which we can look for the answer: (1) the uses to which she has hitherto put her strength, and (2) the statements made on her behalf of the aims for which she needs this strength.

(1) Germany's own acts under the National-Socialist régime show that she claims the right

to decide unilaterally for herself any question in which she is interested, and that no reliance whatever can be placed on her most solemn pledges. Only a small selection from the voluminous evidence on this point can here be given.

On 17 May 1933, in the first year of his Chancellorship, Herr Hitler said in a speech before the Reichstag:

'Germany does not wish to take any other path than that recognized as justified by the treaties themselves. The German Government wishes to come to a peaceful agreement with other nations on all difficult questions. They know that in any military action in Europe, even if completely successful, the sacrifice would be out of all proportion to any possible gains.' (Documents in International Affairs, 1933, p. 207.)

A Reichstag speech of 21 May 1935 is a veritable museum of pledges since broken. In it these passages occur:

'National-Socialism regards the forcible amalgamation of one people with another alien people not only as a worthless political aim, but, in the long run, as a danger to the internal unity, and hence the strength, of a nation.'

'Germany neither intends nor wishes to interfere in the internal affairs of Austria, to annex Austria, or to conclude an Anschluss.'

'The German Government will unconditionally respect the articles [of the Treaty of Versailles] concerning the mutual relations of the nations in other respects [sc. other than the matter of disarmament], including the territorial provisions, and those revisions which shall be rendered necessary in course of time will be put into effect only by the method of peaceful understanding.'

'In respecting the demilitarized zone the German Government consider their action as a contribution to the appeasement of Europe, which contribution is of an unheard-of hardness for a sovereign state.' (Ibid., 1935, vol. I, 160, 171, 172.)

On 6 March 1936 Germany occupied the demilitarized zone without warning.

On 11 July 1936 the text was issued of an agreement between Germany and Austria, of which the first two articles were these:

(1) *'In the sense of the statement made by the Führer and Reich Chancellor on 21 May 1935, the German Government recognizes the full sovereignty of the Federal State of Austria.'*

(2) *'Each of the two governments shall regard the internal political conditions of the other country, including the question of Austrian National Socialism, as a domestic concern of that country, upon which it will exert neither direct nor indirect influence.'* (Ibid., 1936, p. 320.)

In a Reichstag speech of 30 January 1937 Herr Hitler thanked providence that he had been able to bring to a successful issue the struggle for the restoration of German honour and rights. He regretted that it had not been possible to carry through the necessary measures by way of negotiation, but, he added, *'As all this has now been accomplished, the so-called period of surprises has come to an end.'* (Ibid. 1937, p. 161.)

On 12 February 1938 the recognition of Austrian sovereignty contained in the agreement of 1936 was reaffirmed after the visit of Herr von Schuschnigg to Herr Hitler at

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Berchtesgaden. '*Both parties*,' said the official communiqué, '*are resolved to keep to the principles of that agreement and regard it as the starting point for a satisfactory development of their relations.*' Actually it is now known that Herr von Schuschnigg had been forced to make a humiliating surrender to demands utterly inconsistent with this statement.

On 11 March 1938 the German troops invaded Austria and annexed it.

On 13 March 1938 the German Government gave an assurance to the Czech Government that Germany had no aggressive designs against Czechoslovakia.¹

On 26 September 1938, in a speech at the Sports' Palace at Berlin demanding the cession of the Sudetenland, Herr Hitler declared that this was '*the last territorial claim which I have to make in Europe, but it is the claim from which I do not recede and which I shall fulfil, God willing.*' Three days later the Czechoslovak Government was forced to accept the Munich terms of surrender.²

At Saarbrücken, 9 October 1938, Herr Hitler admitted he had reached the determination to bring back to the Reich the 10,000,000 Germans who stood apart from us *at the*

¹ *The Times*, 26 September 1938.

² *The Times*, 27 September 1938.

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beginning of this year (that is to say, before the assurances above-mentioned solemnly given to Austria and to Czechoslovakia).¹

On 15 March 1939 the Germans occupied what Munich had left of Czechoslovakia. It was not until after this event that Britain turned to the policy which Germans call 'encirclement'.

Lebensraum

(2) Herr Hitler in *Mein Kampf*² has explained with complete candour that he regards a vast territorial expansion as necessary for Germany's future, and that this expansion must be secured, if necessary, by the sword. His views on this matter are so important, both for understanding the policy he has hitherto pursued and for forecasting the policy he is likely to attempt in future, that it is necessary to examine them in some detail. It is significant that in only one respect, that of the worthlessness of colonies, has he since shown the slightest sign of having changed his views, and there we have seen an extension, and not an attenuation, of his programme.

The primary purpose of a foreign policy

¹ *The Times*, 10 October 1938.

² For a more detailed account of the doctrines of *Mein Kampf* see Oxford Pamphlet No. 3, in this series, by R. C. K. Ensor. The quotations which follow are taken from the German edition of 1933.

according to Herr Hitler, is to secure the existence of the race by establishing a healthy and natural proportion between the numbers of the population and the extent and resources of their territory. It is a cardinal point in Herr Hitler's philosophy that this 'healthy' proportion is one in which the maintenance of the people is guaranteed by the resources of their own soil. 'Never consider the Reich as made secure,' he says, 'unless, for centuries to come, it can give to every descendant of our people his own piece of ground and soil. Never forget that the holiest right in this world is the right to the earth which a man wishes to cultivate for himself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood which he sheds for this earth' (p. 754.) He has an unbounded contempt for a mainly industrial civilization; industry and commerce, he thinks, should take a subordinate place in the national economy, for the only true basis of a community is a healthy peasant class.

Over and over again Herr Hitler insists that for Germany at present this desirable proportion between her population and their territory does not exist; it must be the objective of the Nazi movement to establish it. And note the magnitude of this task as he conceives it. Germany needs more territory for two reasons which are cumulative in their effect;

she needs it, because her present population is not properly distributed between town and country, and she needs it because her population is going to increase in the future. Herr Hitler assumes a present annual increase of population of about 900,000. German foreign policy should proceed on the basis that a century hence 'there will be 250 million Germans living on this Continent, not packed together as factory coolies of the rest of the world, but as peasants and workers who mutually guarantee one another the means of life through what they produce' (p. 767.)

For an examination of this estimate of the probable future German population the reader may be referred to Dr. Kuczynski's pamphlet '*Living Space*' and *Population Problems* in this series. The estimate is, in fact, so fantastically improbable that if *Lebensraum* were a merely rational construction, we might confidently expect that the conclusions of science would succeed in demonstrating the slenderness of the basis on which it rests. Unfortunately *Lebensraum* makes its appeal far more to the emotions than to the reason, and we must assume that it will survive the destruction of its demographical foundation.

In theory, Herr Hitler thinks there are four different means by which this dispropor-

tion between German population and German territory in which he believes might be rectified (ibid., Part I, ch. iv.): (1) birth control, but this he rejects as leading to racial degeneration; (2) internal colonization, by which he means extending the system of small holdings, but this, though a tempting way out to a people of the 'pacifist disposition' of the Germans, could never assure the future of the nation without the acquisition of more territory; (3) increased concentration on the export trade, which would increase the present disproportion between town and country life; and (4) the acquisition of new territory, the only tolerable solution. Germany, he says, must become a *Weltmacht*, a 'world-power', which she is not to-day and never will be, however militarily powerful she may become, so long as this disproportion between size of population and territorial area continues to exist (p. 729).

Herr Hitler's vindication of Germany's right to new territory reveals one of the fundamental, and also one of the most alarming, of the bases of his programme, his conception of the Germans as a superior race. In striving to carry out its policy of territorial expansion, National Socialism, he says, must bear in mind that Germans are guardians of the highest form of humanity on earth, and that they have therefore

a correspondingly high duty to guard the purity of German blood (p. 732). The lesson of the past is that German policy should have a two-fold aim, 'ground and soil' for its aim in foreign policy, and a new and simplified foundation for domestic policy, corresponding to the German outlook on life. He pours contempt on any who would criticize this policy on ethical grounds. To prate of territorial expansion as a 'violation of the sacred rights of man' is to play the game of Germany's enemies, and serves only to destroy the will of Germans to promote their own vital interests by the only effective means they have, the power of the triumphant sword. Existing political frontiers, which are merely the product of the political struggles of the past, should be no deterrent to Germany; 'no people on this earth occupies a square yard of ground and soil under a higher Will or in virtue of a higher Right. . . . State frontiers are made by men and men may alter them.' When without it a great nation would be destined to go under, the right to an extension of territory becomes a duty; and that is particularly true 'when the question relates not to some wretched little negro people, but to the Germanic mother of all the life which has given cultural shape to the world of to-day' (p. 741.)

About the application of these principles to the existing European situation Herr Hitler is quite specific. The restoration of the 1914 frontiers would be absurd, even criminally absurd. Those frontiers were utterly illogical; they were not complete, because they did not include all members of the German nation, and they were not reasonable from the point of view of military defence. They were merely temporary frontiers established in a political struggle which had not been finished. Nor must there be a return to the pre-War colonial policy; though here, as we saw before, we come upon the one point of foreign policy in which Herr Hitler has since departed from the doctrines of *Mein Kampf*. The territorial policy of the future must turn towards the East and look to Russia and the border States subject to her. Here Destiny itself points the German way; for Russia, having abolished its Germanic ruling class and having fallen under the Jewish yoke, is ripe for dissolution. German policy must be an Eastern policy, having in view the acquisition of the land necessary for the German people (p. 757.)

This brief examination of the most authentic of the sources of the *Lebensraum* claim may serve to dispose of one misunderstanding of its character that is common among Englishmen,

the belief that the claim is first and foremost an economic one. At a time when Germany is so short of labour for her industry and her agriculture that she is importing thousands of foreign workmen from any country from which they can be drawn, she clearly cannot complain of over-population in the ordinary economic or demographic meaning of that term. In his great speech of 29 June last Lord Halifax declared, as British statesmen have many times declared before, that we are ready to co-operate 'in extending to all nations the opportunity of a larger economic life, with all that this means, which is implied in the term *Lebensraum*.' But the dynamic element in the *Lebensraum* claim is not economic, but political, and other passages in Lord Halifax's speech show that he at least is well aware of this. No doubt the economic difficulties of Germany serve to commend the claim to the sympathies of the ordinary German man or woman; it is convenient for a government to attribute the hardships of which Germans are conscious in their daily lives to the nefarious attempts of the outside world at the economic strangulation of Germany, especially when these hardships are largely the outcome of the policy that that government has deliberately chosen to follow. But we shall be making a dangerous miscalcu-

lation of the probable future trend of events, and we shall be unlikely to choose the best way of meeting them, if we fail to realize the fundamentally political character of the *Lebensraum* claim. Certainly Herr Hitler has been perfectly frank about it, and the contempt with which all our offers of a *rapprochement* on the economic plane have consistently been met shows the insufficiency of the economic interpretation which the word taken literally would seem to suggest.

We need not, however, rely only on what Germans tell us, not even on what Herr Hitler himself tells us, is the meaning of *Lebensraum* in the abstract; we can learn what it means by noting how it is put into operation as an actual policy. In Herr Hitler's speech to the Reichstag of 28 April last he had the difficult task of explaining to the German people and to the world at large how the seizure of Czechoslovakia could be reconciled with his own racial principles and with his own previous pledges. His defence is extremely instructive. 'I have always,' he said, 'kept within the limit of such demands as are intimately connected with Germany's living space, and thus the eternal property of the German nation.' And later in the same speech, to show how fully Germany understood and sympathized with

the seizure of Albania by Italy, Herr Hitler described that country as 'living space undoubtedly allotted to Italy by nature and history'. Without this illuminating example the student of German mentality might have supposed that the German claim for *Lebensraum* envisaged an ordering of the world and a division of its territory in which *all* peoples would enjoy the highest attainable facilities for the good life, and that if 'nature and history' have allotted a certain *Lebensraum* to Germany, they may equally well be supposed to have allotted one to the Czechs and another to the Albanians. But evidently this is not so, and Herr Hitler has told us why. It is because the Germans are a superior race, and 'nature and history' ordain that their needs, or what they themselves decide to be their needs, must come first.

Might the Policy become Offensive?

One last criticism of British policy which has recently been made by a German writer to a British newspaper must here be mentioned. It is that the line between defensive and offensive preparations is not a clear one, and that a policy honestly intended at the outset to be defensive may easily be turned by the course of events into one of offence. That in the

abstract is true. The League system, from which Germany broke away, would have secured for her a *joint* consideration of any circumstance 'which threatens to disturb international peace'; as it is, it is true that we must decide for ourselves, or in consultation with the Powers associated with us, whether or not any future action by Germany is of a kind to justify the putting into effect against her of the preparations we are making. In so far as we can foresee the course which events are likely to take, we can do something to meet this difficulty by defining beforehand, as clearly as possible, the circumstances in which we intend to act. The Prime Minister's speech of 10 July last has done this so far as the question which is immediately pressing is concerned, namely, that of Danzig. 'Recent events in Danzig,' he said, 'have inevitably given rise to fears that it is intended to settle her future status by unilateral action, organized by surreptitious methods, thus presenting Poland and other Powers with a *fait accompli*. In such circumstances, any action taken by Poland to restore the situation, would, it is suggested, be represented as an act of aggression on her part, and if her action were supported by other Powers they would be accused of aiding and abetting her in the use of force.' In such a

case, he went on to say, an issue affecting Polish national existence and independence would be raised, and 'we have guaranteed to give our assistance to Poland in the case of a clear threat to her independence, which she considers it vital to resist with her national forces, and we are firmly resolved to carry out this undertaking.'

Lord Halifax's speech of 29 June contained both an assurance and a warning. 'None of this formidable array of strength will be called into play,' he said, 'except in defence against aggression'; but 'in the event of further aggression we are resolved to use at once the whole of our strength in fulfilment of our pledges to resist it.' 'Defence' and 'aggression' are words which may be difficult to define in the abstract. But it is not easy to believe, either that the German Government is in any doubt that our policy will remain in fact, as it is in intention, one of 'defence against aggression', or that it does not know exactly what sort of action Lord Halifax had in mind when he used those words.



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THE REFUGEE QUESTION

BY

JOHN HOPE SIMPSON

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MADE IN ENGLAND

THE refugee question has become increasingly grave in the post-War period. War, nationalism, and racial persecution have combined to drive large numbers of people from the countries in which they lived and worked, and have presented the world with a problem which can no longer be settled by individual charity.

This pamphlet discusses the magnitude of the problem, the methods which have so far been used to deal with it, and suggests future possibilities.

Sir John Hope Simpson, after a distinguished Civil Service career, was Vice-President of the Refugee Settlement Commission in Athens from 1926 to 1930, went on a special mission for the British Government to Palestine in 1930, and was Director-General of the Flood Relief Commission in China from 1931 to 1933. He is the author of a full-length study of the refugee question recently published under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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THE REFUGEE QUESTION

The 'Refugee'

A 'REFUGEE' might be described as an involuntary migrant. He would rather remain where he is, but conditions religious, economic, political, or social have rendered his life there so uncomfortable or, indeed, so unbearable, that he is forced to migrate from his home and to search for more tolerable conditions of life elsewhere. His alternatives to escape may frequently be the concentration camp or suicide. His search is often rendered more difficult in that the ordinary rights of a national are withdrawn from him, he is denationalized, unprovided with the normal documents of travel, and left to fend for himself unaided by any of the services of the State to which he belonged. He is an unwanted inhabitant of the world, unwanted in the country of his origin, unwanted in any other country.

Movements of Population

Movements of population are a commonplace of history, and even to-day populations are only exceptionally, and possibly only temporarily, static. As a result of these movements the population of every civilized country is composed of persons of mixed race. It is probably true to say that pure 'race' is a mythical conception, notwithstanding intense and bigoted belief to the contrary. For example, the British people are notoriously the product of a mixture of many races, as are also the German people and the Italian, the population of the United States of America, and even of India. The elementary international relations of civilization are

incompatible with that isolation which would be requisite for maintenance of purity of 'race'.¹

Though movements of population are no novelty, the world is faced to-day with those of that particular kind which are described as 'refugee movements'. Even those are no new phenomenon. Throughout history from the time of the flight of the Hebrews from Egypt up to the present century there have been movements of population which may be described as refugee movements. Some of them have had momentous results—none perhaps more momentous and less foreseen than those of the emigration of the Pilgrim Fathers in 1602. This was the migration of a body microscopically small, but a migration of which the ultimate colossal effect is visible in the world to-day. An earlier movement, based also on religious grounds, was that of refugee Flemings and Walloons from the Low Countries into England, and later and more important that of the Huguenots, of whom this country, to its lasting advantage, received some 80,000. Religious intolerance, though a frequent cause of refugee movements, is by no means the sole cause. Political hostility was responsible for the migration of the hundred thousand United Empire Loyalists from the United States chiefly to Canada, and after the American Civil War large numbers of confederate refugees fled to countries outside the United States. The great flight of White Russians from Russia was due to political dissidence, and many thousands of Irish migrated

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 5, '*Race*' in *Europe*, by Julian Huxley.

to the United States of America owing to their hostility to the existing régime in their native Ireland. Other refugee movements have been due to economic conditions, of which an outstanding instance was the Irish migration to America during and after the great potato famine of 1845-7.

Nationalism

Nationalism, racial and economic, was not unknown before the Great War. Evidence of the former is found in laws governing alien immigration, in Great Britain, the Aliens Act of 1905. The aim, now so widespread, of racial purity within national boundaries, seems to have been adopted as a deliberate policy for the first time by the leaders of the Young Turk movement from the time of their earliest access to power. Economic nationalism resulted in what were commonly known as 'protective' tariffs which became fairly general in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Great War gave great stimulus to these nationalisms all over the world. Whereas before the War travel between country and country was remarkably easy, after its close obstructions of every kind tended to be placed in the path of the would-be traveller. Rules as to passport and visa, currency and police regulations often combine to discourage ordinary travellers. But discouragement of movement since the War is not confined to the human being. It is also applied to the movements of goods. The doctrine of 'autarky', justified in the eyes of its supporters by the experiences of the War, has materially affected normal international trade.

Every country now attempts so to regulate its economic production that in case of war it would not be materially affected by blockade. By systems of tariff and quota it reduces to the minimum the importation of foreign goods.¹

This intensification of nationalist feeling both in the racial and in the economic sphere has put a stop to those movements of population which were normal in pre-War days. For many years before the War there was an annual exodus of hundreds of thousands from Europe to lands across the oceans. These people, though not classed as refugees, were in fact spurred by adverse religious, political, or economic conditions in their countries of origin. It is probable that facility for emigration at that time prevented movements definitely refugee in character. The importance of the change is evident in the figures published in the annual *I.L.O. Year Books*. In 1933, for example, Europe actually showed an inward balance of migration, while in 1932 Poland, an area from which emigration before the War was enormous, had the small outward balance of 3,800, and this was only due to emigration to Palestine, backed by Jewish funds for reasons not purely economic.

We are thus living to-day in a world divided into 'racial' and economic compartments, to a considerable degree watertight. The system is not confined to those countries which are highly developed and full of population. It includes certain countries with ample territory in need of development. Even

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 4, *Economic Self-sufficiency*, by A. G. Fisher.

in these countries, as a general rule, immigration is discouraged, with the object of maintaining 'racial' purity uncontaminated, or in the determination to avoid the possible formation of an alien minority or, in some cases, in the fear that admission of immigrants may affect the standard of life of the existing population.

Post-War Movements

During and immediately after the War there were four important racial refugee movements, which may now be regarded as definitely settled. They were those of the Armenians, the Greeks, the Bulgars, and the Turks. Of these the first three engaged the attention and benefited from the activity of the League of Nations, which in those early days of general support was peculiarly fitted to take charge of the international refugee problem.

Armenian Movement

Dr. Nansen was the first League High Commissioner in charge of refugee work, and though the principles adopted by the League itself confined its activities to political and juridical protection, and precluded any humanitarian effort, its agent, Dr. Nansen, considered himself bound by no such restrictions, and spent himself in the effort not only to provide juridical and political protection but also to relieve the sufferings of the unfortunate refugees in his charge. It was largely due to his efforts that many Armenians were settled in the Erivan Republic, and to those of himself and his successors that the hundred thousand remaining as homeless wanderers in Syria and the Lebanon have been

satisfactorily settled. No Armenian problem exists at the moment. A large number are finally settled in France, where the second generation is automatically naturalized. A smaller number are settled, though not with equal security, in Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania. Altogether in Europe and the Near East, excluding the Erivan Republic, there are some 215,000 Armenians who were refugees, but who may now be regarded as settled.

Greek Movement

From ancient times there had been a Greek element in Asia Minor, which grew and prospered under the Turkish régime, and provided the Sultanate with political and economic experts. During and after the Great War the sympathies of the Greeks of Asia Minor were with the Allies, and it was to be expected that the Nationalist Government of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, when victorious in the Graeco-Turkish war which ended with the sack of Smyrna in 1922, would demand the exclusion of the Greek population from Asia Minor. This was effected by the Convention of Lausanne in the following year.¹ It was agreed that the Greeks of Asia Minor should be exchanged for the Turks in Greece, and Greece was faced with the problem of provision for 1,300,000 new nationals, including those who migrated from Bulgaria, with which State a similar agreement was concluded. Settlement was effected by a Commission under the auspices and direction of the League of Nations. It could have been successful in no other way. The settlement was on the

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet, No. 9, *Turkey, Greece, and the Eastern Mediterranean*, by G. F. Hudson.

whole highly satisfactory, and the problem of the Greek refugee no longer exists. Indeed, the Greek population of refugee origin is an element of strength and of prosperity to the Greek State.

Bulgarian Movement

The experience of Bulgaria resembled that of Greece, though the number of refugees was much smaller. They numbered about a quarter of a million, and came not only in consequence of the exchange with Greece, but also from Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Turkey. In this case also settlement was under the auspices of the League, which appointed a Commissioner for the purpose. As in the case of the Greek settlement, the expense was met from an international loan, sponsored by the League of Nations.

Turkish Movement

The transfer of Turkish populations from outside into Turkey was also on a large scale, but was organized by the Turkish Government without assistance from the League. Some 400,000 came from Greek territory alone. The policy adopted by the Turkish Government contemplates the immigration to Turkey of all Turkish-speaking inhabitants in adjacent countries except Thrace, and that Government announced in June 1938 that the completion of the plan would mean that a million Turks from outside Turkey had been admitted and settled in the country.

Russian Movement

A further and very important movement of

refugees occurred after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 and the consequent civil wars in Russia. Opinions differ widely as to the numbers involved, but recent careful examination suggests that there were over a million so-called 'White' Russian refugees, but that previous estimates of two or even three millions were exaggerated. These refugees scattered all over the world. They were welcomed in the Slav States, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, and in Czechoslovakia. In these three countries they were treated with remarkable generosity. In Czechoslovakia President Masaryk and Dr. Beneš, both of whom had experienced the misfortunes of refugee status, adopted the policy known as *Action Russe*, under which Russian refugee professors, students, and agriculturists were invited to the country and maintained while there resident. Russian universities, secondary, high, and technical schools, and agricultural colleges were organized, and efforts made to raise the educational and technical standards of the refugees, in the expectation that the skill acquired would be useful on their return to Russia when conditions in that country became, as Dr. Masaryk was convinced they would become, more normal. In common with many other European statesmen he was under the mistaken impression that the Bolshevik experiment would prove to be a temporary interlude in Russian history.

France also received and still affords asylum to a very large number of Russian refugees, who are gradually becoming assimilated. There is, however, scarcely a civilized country in the world where Russian refugees cannot be found. In most coun-

tries they are gradually becoming absorbed, but there is one group, that in the Far East, in China and Manchukuo, whose present condition is precarious and whose future uncertain. Absorption in the native population is impossible. Assimilation with the foreign population resident in the large towns was in progress until the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and of China. Under the policy adopted by the Japanese the Russian refugee has no prospects, and the only remedy for the unsatisfactory conditions under which he suffers is that he should be transferred to some other country which offers security and opportunity to the refugee to earn his living. Some ninety thousand persons are affected in this group.

The League and the Refugees

The connexion of the League of Nations with refugee questions began with the appointment of Dr. Nansen as High Commissioner for Russian refugees in September 1921. He was allowed much liberty of action, subject always to the consideration that the League should not be involved in expense. His duties were to define the status of refugees, to secure their repatriation or their employment outside Russia, and to co-ordinate measures for their assistance. The sole financial assistance given by the League in the year 1922 was a grant of £4,000 for the administrative expenses of the central office. The League was fortunate in its High Commissioner. The story is too long for record in this pamphlet, but has been told at length elsewhere. Dr. Nansen began with the dispersion of the Russian

refugees from Constantinople, where in 1922 there were 35,000, though the city was already congested by the presence of 75,000 Turkish and 155,000 Greek refugees, and the object was achieved at incredibly low cost. The care of other refugees in the Near East, Armenian, Greek, Bulgar, was added to Dr. Nansen's duties in 1922 and 1923.

The Nansen Passport

One of the initial difficulties which confronted Dr. Nansen was the fact that the refugees had no passports or other valid documents to establish nationality and so to facilitate travel. Indeed, the mass of the Russian refugees were stateless people, as were the Armenian refugees. One of his first tasks was therefore to create a system of identity documents which might serve the purpose of a passport, and at a conference in July 1922 he secured the agreement of fifty-one nations to the adoption and recognition of the identity certificate known as the Nansen passport, the first international certificate of the kind ever issued.

Conventions of 1933 and 1938

An ordinary traveller, provided with passport and visa, is entitled to the services of representatives of his government in those foreign countries which he may visit. He is also entitled to the benefit of legal protection by the courts and the police of those countries. These privileges arise out of his status as a national of his country of origin. The stateless refugee can claim none of these privileges, and the next duty of the League's High Commissioner was

to induce governments to accord to refugees present in their territory at least some of the more important advantages of this kind enjoyed by the ordinary traveller, or by the foreign resident in their country. This object was attained. After a series of Agreements, a Convention was concluded at Geneva in 1933, and accepted by nine States, which conferred on stateless refugees under the protection of the League of Nations certain elementary civil rights enjoyed by ordinary foreign nationals travelling or resident in their territories. The importance of this document lies in its character. It is a formal treaty, and should the League of Nations disappear and with it the political and juridical protection of those classes of refugee with which it deals, the rights of the refugees secured by the Convention would persist. A similar Convention, to which seven governments have acceded, was concluded in 1938 in favour of refugees coming from Germany.

Importance of League Protection

Although the League has consistently disclaimed any responsibility for humanitarian work among refugees, its protection and interest have been of the first importance. The action of the League of Nations in connexion with the settlement of Greek and Bulgarian refugees has already been noted. Had it not been for the support of the League, the funds necessary for those settlements could not have been raised. Nor is it conceivable that the Greek and Bulgarian Governments would have accepted arrangements which in fact amounted to the creation of autonomous bodies within their

States, with powers in practice autocratic, had these bodies not been subordinate to a powerful international organization of which Greece and Bulgaria were themselves members.

The High Commissioner

Under the control of the League of Nations the High Commissioner has his representatives in many countries where refugees have settled temporarily or permanently, and though they have no official position, except in France, they are of great help to the refugee in his dealings with the officials of the Government. The High Commissioner himself is in a position to negotiate with and to influence the policy of governments, and the Conventions of 1933 and 1938 must be attributed to the President of the Nansen International Office (the successor of Dr. Nansen), and to the League High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany respectively.

The office of the High Commissioner for Refugees coming from Germany was created in 1933, when the rise of Nazi power resulted in the flight of oppressed Jews and political opponents of the régime of that country. At that time Germany was a member of the League, and it was feared that if the protection of German refugees was committed to the President of the Nansen International Office, whose expenses were met from the League budget to which Germany herself contributed, antagonism would result. A compromise was therefore effected by the appointment of a High Commissioner, the expenses of whose office should be defrayed entirely

from private or other sources, no contribution being made by the League. It was also laid down that the High Commissioner should report, not to the Council of the League, but to his own Governing Body. Germany subsequently resigned from the League, and from 1 January 1939 the offices of President of the Nansen International Office and of High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany were combined in one office, that of High Commissioner for Refugees, to which Sir Herbert Emerson was appointed. Its head-quarters are in London.

Limitation of League Protection

It should always be remembered that the League of Nations deals, not with all refugees, but with certain classes only. The Russians, Armenians, Assyrians, and Saarlanders are under its protection, as also are refugees originating from Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia. The League, however, affords no protection to Italian, Spanish, or Portuguese refugees, nor does it deal with refugees from Abyssinia, or Chinese refugees in or from China. Frequent attempts have been made to interest the League in refugees as such, irrespective of origin, but these efforts have been unsuccessful.

The Intergovernmental Committee

There is another international organization which is interested in refugees from Greater Germany and Czechoslovakia. In July 1938 President Roosevelt called together a Conference at Evian to consider the problem of these refugees from central Europe. The meeting was attended by representa-

tives of thirty-one governments, and it resulted in the constitution of a permanent Intergovernmental Committee with head-quarters in London. This Committee appointed a 'director of authority', whose duties were described as follows: 'he shall undertake negotiations to improve the present conditions of exodus and to replace them by conditions of orderly emigration. He shall approach the Governments of the countries of refuge and settlement with a view to developing opportunities for permanent settlement.' The first director was Mr. George Rublee of Washington. On his resignation Sir Herbert Emerson, League High Commissioner, was appointed director. The liaison between the work of the League and that of the Intergovernmental Committee in connexion with refugees from central Europe is thus complete.

The Central European Movement

The story of the persecution of the Jew and of the so-called 'non-Aryan' in Germany, Austria, and Czechoslovakia since its annexation is one of the saddest pages of history. The theory of 'racial' purity was one of the planks of the National-Socialist party even before the assumption of power by Adolf Hitler in January 1933, and the application of the principle implied the elimination of the Jewish element in the population of the Reich. This elimination was effected in part by the application of legal provisions, in part by administrative action, even where such action was not in accordance with any formal law or decree of the Government. The Jew or 'non-Aryan' had in such cases no remedy,

for the Courts in practice refused to extend their protection to a Jew whose opponent did not suffer from 'racial' disability.

The original laws which aimed at the elimination of the Jew were extraordinarily harsh, and later laws have become progressively more severe. The first decree issued under the Reich Nationality Law in 1935 disfranchised those defined as Jews, who included all persons with three, and the large majority of those with two, Jewish grandparents. They were debarred from being officials, State lawyers, or doctors; they were excluded from professional participation in literature, the stage, the cinema, broadcasting, music, or painting; they were not permitted to render labour or military service. The Law for the Protection of German Blood, passed the same year, invaded the domestic sphere and limited the classes with whom persons with varying proportion of Jewish blood might intermarry. Later decrees intensified the persecution. Jews were banned from universities and schools, and a campaign against the Jew in industry and trade began in 1935 which resulted in the ultimate elimination of all Jewish concerns, Jews being driven out of one business after another. Even licences for petty trading were withdrawn in 1937 and a successful campaign for the suppression of 'non-Aryan' banking and stockbroking businesses was in progress. To-day Jewish participation in commerce and industry has disappeared. By the spring of this year (1939) the liquidation of Jewish business was complete, and out of 402,000 Jews still remaining in Greater Germany, excluding the Sudetenland, only

5,500 had the right to employment and only 3,280 were actually employed.

Objects of Nazi Policy

The deliberate and expressed object of Nazi policy in regard to Jews and 'non-Aryans' is to render life in Germany impossible for them and to compel them to emigrate. The withdrawal of means of livelihood has been accompanied by persecution and humiliation of every kind, not even children being exempted from maltreatment. There is no need here to record details which have been published not only in the daily press but in numerous more permanent publications. Maltreatment culminated in the savage and disgraceful pogrom of November 1938, which followed the assassination of vom Rath, a member of the German diplomatic staff at Paris, by a Polish Jew. In revenge for that crime the Reich Government imposed a fine of a milliard marks on the innocent Jewish community of Germany. Confiscation of Jewish property by various methods had been one of the items of policy from the start. It culminated in this unjustifiable imposition. Every possible step had been taken to attain the object of Nazi policy. The means of livelihood and accumulated resources of the Jews had been taken from them. The amenities of cultural and social life had been withdrawn, and no alternative remained for the Jew save to escape from Germany as best he could.

Jewish Plan of Emigration

Flight of refugees from Germany began in 1933 and continues to-day. In the earlier years the Jew-

ish organizations succeeded in controlling the emigration to some extent, so that at any given time the number of refugees in countries of temporary refuge who awaited permanent settlement elsewhere were only some 30,000. They had also formulated a plan contemplating methodical emigration of about 25,000 Jews each year, and had arranged to finance a movement of that size. This would have removed from Germany within a limited period all those fit for settlement in new environments. The plan was upset by the annexation of Austria in March 1938. The ferocity of the consequent persecution caused a grave and sudden increase of efforts to escape and thus placed heavy additional burdens on Jewish charity and dislocated the financial arrangements for the execution of the plan. The number of illegal entrants into adjacent countries increased largely and that of refugees in countries of temporary refuge rose from 30,000 to over 100,000, notwithstanding closure of frontiers and stringent measures to prevent entry. This action was inevitable, but meant cruel suffering for those turned back into Germany.

In October 1938 came the annexation of Sudetenland, followed in March 1939 by the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Both the size and the area of the problem were thus again increased. Several thousand refugees from Germany who had escaped into Czechoslovakia were added to the number of those whose safety could only be secured by flight. In addition there were many thousands both of Germans and of Czechs who had been loyal subjects of the Czechoslovak Government in its resistance to pressure from the Government of the Reich who

were marked men and whose only safety lay in escape from the country. The local Jewish community in Sudetenland also was subjected to that persecution from which their fellows in Germany had suffered for more than five years.

Numbers

In a recent broadcast Sir Herbert Emerson, League High Commissioner for Refugees, stated that, between 1933 and the end of 1938, refugees who had left Germany and Austria numbered 350,000. He continued: 'Even so, in February of this year there were still 600,000 persons who came within the Nuremberg laws and of these 400,000 will have to be evacuated. They are not all Jews by religion. On the contrary, about one-third of them are Christians. If there is serious persecution of the Jews in Bohemia, Moravia, and Slovakia, the total number to be dealt with will be more than three-quarters of a million.' This may be taken as the most authoritative statement of the size of the 'racial' problem. There must, however, be added those groups, whose numbers are unknown, which are bound to leave Nazi territory for political or for religious reasons. It is true that both the political leaders and the Churches discourage emigration, on the ground that the existence of any strong current might lead to intensified persecution of those who remain behind, and it is remarkable how small is the number of political refugees, considering the strength of the Social Democratic Party and of the Trade Unions before the Nazi revolution of 1933. Refugees on religious grounds are becoming more

numerous, and a recent letter from the Vatican estimated the number of Catholics (chiefly it is true 'non-Aryans') who must leave Greater Germany as 200,000.

Method of Emigration

Jewish organizations and, to a smaller extent, Christian organizations have been active in promoting emigration of refugees to countries of final settlement, chiefly by the method of infiltration. The countries which have been most willing to receive refugees have been the United States of America, Palestine, the Argentine Republic, Brazil, and China. With the exception of the United States, where immigration is regulated by a quota, and of China, the countries of immigration have now taken measures to reduce admission of refugees. No country is likely to welcome alien immigrants who have been deprived of all their property and are turned out into the world as paupers. It is indeed remarkable that openings have been found in foreign countries for over 150,000 under the conditions in which emigration is now permitted.

Palestine is a particular case. The reason for restriction of immigration there is political rather than economic, and the quota at the present time is largely, if not entirely, filled by illegal immigrants, forwarded by organizations which specialize in illicit entry. This fact increases the difficulties of the Zionist authorities, who have large numbers of trained pioneers waiting for entry, but whose admission is prevented by the traffic in illicit immigrants.

China also is a particular case. Some ten thousand

Jewish refugees from central Europe have sought asylum in the Treaty Ports, the large majority in Shanghai. They are dependent on charitable assistance and have imposed an intolerable burden on local Jewish philanthropy. Their future is exceedingly unpromising.

Australia is taking 5,000 selected refugees each year for three years. Canada has agreed to admit about 400 families from Czechoslovakia. These are agriculturists and artisans and will be settled on the Peace River with financial assistance from the sum of £4 millions which was given to the Czechoslovak Government by Great Britain as a free gift.

Countries of Temporary Refuge

The process of selection and of obtaining permission to admit a refugee to a country of settlement is long and difficult. In view of the urgency to remove refugees from Germany, where conditions have become quite intolerable, several countries, including Great Britain, afford temporary asylum to a limited number, on condition that the refugees admitted shall ultimately emigrate overseas. France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, and Great Britain are the chief countries of temporary refuge, and to a smaller degree Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. Spain, which was an important country of refuge, has ceased to act in that capacity. No official statistics of admission are published, but it is certain that the total of those who have escaped to these countries far exceeds 100,000. In Great Britain, as in some other countries, a refugee is admitted only if guarantees are provided against

him becoming a charge on public funds and that finance for his ultimate emigration will be forthcoming when required. A further general condition prevents acceptance of employment, paid or unpaid, by the refugee while resident in the country. Until recent months immigration was selective and individual. Since the November pogrom a system has been introduced under which children can be admitted on a block visa for a specified number, and some 7,000 children have been or are being admitted in this way. A similar method has been employed for the immigration of a total of 3,500 men, who are guaranteed by Jewish organizations and are housed in camp at Richborough.

New Nazi Plan for Jews

A decree was announced in Berlin on 6 July which to some extent changes the position of the Jew in Germany. Its object is to encourage emigration. A 'Reich Jewish Association' has been formed, to which every Jew in Germany must adhere, and which replaces every existing organization dealing with Jewish education and welfare. The Association is entrusted with the provision of schools, universities, and polytechnics, if these are necessary to facilitate emigration. Compulsory attendance of all Jewish children at these schools is decreed. The Association is also responsible for welfare work and for preventing Jews becoming a public charge.

The object of the Association is not to make life easier for Jews in Germany but to facilitate their emigration. As is reported in *The Times* of 7 July, 'it is pointed out that the Jews themselves must

establish, from the current income of the Association and from the special sums which they will receive upon the emigration of Jews, an office which shall be sufficient at all times to support Jews in Germany with Jewish money, and to enable poor Jews to emigrate'.

Recent information from Germany indicates that the position of the Jew has been relieved in certain respects. Between 4,000 and 5,000 young Jews have obtained work on the roads and fortifications, and a number of Jewish doctors and surgeons are being retained in the country, so that they may form a medical reserve in case of war. They are permitted to practise among Jews only. But the principles of National Socialism are unchanged. To quote again from *The Times* of 7 July: 'The aim of National Socialism remains that of removing every single Jew from the Reich.'

Italian Refugees

Refugees from Italy are purely political and the mass is found in France. They do not constitute a grave international problem, as do the refugees from central Europe. Including dependants they probably number between 30,000 and 40,000. As there are some 900,000 Italians in France, the political refugee from Italy is certain to meet friends and will probably find relatives, and experiences little difficulty in maintaining himself and his family.

The League of Nations provides no political or juridical protection for these refugees. They have asked for such protection on several occasions, but without success.

Spanish Refugees

The end of the Civil War in Spain resulted in a flood of refugees into France, in number in excess of 400,000. The French Government organized camps for their reception. At the beginning there was naturally much confusion, and conditions, especially sanitary conditions, were in places unsatisfactory. The organization, which is costing France millions of francs a day, now works smoothly. The great majority of the refugees will probably be repatriated, and repatriation has begun, but is proceeding very slowly. There will be a residue, estimated at 40,000, who believe that their lives would be in danger were they to return to a Nationalist Spain, and for them some arrangement must be made. About one thousand have already emigrated to Chile and some hundreds to Mexico and other countries, and it is expected that Mexico will provide asylum for the bulk of the remainder of this group.

France has shown great liberality in her treatment of refugees generally. She has maintained the legal right of asylum for those suffering from religious and political persecution, and reaffirmed the principle in a decree of 2 May 1938. The reception of Spanish refugee children was organized by the Confédération Générale de Travail, and their treatment was quite remarkable. Very large numbers were temporarily adopted and maintained by households of the working class, and the Trade Unions made arrangements for technical education and apprenticeship for the elder boys.

By her geographical position France has been

particularly liable to influxes of refugees. She now has over 600,000 from various countries within her borders, and it is unjust that the financial and organizational liability for their maintenance should fall entirely on France as it does at present.

Chinese Refugees

The invasion of China by Japan and the occupation of large areas of the country have resulted in colossal movements of refugees. The population of the occupied territory is moving and has moved by the million, and it is reported that not less than twelve million refugees have entered the three western Provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechuan alone. The sufferings attendant on a trek of this magnitude have been indescribable. The Chinese National Government has done all in its power to relieve suffering and to provide means of settlement in the undeveloped but fertile western territories, and is reported to have spent one thousand million dollars in relief and settlement expenditure. Much help has also been received from the charitable of many nations and notably from the Chinese resident outside China, but the movement has been so stupendous that no imaginable sum would be adequate to finance it.

Industries, schools, and universities have taken part in this great migration, and the one redeeming feature is found in the certainty that, with the rapid improvement of means of communication which is in progress, and the consequent development of a rich area which has hitherto lain fallow, the future of those great Provinces is assured. It

may well be that the cultural, industrial, and political centre of China has moved permanently from her Eastern to her Western Provinces.

Refugee Movements a Political Problem

The civilized world is to-day faced with refugee movements which constitute for all civilized countries a major political problem. It is too late to use the argument that the treatment of the Jew in Germany is Germany's affair; that argument has been used by official spokesmen of the National-Socialist State, even while the Government of that State was taking action which forced the refugee to enter a neighbouring country, and there presented that country with a political problem. The fact that it is a political problem which concerns civilized governments was recognized by those governments when they accepted President Roosevelt's invitation to take part in the Evian deliberations. The problem has been created, in so far as the central European refugees are concerned, by the medieval policy adopted by the government of Adolf Hitler. Its solution has been rendered exceedingly difficult by the prevalent 'racial' and economic nationalism for whose existence all governments are responsible.

Responsibility of Governments

The large majority of civilized governments have accepted a measure of responsibility for solution of the problem by participation in the Evian Committee and the Intergovernmental Committee which followed it. They have, however, made little headway in devising and undertaking

measures for its solution. They have adopted one principle which effectively prevents drastic or complete measures for solution, in that the finance necessary for relief and for settlement has hitherto been regarded as an obligation on the private organizations. Enormous sums have been subscribed for these objects. On 5 July the Earl of Lytton stated in the House of Lords that altogether, in a few years, £5,000,000 had been raised through private charity in this country. This money has already been spent or earmarked. Perhaps 200,000 refugees have been settled, and among them those who succeeded in escaping in early years, when they were able to bring out some of their capital with them. According to Sir Herbert Emerson there are still at least 400,000 who must be evacuated, and the number may prove to be three-quarters of a million. In addition there are well over 100,000 in countries of 'temporary refuge'. It is clear that the problem is of such magnitude as to be entirely outside the financial capacity of the private organization, however liberally supported by private charity. Nor can it be expected that private charity will continue to provide sums so considerable as those raised by special effort in the past few years. It is clear that the first requisite towards a solution of the problem is recognition by governments that they must provide the major portion of its cost.

Methods of Settlement

Solution of the problem implies that the refugee shall be settled in a country of permanent refuge. Whether this is effected by infiltration or by mass

settlement, it inevitably takes time. The immediate urgency is to get the refugee out of the country, where he is subject to maltreatment and consequent demoralization, and to remove him as soon as possible. Existing methods are inadequate for the purpose. This fact has been recognized both in Great Britain and in Holland, and the system of block visas has been used in certain particular cases. This system should be extended, and entry rendered less difficult. Adequate provision of this kind would remove the conditions which now compel the refugee to resort to illegal entry. But such an extension will demand the provision of camps of refuge for those admitted, of the type already working at Richborough. The cost of provision of the camps and of the maintenance of the refugees in them would inevitably be a public charge, for private charity is insufficient to meet that cost.

In the Intergovernmental Committee the machinery exists for international agreement as to the numbers which each country would take for temporary refuge. That Committee is in diplomatic relations with the Nazi Government, and could make efforts to secure more reasonable treatment of the undesired population remaining in Germany in return for arrangements ensuring more rapid emigration.

Hitherto the common method of settlement was by infiltration. This was adequate and desirable when the problem was limited to the refugee from Germany proper. It has the advantage that it facilitates assimilation. Though this method will

doubtless continue, it is no longer adequate. The numbers affected have become so large that the solution by settlement by infiltration requires in addition settlement by groups. This fact has been recognized, and the investigation of the possibilities of British Guiana, of San Domingo, and of Mindanao (Philippines) has been undertaken. The settlement of refugees from Czechoslovakia on the Peace River in Canada has already been mentioned.

Mass settlement requires not only an area in which to settle, but expert supervision of settlement and preliminary training of the settler. The experience of Jewish settlement in Palestine has established that success can be commanded, even in an area apparently unsuitable, if care is taken to fulfil these conditions. It also demands adequate finance, which in the case of the refugees from central Europe implies at least a guarantee by governments.



Immigration and Population

There are several Western European countries where the trend of population statistics is causing anxiety. In London, for example, on 7 July there was a meeting of headmasters of public schools to consider the problem caused by the decrease in the number of boys of school-going age, and it is notorious that the school population is decreasing. In France again the position is even more acute. Under these circumstances the attitude of these and of other countries, whose position is very similar, in refusing to consider themselves as countries of ultimate settlement of selected refugees is un-

intelligible. It would be sound policy to accept as many children as possible with the deliberate intention of bringing them up and educating them and ultimately naturalizing them citizens of the country which adopts them, to fill to some extent the gap caused by the diminishing birth-rate. It is difficult to understand a policy which admits refugee children, provides the necessary expense for their education, and demands that the finished product should be exported at the age of eighteen. There is no recorded case of a country which suffered by the assimilation of a refugee immigrant population. To take one example, the welcome extended by France to Russian and Armenian refugees has been repaid by the work done by them in the heavy industries.

Conclusion

Private charity has responded nobly to the humanitarian claims presented by the refugee problem of the last few years. There is still ample scope for private effort. But the essence of the problem is political, and private effort is impotent conclusively to deal with it. The problem requires the active consideration of governments. Unless governments are prepared to regard it as a major political disturbance, whose reactions affect the well-being of each civilized state and of the comity of civilized nations, no radical solution can be expected, and the private energy displayed will largely be wasted.





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BUCHAREST

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS
No. 14

THE TREATY OF
BREST-LITOVSK
AND GERMANY'S
EASTERN POLICY

BY
JOHN W. WHEELER-BENNETT

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EARLY in 1918 Germany and her allies, having defeated Russia and Rumania, concluded the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and of Bucharest. These Treaties were annulled when the Central Powers were defeated by the Allies later in the year, but they are of great importance, firstly, as examples of Peace Treaties drawn up by a victorious Germany (in which connexion it is instructive to compare them with the Treaty of Versailles); secondly, for the light they throw on Germany's policy in Eastern Europe to-day.

Mr. Wheeler-Bennett is the author of *Brest-Litovsk: The Forgotten Peace* (Macmillan, 21s. net), the standard work on the subject.

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THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK AND GERMANY'S EASTERN POLICY

The Forgotten Peace

LITTLE more than twenty-one years ago—on 3 March 1918—the first treaty of peace between belligerent parties in the World War was signed by the Central Powers and Russia at Brest-Litovsk. Few then appreciated the full significance of the event. At the moment it appeared to mark the complete victory of German arms on the Eastern Front, and, for Russia, the greatest humiliation in her diplomatic and military history. But though these results were of grave importance in themselves, the more far-reaching effects of the treaty could not be guessed at. In retrospect, however, it is possible to say that, with the exception of the Treaty of Versailles, the Peace Treaties of Brest-Litovsk with Russia and the Ukraine and the complementary Treaty of Bucharest with Rumania had consequences and results more important than any other peace settlement since the Congress of Vienna.

The Conference at Brest-Litovsk

The long-expected Revolution had broken out in Russia in March 1917 with the slogan of 'Peace, Bread, and Land', and the German High Command had added its contribution to chaos by allowing Lenin and his followers to return from Switzerland to Petrograd in the famous 'sealed train'. As a result,

the political complexion of the Revolution changed rapidly from 'parlour pink' to scarlet; the Liberal government of Prince Lvov gave place to the Socialist régime of Alexander Kerensky; and he in turn was ousted by the Bolsheviks at the Second Revolution of November 1917.

The final Russian offensive of July 1917 had collapsed after the close of its early momentum, and the counter-thrust of the enemy had carried the German armies to Dvinsk and Riga. The Russian soldier, exhausted and war-weary, had 'voted for peace with his legs', in Lenin's phrase.

Capitalizing the deep-felt longing of the Russian masses for peace, Lenin at once declared a cessation of hostilities, and thus it came about that, after some vicissitudes and the murder of the Russian Chief of the General Staff, there sat down on 20 December at the Brest-Litovsk head-quarters of Prince Leopold of Bavaria one of the strangest gatherings in the history of modern diplomacy. Fate had decreed that the representatives of the most revolutionary régime ever known should sit at the same table with the representatives of the most reactionary military caste among the then ruling classes, that a Bavarian nobleman, a Knight of the Golden Fleece, and a Prussian major-general should negotiate on equal terms with a group of Bolshevik leaders but lately returned from exile, and from whose clothes the reek of dungeons had barely been banished.

The two groups were as widely separated in ideology as in social standing. The representatives

of the Central Powers spoke the ancient language of diplomacy. They thought in terms of strategic lines, of provinces ceded, of economic advantages to be gained. Not so the Bolsheviks. Their parlance was not one of frontiers and concessions; they were not concerned with geographical expressions. They aimed by propaganda upon war-weary European Socialism to achieve what they knew could not be achieved by arms, namely World Revolution and the replacement of military imperialism by the dictatorship of the proletariat. They were prepared to abandon whole provinces to the victors if by so doing they could arouse the working classes of the Central Powers to a realization of the evils of military dictatorship. He is no Socialist, wrote Lenin in his open letter to the American working men in 1918, who will not sacrifice his fatherland for the triumph of the social revolution.

German Aims

So fundamental a difference in approach necessarily resulted in equally different techniques in negotiation. For both parties the time factor was vital. For Germany it was essential to concentrate all available troops on the Western Front as soon as possible in order to ensure the success of the spring offensive against the Allies on which the High Command had staked their all. Hindenburg and Ludendorff therefore demanded a speedy conclusion of the negotiations. Russia was at the mercy of Germany, they urged; no further resistance was

possible; and a victor's peace should crown a victor's war. Here at last was a chance to extend the frontiers of Germany to include the Russian provinces of Courland, Livonia, and Estonia, where both the aristocracy of the Baltic Barons and the middle class were largely of German origin, and also Lithuania. There opened before their eyes, too, the opportunity to exploit the rich black soil of the Ukraine, whence grain could be exported to feed the army and population of Germany, brought near starvation by the Allied blockade. A dream of reducing the former Russian Empire to a series of partitioned States, each dependent upon Germany as economic and political protectorates, began to take hold upon the imagination of the General Staff. But in any case speed was the essence of the contract. If the Bolsheviks would not immediately accept the terms offered by the Central Powers, then the offensive must be resumed and peace dictated at Petrograd instead of Brest-Litovsk.

The Imperial German Government, and in particular the Foreign Secretary, Baron Richard von Kühlmann, opposed this policy because of its crudeness and because, with greater political sagacity, they did not share the illusions of the General Staff. Even at that date Kühlmann doubted the possibility of a complete victory in the field for German arms. A negotiated peace was the best that could be hoped. Like the generals, he was anxious to obtain as great territorial gains as possible in the East, but only in order to hold them as bargaining factors when negotiations for a general peace finally became a possi-

bility. He hoped to avoid making territorial sacrifices in the West by displaying a readiness to surrender conquered territory in the East. Moreover, he was anxious to arrive at a settlement with the Russians peacefully in order to facilitate the course of future negotiations with the other Allied and Associated Powers. To this end the Central Powers accepted the formula of 'no annexations, no indemnities and the principle of self-determination' which the Bolsheviks put forward as the basis for negotiation of a general peace by all belligerent parties. When, however, it became evident that the remainder of the Entente Powers would not accept the invitation to Brest-Litovsk and that, as the Germans had always supposed, the Bolsheviks had to negotiate alone, the Central Powers flung off the mask of 'no annexations, &c.', and, under pressure from the German High Command, pursued a policy of unrelieved imperialism.

Russian Aims

But, while the German generals demanded a speedy show-down, the Bolsheviks desired exactly the opposite. The longer the negotiations were drawn out the greater the opportunity for propaganda. If the workers and peasants in the countries both of the Entente and the Central Powers were to realize fully what had happened in Russia and were to conceive a desire for emulation, a certain interval was necessary during which the intentions and policy of the new Soviet State might become known. To the vast annoyance of the German General Staff,

the Bolsheviks were successful in imposing their policy of procrastination on the peace discussions. First Joffe and later Trotsky carried out delaying tactics with masterly skill, and for six weeks the conference was little more than a debating society. Trotsky discovered in Kühlmann an adversary who was his equal in dialectics, and the two indulged in what the irate Czernin later described as 'spiritual wrestling matches'. The German Secretary of State was trying to persuade his opponent to accept the fate of the occupied Baltic Provinces, as already settled. Trotsky maintained with a wealth of verbiage that their so-called 'self-expressed desire' for union with Germany was nothing but a veiled militarist annexation. As neither would abandon his viewpoint a complete deadlock ensued, and remained unbroken despite the protests of the representative of the Supreme Command, General Hoffmann, and the pleadings of the Austrian Foreign Minister, Count Czernin, who was aware that the sands of life for the Dual Monarchy were running out. The Supreme Command wanted troops and Austria-Hungary needed bread: as long as Kühlmann and Trotsky remained locked in rhetorical combat, neither was forthcoming.

The Conference breaks up

10 February 1918 saw the end. On the previous day the Central Powers had signed a separate treaty of peace with the Ukraine, which had proclaimed its independence from Russia under a form of social democratic government. The agreement provided

for the exportation to Germany and Austria-Hungary of a million tons of foodstuffs and placed the newly created State under the virtual 'protection' of the Central Powers.

Outflanked from the south, and disappointed that the toiling masses in Europe had failed to respond to the glowing prospect of a proletarian paradise portrayed for them in an endless flood of propagandist word-pictures, the Russians were forced to abandon their policy of delay. The January strikes in Germany and Austria had momentarily encouraged Bolshevik hopes, but they had proved a false dawn. The Bolsheviks needed to be able to concentrate their full energies at home to consolidate the Revolution and to defend it against the counter-revolutionary forces of the Right and Centre, now organizing in the north, south, and east. New tactics were necessary. On 10 February, then, Trotsky made his historic gesture of 'No War—No Peace'. He refused to accept the German terms but declared the state of war at an end, and retired to Petrograd in belief that the Central Powers were so anxious for peace that they would accept the position despite its anomalies.

This gesture, dramatic and original though it was, had merely the effect of handing the game to the Supreme Command. Against the vehement protests of Kühlmann and Czernin and the weaker opposition of Chancellor von Hertling, Hindenburg and Ludendorff forced the Kaiser to agree to a resumption of hostilities. A rapid advance conducted by Hoffmann brought the German troops to within

raiding distance of Petrograd. The remnant of the Russian army, already undermined in discipline and morale by subversive propaganda, broke 'like thin clouds before a Biscay gale'. There was virtually no resistance. If the Revolution was to be saved, a 'breathing space' was essential. After a bitter internal struggle the Bolsheviks sued for peace. The German reply was an ultimatum setting forth conditions, for the discussion of which three days were allowed, while the treaty once signed must be ratified within two weeks.

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk

With no other course open to them, the Bolsheviks accepted the inevitable, and on 3 March 1918 the Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed. This treaty, together with the supplementary agreements of the following August, required Russia to renounce sovereignty in favour of Germany and Austria-Hungary over Russian Poland, Lithuania, Courland, Livonia, Estonia, and the Islands of the Moon Sound. To Turkey she had to cede Ardahan, Kars, and Batum. In addition she was forced to recognize the independence of Finland, the Ukraine, and Georgia, and to agree to reparation payments to the amount of 6,000,000,000 marks in goods, bonds, and gold, on which she actually paid instalments totalling 120,000,000 gold rubles. Russia lost 34 per cent. of her population, 32 per cent. of her agricultural land, 85 per cent. of her beet-sugar land, 54 per cent. of her industrial undertakings, and 89 per cent. of her coal-mines. European

Russia was dismembered; she was cut off from the Black Sea and very nearly from the Baltic also.

Such was the result of negotiations originally undertaken on the basis of 'no annexations, no indemnities, and the principle of self-determination'. Such was the peace of which the *Nord-deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* could write: 'The significance of the treaty with Russia lies in the fact that the German Government has worked only for a peace of understanding and conciliation.'

The Settlement with Rumania

Having thus disposed of prostrate Russia the Central Powers turned their attention to her smaller ally to the south-west. The Russian collapse in 1917 had removed all hope of continued resistance by the Rumanian army, whose defences could now be very easily turned. The Government at Jassy and the High Command, therefore, entered into negotiations with Field Marshal von Mackensen which resulted in the conclusion of the armistice of Focani on 9 December 1917.

Kühlmann, Czernin, and Talaat Pasha had not returned to Brest-Litovsk after the rupture of negotiations by Trotsky on 10 February. After visiting their respective capitals they foregathered towards the end of the month with their Bulgarian colleague and the Rumanian representatives at Prince Stirbey's Castle of Buftea, and the preliminary negotiations began.

For Rumania peace at the hands of the Central Powers was only less painful than complete con-

quest. The alternative to the acceptance of a dictated treaty was obliteration from the map—complete partitionment between the States of the Quadruple Alliance. Austria-Hungary and Germany entertained a bitter hatred for this State which had abandoned her treaty of alliance with them,¹ and added to this was a scathing contempt for a defeated enemy, whilst Bulgaria nursed a long-cherished revenge for her own defeat at the hands of Rumania in 1913.²

The German Emperor and the German High Command favoured the deposition of the 'traitor' Hohenzollerns from the Rumanian throne, and the substitution of some loyal German Prince, but this was opposed both by Mackensen and Czernin on the grounds that it would constitute too great a blow to the monarchical principle. King Ferdinand was, however, forced to meet Czernin in Bucharest at the end of February and to hear such direct and outspoken reproaches as can seldom fall to the lot of any sovereign.

The Treaty of Buftea

The preliminaries of peace were signed at Buftea on 5 March 1918, and were in keeping with the tenor of negotiation set at Brest-Litovsk. Rumania

¹ The Treaty of Alliance between Austria-Hungary and Rumania, to which Germany acceded by special protocol, was signed on 30 October 1883. It had been renewed at regular intervals by King Charles of Rumania, most recently in 1913.

² Under the Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913), which concluded the Third Balkan War, Rumania had acquired, at the expense of Bulgaria, a strong strategic frontier in the Dobrudja.

was as incapable of resistance as Russia had been, and the terms were in accordance with her condition and with the bitterness of the hatred of the Central Powers.

The whole of the Dobrudja was ceded to the Quadruple Alliance for subsequent partition among themselves. Hungary received substantial territorial concessions along the whole length of the Carpathian border, which placed her in a dominant strategic position *vis-à-vis* Rumania. The Rumanian army was to be reduced to a bare skeleton, all enemy territory occupied by it was to be evacuated, and the transportation of Austro-Hungarian and German troops was to be facilitated through Moldavia and Bessarabia in their advance on the Ukraine. All officers of the Entente military missions were to be dismissed. In addition, Rumania accepted 'in principle' all economic measures considered 'adequate to the occasion'.

But the Treaty of Buftea was only a preliminary, and there followed eight weeks of subsequent negotiations during which the Rumanian Prime Minister, Marghiloman, tried desperately to obtain some mitigation of the terms. All in vain: when the Peace of Bucharest was finally signed on 7 May it was found to be even more Draconian than its predecessor.

The Peace of Bucharest

The Central Powers condemned Rumania to economic servitude and reduced her sovereignty to a farce. The whole line of the Carpathians went to

Hungary. The Dobrudja was divided between Bulgaria in the south and an Austro-German condominium in the north. Rumania was cut off from the sea, being merely conceded the use of Constanza as a free port. The Austrians took as a pledge the port of Turnu-Severin, and the Germans that of Giurgiu. Completely disregarding the international conventions regarding the freedom of transit and navigation on the Danube, the Central Powers and Rumania agreed that the river below Braila should be placed under a new commission consisting of only those States bordering on the Danube or on the European coast of the Black Sea, which in effect meant that the control of the whole river passed into the hands of the Teutonic Powers. Finally, the Rumanians were compelled to agree to work for years to feed Germany and her allies at fixed prices, and her oil-wells were leased to Germany for a term of ninety-nine years. An army of occupation was to be maintained in the country in order to enforce the terms of the treaty, and evacuation was only to take place 'at times later to be agreed upon'. One sole concession was made to Rumania. She was to receive a free hand in securing from Russia the province of Bessarabia.¹

¹ The Peace of Bucharest was finally ratified by both Germany and Rumania in July 1918. When, however, it became known that the abrogation of both it and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk would be a prerequisite demand by the Allies in granting a cessation of hostilities, the Rumanian Government again declared war on Germany a few hours before the signing of the Armistice on November 11, 1918. Rumania was thus able to come to the Peace Conference as one of the Allied and Associated Powers.

The all-embracing scope of the Peace of Bucharest is indicative of the powerful influence exercised by German industrialists and military leaders at that moment, and the voluminous treaties which constitute the whole agreement are, perhaps more even than those signed at Brest-Litovsk—since the Peace of Bucharest provided indirectly for enormous war indemnities—the most convincing evidence of what a victorious Germany would have been. Its negotiators, and particularly Baron Burian, successor to Czernin, professed to regard it as 'moderate and just' (*mässig und gerecht*), and the *Münchener Post* described it as 'a model of the peace to be imposed on all our enemies'. But its true interpretation was given by a German staff officer in reply to the protests of a Rumanian diplomatist. 'A *harsh* peace', he said. 'You call it a *harsh* peace? Just wait till you see what we are preparing for France and England.'¹

The Results and Significance of Brest-Litovsk

The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was a milestone in modern history. For Russia and for Germany it obviously had results of incalculable importance; but for the Allied and Associated Powers its significance also was very great. The course of world history was changed on 3 March 1918.

For the Bolsheviks, peace on the Eastern Front, even such a peace as that exacted by Germany,

¹ See R. W. Seton-Watson, *History of the Rumanians* (Cambridge, 1934), p. 518; A. Marghiloman, *Note Politice 1897-1924* (Bucharest, 1927), iii, p. 340.

spelled salvation. By a gigantic sacrifice Lenin had purchased a 'breathing spell' during which he might discipline his own followers, eliminate the remainder of the revolutionary-bourgeois parties, and organize the defence of the Soviet Power against the attack of the Whites. With the shattering of their early hopes of a widespread revolt by the European proletariat, the Bolsheviks began concentrating their energies on the consolidation of the revolution in Russia. They could do this effectively only after hostilities had ceased to engage their attention. Lenin's stern adherence to the policy of national immolation caused wide dissent among his followers, but it gained that modicum of time necessary for the organization of the Red Army on the ruins of the Tzarist military machine. At the time his sacrifices to some appeared quixotic and unduly pusillanimous, but their wisdom was displayed when the victory of Kazan over the counter-revolutionaries bore witness to the growth of the new Soviet military formations. Without the 'breathing spell' the Bolsheviks might—probably would—have perished at the hands of the advancing Germans, or of the White counter-revolutionary forces or by the intrigues of the Cadets and the Social-Revolutionaries of the Right and the Left. The world might then have never witnessed the vast experimentation of the victorious Soviet Power nor endured the attentions of the Third International. The potential 'ifs' of the question do not cease there; they extend in an unending and roscate vista into limbo, for if there

had been no Comintern, would not Fascism and National-Socialism have been deprived of their primary *raison d'être*? And, though the particular brand of extreme disgruntled nationalism which they represent might well have found some other outlet, it probably would not have manifested itself in the form of totalitarianism.

Thus Ludendorff was the involuntary saviour of Bolshevism for Europe. By the same reasoning he was the godfather of that National-Socialist movement which later he espoused; for if Adolf Hitler is the putative child of the Treaty of Versailles, he also is the offspring of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk.

German Hopes

For Germany both the issues and the results were more complicated than for Russia. Yet, in the case of Germany, the importance of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest was very great. At the outset it appeared as if the Supreme Command was on the eve of the realization of its wildest dreams. The psychological effect on the jaded civilian population close to starvation was to refresh its war enthusiasm and to rekindle the *Siegeswille* (will to victory) which had burned low in the dark days of 1917. And, indeed, the material achievements of the Supreme Command were very alluring. Within their grasp were the occupied provinces of the Baltic, ready to be erected into semi-independent States subject to German domination. Before them stretched the fertile lands of the Ukraine, whence grain and meat would be forth-

coming for hungry populations and horses for hard-pressed armies. The puppet government of the *Rada* was completely dependent upon German bayonets for its existence and could be—and ultimately was—overthrown by the pressing of a button to make way for an even more subservient successor. In addition, the treaties made by the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest gave them access to the oil-wells of Azerbaijan and Rumania.

The bulk of the fighting having been done by Germany, the lion's share of the spoils fell to her. Already she was the dominant party in the Quadruple Alliance; now her position was vastly strengthened, for she held nominal sway over the Ukraine and Rumania, while her influence extended through the Trans-Caucasus and to the farther boundaries of the Don Basin. The way lay open for an intensification of the anti-British activities then being carried on in Persia and Afghanistan and for the institution of subversive propaganda in British India. But the ambitions of the Supreme Command vaulted still higher. They embraced not only a string of satellite States along the Russian border, but a Russia surrounded by German dependencies and which in time would itself become, for all practical purposes, a German colony.

German Disappointments

But neither the possible nor the impossible ideas of the Supreme Command were destined to be fulfilled. The deliveries of food and grain from

the Ukraine fell far short of the promised million tons, and of these the greater part went to Austria-Hungary. The same was true of the expected oil and grain to be procured from Rumania. Attempts to obtain foodstuffs by force and against the will of the population failed utterly. Brest-Litovsk proved a will-o'-the-wisp, luring the Supreme Command ever farther and farther in pursuit. And the Supreme Command was an all-too-willing follower. The paranoia of Ludendorff had now become Napoleonic. The First Quartermaster-General saw himself, bathed in the sunlight of victory, creating and distributing kingdoms as had the Emperor of the French after the Peace of Tilsit. He kept a garrison in the Baltic States, where grand-ducal governments were in process of creation; an army of occupation was maintained in Rumania; an expeditionary force was dispatched to Finland to crush a Bolshevik rising; another expedition penetrated to Baku; a third occupied the Crimean ports, and the German colonies in the Crimea were urged to appeal to the Kaiser for annexation. Ludendorff's conception of *Deutschtum* ('Germandom') had become all-embracing. 'German prestige demands that we should hold a strong protective hand, not only over German citizens, but over all Germans,' he was writing at that moment (June 1918) to the Imperial Chancellor. In addition, the problems of the Polish Regency demanded constant care and supervision, and in the Ukraine the maintenance of a succession of unpopular régimes proved more of a liability than an asset.

A victor's peace must be enforced, and in enforcing the terms of the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest the Supreme Command lost sight of the primary object with which it had begun the negotiations. It had sought to free its hands in the East in order to concentrate its reserves of man power in the West. Yet a million men immobilized in the East was the price of German aggrandizement, and half that number might well have turned the scale in the early stages of the German offensive in France. According to both French and British military authorities, only a few cavalry divisions were necessary in March and April 1918 to widen the gap in the Allied line so that a general retreat would have been inevitable. These were not available to the Supreme Command on the Western Front; but at the moment three German cavalry divisions were held virtually idle in the Ukraine. Only in the late summer of 1918, when the German losses had attained fantastic figures, were troops transferred from the East. But they came a few at a time and too late. Ludendorff the Politician had defeated Ludendorff the General.

Nor was this all. The seed sown at Brest-Litovsk brought forth not only Dead Sea Apples but also poisoned fruits. Too late were the Germans to realize that they themselves were not immune to the virus which they had injected into the body politic in Russia. Through different channels the poison of Bolshevik propaganda flowed back into Germany. When Lenin had been sent across Europe in a 'sealed coach', it had not

been foreseen that a year later a Soviet Ambassador with full diplomatic privileges and immunities would be resident in Berlin, providing a rallying-point and source of monetary support for the revolutionary elements of extreme German Socialism. Though it is very greatly to be doubted that Lenin received any financial assistance from the German Government or Supreme Command on his return to Russia, it is an established fact that members of the *Spartacist* (Communist) Party and the Independent Socialist Party were provided with money from Joffe for revolutionary purposes, and when, in October Joffe was finally expelled for his activities, it was too late.

Apart from this official contact of the Soviet Government with the revolutionary elements in Berlin, there were thousands of unofficial emissaries who brought with them the seed of subversive propaganda. German prisoners of war had been subjected to the full force of Bolshevik wiles. They had seen the Russian army crumble away under its influence, and on their return to Germany they brought the new political plague. Added to these were the troops on the Eastern Front themselves, who, by the Armistice Agreement of Brest-Litovsk, had been permitted to fraternize with the Russians in no-man's-land and had received from them copies of the *Fackel* and other revolutionary material specially prepared for German consumption. Thus each division transferred from East to West brought infection with it. 'We reached the point', admitted Hoffman, 'where we did not dare to

transfer certain of our Eastern divisions to the West.'

Not only did the Peace of Brest-Litovsk save the Revolution in Russia, it also materially contributed to the outbreak of the Revolution in Germany; and such 'stabbing-in-the-back' as was done is attributable to the Supreme Command itself, for they had supplied the original daggers.

Significance of Brest-Litovsk for the Allies

To the Allied and Associated Powers the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest were of almost as great significance as to the contracting parties. The disclosure of the naked and brutal policy of annexation as practised by a victorious militarism proved a salutary deterrent to the activities of well-meaning but misguided pacifists in the countries of the Entente. These, discouraged by the dark days of 1917, had been preaching a 'peace of understanding'. The attitude of the German Supreme Command towards Russia, Rumania, and the Ukraine showed clearly what might be expected in the way of 'understanding' from the adherents of the *Machtpolitik*, and the effect on the peoples of Great Britain, France, Italy, and their smaller Allies, was a stiffening of the ranks, a locking of shields, a determination to fight on to the end and to destroy the militarist power in Germany. It was this renewed spirit of resistance which enabled the civilian population to remain calm in the face of the early disasters which followed the launching of the great German offensive on 21 March 1918, and to retain their confidence throughout that fearful spring and

early summer until the Allied counter-offensive on 18 July wrested the initiative from the German armies for the last time.

In addition to this psychological effect, the Peace of Brest-Litovsk had other unforeseen repercussions in the Allied camp. It was responsible for the arrival of Japanese troops for the third time in history upon the mainland of Asia. Terrified by the prospect of German penetration into Asiatic Russia, the British and French Governments, in direct opposition to the views of their advisers in Moscow and despite very great reluctance on the part of the United States, countenanced the dispatch to Siberia of an inter-Allied expeditionary force in which the Japanese contingent was much the largest numerically. Though the Allied and American troops were withdrawn soon after the conclusion of peace with Germany, the Japanese divisions were not evacuated until after the Washington Conference of 1922, and this period of occupation undoubtedly whetted the appetite of Nippon for further territorial acquisition in Asia.

The Effect in U.S.A.

In the United States the effect of the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest was even more apparent. During the first year of American participation in the War there had seemed to the Allies a certain lukewarmness in President Wilson's pursuit of his policies. 'War upon German imperialism, peace with German liberalism'—that had been the essence of his speeches since April 1917. The

emphasis had been laid on the profit which the liberal elements in Germany could acquire by divorcing themselves from the domination of the Supreme Command and accepting the terms which the President would persuade the Allies to offer. It was largely in this spirit that Mr. Wilson had enunciated his Fourteen Points in January 1918. In formulating that programme he had hoped, on the one hand, to encourage the Russians to refrain from making a separate peace; and, on the other, to divide the German people from their rulers.

The unsatisfactory reply of the German Government to the Fourteen Points, followed by the bare-faced brutality of the terms dictated at Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest and their ratification by the Reichstag almost without protest, convinced the President that there was but one Germany to be conquered, the Germany of the Supreme Command, and that the soundest political strategy was to reiterate again and again the impossibility of peace with the kind of government that had imposed the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest.

This change in policy, a change so vital that to it may be attributed in large measure the final and speedy victory of the Allied cause, was made public in President Wilson's speech at Baltimore on 16 April 1918, in which he frankly admitted his recent change of heart and new resoluteness of purpose:

'... I am ready ...', he declared, 'to discuss a fair and just and honest peace at any time that it is sincerely proposed—a peace in which the strong and the weak shall fare alike. But the answer, when I proposed such

a peace, came from the German commanders in Russia, and I cannot mistake the meaning of the answer. I accept the challenge. . . . Germany has once more said that force, and force alone, shall decide whether Justice and Peace shall reign in the affairs of men. . . . There is, therefore, but one response possible from us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint or limit, the righteous and triumphant Force which shall make Right the law of the world, and cast every selfish dominion down in the dust.'

This amounted to no less than a pledge of the last man and gun and dollar in America to the Allied cause. Unanimity between the United States and the nations of the Entente had at last been achieved and victory was assured, for once the American man-power was made available, there could be no doubt of the outcome. The artificer of this compact was Ludendorff and the background of its forging was Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. The German Supreme Command by its policy of aggrandizement had contributed to the Allied cause that final and essential degree of co-operation and oneness of purpose necessary for victory.

Indeed they did more, for they had for ever deprived themselves of the ability to use the Fourteen Points as a basis of negotiation. When the idea was suggested by Germany in the first Armistice Note of 4 October, it was met with a blank refusal on the part of the Allies ' . . . the pronouncements of President Wilson were a statement of attitude made before the Brest-Litovsk Treaty', ran an official British memorandum of that time. ' . . . They

cannot, therefore, be understood as a full recitation of the conditions of peace.' In the interpretation of the Fourteen Points which occurred during the pre-Armistice negotiations it was made clear that no vestige of Germany's conquests in the East could be retained by her. 'In any case the treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest must be cancelled as palpably fraudulent', stated the official commentary prepared by Colonel House's commission. 'Provision must be made for the withdrawal of all German troops in Russia.' And it was in accordance with this view that the treaties were abrogated in the Armistice Agreement of 11 November, and formally annulled by the Treaty of Versailles.¹

Significance of the 'Forgotten Peace' To-day

Such were the more immediate results of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, and such was their tremendously important influence on contemporary events. But their political implications are even more significant to-day, for they have a prominent place in the present ideological trends in Germany, where the practical application of the principles involved has become a potent factor in Nazi foreign policy.²

¹ See also Oxford Pamphlet No. 6, *The Fourteen Points and the Treaty of Versailles*, by G. M. Gathorne-Hardy. It was this attitude of the Allied and Associated Powers towards the dictated Peace of Brest-Litovsk which strongly influenced the German Social Democrats in finally accepting the dictated Peace of Versailles. They were persuaded that reaction against the harshness of the peace terms would inevitably occur in the Allied countries and that this would result in a revision of the Treaty.

² For the following pages see also Oxford Pamphlet No. 3 on *Mein Kampf*, by R. C. K. Ensor.

As early as 1920 the Weimar Republic, supported by the majority opinion on the German General Staff represented by General von Seeckt, sought to reach a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union, and largely succeeded in doing so by the Treaty of Rapallo, the German-Russian Non-Aggression Treaty, and the Military Agreement of 3 April 1922. There remained, however, a minority school of thought which followed in the Hoffmann tradition, regarding Bolshevism as the root of all evil and dreaming of the ultimate realization of those far-reaching plans for German expansion in Eastern Europe which so sadly eluded them after Brest-Litovsk.

Added to this are the very definite views which Adolf Hitler himself holds regarding the treaty and the legend about it which the National-Socialist Party has sedulously fostered, pointing the way to what is described as an attainable ideal. For the ideology which actuated the dictation of the treaty has not been replaced by any other set of ideas and is now accepted by a large part of the German people. The present German generation, the generation of Nazi Germany, regards the principles of Brest-Litovsk and the motives lying behind it as an actual political programme. None has been more eloquent in this view than the *Führer* himself, in his comparison of the Treaty with the Peace of Versailles. 'I placed the two Treaties side by side, compared them point by point, showed the positively boundless humanity of the one in contrast to the inhuman cruelty of the other', he wrote in

Mein Kampf. 'In those days I spoke on this subject before audiences of 2,000 at which I was often exposed to the gaze of 3,600 hostile eyes. And three hours later I had before me a surging mass filled with righteous indignation and boundless wrath.' With this as a pointer it is not surprising to find Hitler stating somewhat later in his work: 'We [the National Socialists] stop the perpetual German migration towards the South and West of Europe and fix our gaze on the land in the East. . . . When we talk of new lands in Europe, we are bound to think first of Russia and her border states.' And again: 'We must not forget that the international Jew, who continues to dominate over Russia, does not regard Germany as an ally, but as a state destined to undergo a similar fate. The menace which Russia suffered under is one which perpetually hangs over Germany; Germany is the next great objective of Bolshevism.'

Here, then, is combined in one political philosophy the doctrines of pre-War Pan-Germanism, all-pervading hatred of the Jew and the ideological opposition to Bolshevism; and the only means by which this philosophy may be given practical application is through a reversion to the German psychology of Brest-Litovsk. It is not unimportant that political writers of 1917 talked as freely of German equality (*Gleichberechtigung*) as do the Nazi pundits to-day, but they were even more frank in their interpretation of it. 'The issue between us and England constitutes not so much isolated problems, as the conflict between England's world domination

hitherto and our endeavour to obtain *Gleichberechtigung* in the world. That is why the war is being waged.' So wrote Professor Hettner in his book, *Der deutsche Friede und die deutsche Zukunft*, and years later Hitler epitomized this statement in a single sentence: 'Germany will be a World Power or nothing at all.' He admits that England had not wanted Germany to be a World Power, but says that this is not for the moment an urgent question, for Germany is first concerned with uniting the German race and fighting for territory in Europe.

Reverting to the Ludendorff thesis that 'German prestige demands that we should hold a strong protecting hand, not only over German citizens, but over *all* Germans', Hitler aims first at the realization of a *Deutschtum* stretching from Jutland to the Brenner and from Strassburg to Riga, 'The German People's Germanic state', including within itself all Germans and charged with the task 'slowly and surely to raise them to a dominant position'. Later, it is declared, the aim of the Nazi foreign policy must be to secure for Germany enough territory to accommodate 250,000,000 Germans. This expansion, according to the views expressed in *Mein Kampf* officially described as 'the unchangeable basis of the world of National Socialist thought and feeling',¹ is to take place in the East and South-east of Europe, in those territories to which German colonization during the Middle Ages was directed — 'We begin again where we left off six centuries ago.'

¹ Alfred Rosenberg in the *Völkischer Beobachter*, 18 July 1935.

Considered in this light, the steps taken by Nazi Germany in Austria and Czechoslovakia and her attitude towards the Baltic States, Poland, Hungary, and Rumania assume a new significance. The expansion of Germany conceived to-day in these terms parallels the political system which the Pan-Germans and the Supreme Command planned during the World War; that is to say, German political hegemony over all remotely Germanic States and a meditated acquisition of Russian territory. The skeleton structure of that system was set up under the Treaties of Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest. The methods differ in each case. First Austria is absorbed into the Reich, and with it the control of the Danube passes to Germany. Czechoslovakia is subjected to threats, terrorism, and propaganda, then partitioned, and, finally, annexed as a 'protectorate'.

Rumania, under threat and pressure, is forced to conclude an economic agreement with Germany highly advantageous to the Reich. Poland is assured of the intentions of Germany to secure a 'peaceful solution' of the Danzig Corridor and Upper Silesian problems and threatened with war if she does not agree—it may be recalled that in *Mein Kampf* the Poles are not only dismissed as 'inferior', but Polish children are classed on the same low level as Jews, Negroes, and Asiatics!

As in the days of Brest-Litovsk, the Baltic States are offered compromises and the expectation of security, while towards Hungary¹ and Yugoslavia is

¹ For the Nazi attitude towards Hungary see Dr. Ivan Lajos, *Germany's War Chances* (London, 1939), pp. 20-9.

adopted a policy of alternate threats, blandishments, and flattery.


Germany and Russia

So the *Drang nach Süd-Osten* (pressure towards the south-east) is well under way again, and simultaneously the first steps are being taken to direct German political thought towards the advantages of expansion into Russia. German 'colonization' in Russia had been proposed by Dr. Schacht at a conference in Rome in November 1932, even before the advent of Hitler to power. The subject was revived in Herr Hugenberg's famous memorandum to the World Economic Conference in June 1933. The *Führer* himself made plain reference to it during his speeches against Communism at the Nürnberg *Parteifest* of 1936: 'If the Urals with their incalculable wealth of raw materials, the rich forests of Siberia, and the unending cornfields of the Ukraine lay within Germany, under National-Socialist leadership the Country would swim in plenty.'¹ 'We would produce, and every single German would have enough to live on', he told representatives of the *Arbeitsfront* (Labour Front) on 12 September. No purer example of Brest-Litovsk psychology could be required than this incitement to plunder. The speech might as well have been inspired by

¹ As reported in the British Press of 14-15 Sept., this sentence was variously translated, as follows: 'If we could command' (*The Times*), 'If we had at our disposal' (*Daily Telegraph*), 'If we had' (*Manchester Guardian*). In the official text of the speech, published in the German press on 14 Sept., it was noted that the sentence had been modified and issued in the form printed above.

the Press Department of the Great General Staff in the early weeks of 1918.

The nearing of the completion of German re-armament brings to a close the first stage of the Nazi development towards *Gleichberechtigung*. The second, which overlaps the first, has already begun, and Germany is well on the way to the establishment of her desired hegemony. With each step forward the burden of the psychology of Brest-Litovsk weighs heavier upon the German mentality and makes more inevitable the ultimate efforts to fulfil her destiny. Europe has been treated to one display of the effects of this psychosis, and should Germany succeed in re-establishing the situation which existed for a brief moment after Brest-Litovsk and Bucharest, the results would be even more threatening than they were then. For an industrialized Russia exploited by the organizing genius of Germany conjures up a vision which no Western European can contemplate with equanimity. But in 1918 the will-o'-the-wisp of ambition lured Germany into a slough of dilemmas from which she could not extricate herself. The rest of Europe remembers what Herr Hitler may have forgotten, that disaster followed in the train of glory.



Europe in 1944 (pre-war frontiers shown)

Miles
200 400



THE HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE

OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS
No. 15

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

BY
R. BIRLEY

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1939

ON 15 March 1939 the Germans occupied the western portion of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, which was made into a province of the Reich with the name of Bohemia-Moravia, while the eastern portion, Slovakia, became a German protectorate and Carpathian Ruthenia was annexed by Hungary. In a proclamation issued immediately after the annexation, the German Chancellor made certain claims to justify his action, and he elaborated these in his speech to the Reichstag on 28 April. No attempt is made here to deal with the claim that it was the duty of Germany to bring order to Central Europe, for which readers may be referred to Pamphlet No. 10, C. A. Macartney: *The Danubian Basin*, or to extend her 'Lebensraum', for which they may be referred to Pamphlet No. 8, R. R. Kuczynski: *Living-Space and Population Problems*. But both these claims were based on the explicit assumption that History had shown that the Czechs were a race naturally subservient to the Germans, and that the Republic of Czechoslovakia was an artificial creation which could not hope to endure.

This pamphlet discusses the History and Culture of the Czech people and examines the nature of the Republic which has been destroyed. The author, who is Headmaster of Charterhouse, is an historian who has made a study of the history of the Czech people.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

A GLANCE at the map of Europe will do much to explain the peculiar position of Bohemia in European history. Situated in the very heart of the continent, with mountains to the west, the north, and the south, but open to the east, it was fated to prove a kind of inlet into which would pour any migrations across Europe from the eastern plains. The essential factors of Bohemia's history were determined by the last of these migrations and by the early destiny of the migratory people, during that period between the sixth and the eleventh centuries when the metal in the mould of Central Europe solidified to form the pattern of races which exists to this day. The mysterious movement of the Slavs brought them into what we now call Germany in the sixth century. In the ninth century began the return of the Teutonic tide, when the Slavs, who had surged forward as far as the line of the River Elbe, were gradually overcome by the better organized Germans. It is a mistake to imagine any process of extermination or of a migration of Slavs back to the east. The Teutonic return, though marked by occasional massacres and the inevitable movements in flight of a defeated people, was a colonization. But while the Slavs of central Germany were in a state of tribal anarchy, in Poland and Bohemia the Teuton found himself faced by kingdoms which were able to organize resistance. It was the fact that Poland and Bohemia had

already in the tenth century moved some way towards political unity that accounts for their continued existence to this day.

The Czechs had entered the Bohemian plain in the sixth century after Christ, the dominant tribe among several who moved in this direction during a confused period of migration. Towards the end of the ninth century they were converted to Christianity. This brought them out of the period of prehistory, giving them the fundamental necessity of any culture, a script. In considering the history of all the peoples of Central and South-eastern Europe the method of their conversion proves to be a decisive factor. And here, at the very beginning, the destiny of Bohemia was made clear. In the ninth century it formed part of a great, if transient, empire, the Moravian kingdom of Svato-pluk. Christianity came to this kingdom from the east through the mission of Cyril and Methodius, and the people of Bohemia received from them the Greek script which even now does much to unite the various members of the Slavonic world. If the Czechs had accepted the Christian missionaries from Bavaria who had attempted to penetrate their mountain frontier a century earlier, Bohemia, though racially the same as it is now, would doubtless be a Teutonic State, with Teutonic language, script, and culture. But, while the Czechs were converted from Constantinople, the turn of History soon cut them off from the East. They repudiated their ecclesiastical connexion with the Byzantine Empire, and accepted the supremacy of Rome. A

century later, in about 975, the first Bishopric of Prague was founded through the efforts of the Archbishop of Mainz. Bohemia had already begun to play its destined role in History as a Slav State, conscious of its Slav origins, but culturally linked with Germany and western Europe.

Bohemia in the Holy Roman Empire

The break-up of Svatopluk's kingdom after his death in 894 created Bohemia. Part of the kingdom, the land of the Slovaks, was overrun by the Magyars, who held it until twenty years ago. In the Bohemian plain a State was slowly to be formed, the so-called Duchy of Bohemia. (There were at first two principalities, the Duchy of Bohemia and the Margravate of Moravia. They were never separated after 1050, but Moravia continued to have certain independent rights). Although Bohemia was strong enough to resist the German colonization which proceeded relentlessly during the following centuries, it could not keep itself entirely free from German domination. At the beginning of the ninth century Charlemagne had united western Christendom in the Holy Roman Empire. Much of his work was soon undone and the fundamental division between French and Teuton was traced broadly in the map of Europe within one generation of the great Emperor. The title and ideals of the Empire were handed down after a century of vicissitudes to the German portion of his realm. So there appeared in Europe the great creation of the Medieval Empire, a federation of States, predominantly German, but

including also Italians and Provençals, Flemings and Walloons, Danes and Slavs, owing allegiance to a figure who represented in men's minds the sovereignty of Rome and the divine sanction of Christ. Of this Empire Bohemia was one such State, and one which gradually gained in political importance and prestige. To have suggested in the Middle Ages that this made Bohemia a German kingdom would have been almost as absurd as to suggest that Milan or Marseilles were German cities. Bohemia owed allegiance to the Emperor, but her country was her own, and her heroes, such as the martyred Duke Wenceslas (the 'Good King Wenceslas' of the English carol), were Czechs, not German statesmen or ecclesiastics ruling a conquered people.

That Bohemia, part of an empire with a German prince as Emperor, situated in the midst of Teutonic lands, should remain unaffected by German influence was, of course, impossible. This influence was immensely strengthened by the appearance in Bohemia of German traders and settlers. Their coming was quite different from that of the German colonization of the Slavonic lands to the north, which was the result of continual military pressure. To Bohemia the Germans came as a result of peace. They filtered over the mountain ranges into the periphery of the country and, in larger numbers, they came to the cities, many of which they actually founded, and to the great trading centre of Prague. To date their arrival is impossible. Their appearance is not heralded by any German victories or successful treaties. But Prague certainly contained

many Germans as early as the eleventh century and this migration was especially fostered in the thirteenth century by Ottokar II, the greatest of the medieval kings of Bohemia. They were to be the cause eventually of one of the most difficult of European problems, but it is essential to realize that in the Middle Ages and for centuries afterwards there was never any suggestion that the political frontiers should be altered because the country came to contain a Teutonic fringe.

By the Golden Bull of Frederick II, issued in 1212, the position of Bohemia in the Empire was made plain. Its rights to its own laws and government and its own choice of its rulers were finally accepted by the Germans. This compact is, perhaps, the clearest evidence which may be produced that the Imperial rights in Bohemia during the Middle Ages did not include any control of the administration of the country. During the second half of the century Bohemia passed through periods of transient greatness and collapse. Ottokar II, the only great aggressor in Czech history, added to his domains Austria, Styria, and Carinthia, but in 1278 the Hapsburg Rudolph shattered this futile dream of domination on the Marchfeld outside Vienna. In 1306 the line of the Přemysl kings, who had ruled the country for five centuries, came to an end. After an unsuccessful attempt by the Hapsburgs to govern the country, the Bohemians elected as their ruler John of Luxemburg, who had married the daughter of the last Přemysl.

John, of course, was a German, but he was quite

uninterested in his kingdom, and after ten years he left Bohemia to live chiefly in France until he fell on the field of Crécy. The German officials he had introduced were expelled and Bohemia was ruled once more by its own people. In 1323 he had sent for his infant son, Wenceslas, whose name was changed to Charles at his confirmation, to come to France. This youth returned to Bohemia as regent ten years later and, in 1346, he became Holy Roman Emperor. He was, perhaps, the greatest figure in Bohemian history. A Czech by birth and language, he had been brought up in France and destiny had made him a German ruler. Under him the problem of Bohemia seemed to be solved. Its political privileges were ratified, and its position in the Empire as one of the seven electoral powers was secured. Its national independence was upheld and its native culture fertilized by foreign influences, German, French, and Italian. Most striking was the rise of a great Czech school of painting, in which was mingled to produce a remarkable synthesis the Gothic spirituality of French art and the humanism of Italy. The culmination of the school is to be found in the works of the Master of the Trebonsky Altar, one of the greatest of medieval artists. In his paintings of the passion of Christ, the central figure, portrayed with the finest spiritual power, stands isolated among surrounding figures which display the influence of the more humanist conceptions of Italian art.

The most famous of Charles's creations was the University of Prague, the first great centre of learn-

ing in the Empire north of the Alps. It was founded in 1348 to serve the representatives of four 'nations', Bohemians, Poles, Bavarians, and Saxons. Herr Hitler in his speech of 28 April spoke of it as the oldest German university. It was, in fact, at first an international institution. The subsequent rise of universities in Germany led to a decline in the German influence in Prague, and in 1384 the Emperor Wenceslas decreed that the administration of the university should be preponderantly Czech.

The Hussite Movement

The claim by the German Chancellor that he is upholding the German rights of the Holy Roman Empire has made it necessary to study the history of Bohemia in the Middle Ages. The claim cannot possibly be sustained. It depends on a view of the Empire which is an anachronism, it neglects the independence of the Czechs within that Empire, and it denies all originality to Bohemian culture during this period. In any case the claim might be held to be rendered invalid by the fact that at the end of the Middle Ages the Czechs carried through an immense and successful nationalist rising, the Hussite movement.

John Hus was burnt at the Council of Constance in 1415. Four years later Charles's son, Wenceslas IV, died childless and the crown was claimed by his brother, Sigismund, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, the opponent of Hus. The Czechs realized that his accession would mean the condemnation of the new doctrines they had accepted.

It was inevitable that the Germans in Bohemia should support the old faith. The Hussite wars which followed the rejection of Sigismund's claim were at the same time a revolt against Teutonic influence within the country and a resistance to a succession of tremendous crusades from without. They make a wonderful military epic. The Czechs, under the leadership of the blind John Žižka, one of those almost legendary warrior heroes of history, won victory after victory against the vastly more numerous invaders. That the Hussites became themselves disunited, and that the more moderate party eventually overwhelmed the extremists, does not affect the issue. The decisive battle of Lipany in 1434 led to the acceptance of Sigismund, but on terms which safeguarded the essential reforms which Hus had preached and the national independence of the people. The towns of Bohemia now lost almost entirely their German character and on the frontiers whole districts were won back by the Czechs from German settlers.

There are three reasons why the Hussite Revolt is of such immense importance to the Czechs. Their heroic defence in the face of the opposition of almost all Europe gave them a self-confidence which was never quite lost in the darkest days in the future. Further, they could say with pride that they had made an original and independent contribution to European civilization. The ideas of Hus, the demand for the reform of the clergy and for the right of the laity to receive the Communion in both kinds, which symbolized an attack on the privileged

position of the priest, were to influence profoundly the greater movement started by Luther a century later. (A painting in Prague shows Wyclif striking a steel, Hus lighting a candle from the flame, and Luther lighting from this a blazing torch.) But perhaps even more important was the fact that the Czechs now began to develop a national literature of their own.

The period of warfare following the burning of Hus did much, however, to weaken the country. After the death of Sigismund in 1437 there were twenty years of anarchy until the Bohemians elected as their king the nobleman, George Podiebrad, the first truly Czech ruler since the end of the Přemysl dynasty. During his rule of fourteen years the Czechs enjoyed their last period of government by a man of their own nationality until the twentieth century. George was an able and patient statesman. His policy was to uphold the religious compromise which had ended the Hussite wars and to live at peace with his German neighbours. It was a period of national revival, the consummation of her victories, of the greatest days of Czech prose, of a new outburst of Czech art in architecture and painting. But it was a short period. George was succeeded by Vladislav, a Polish prince, who became in 1490 king also of Hungary. He was succeeded by his young son Louis, who perished in 1526 on the fatal field of Mohacz, when the Magyar kingdom went down before the Turk. The Bohemians then elected as their king Ferdinand of Hapsburg, Archduke of Austria, the husband of

Louis' sister, and the union of the crowns of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, which was to last for nearly four centuries, brought about the creation of the great Hapsburg dominion and ushered in a new period in the history of the Czech people.

The Hapsburg Empire

The Hapsburg dominions were linked together by the personal sovereignty of one man. To understand their nature it is necessary to consider the nature of this sovereignty. It must be remembered, first, that of all political institutions Monarchy is the one most completely discarded in modern Europe. (Englishmen may resent this statement, but they will realize that the English conception of Monarchy is one so different from the classical conception as to represent really a new political institution altogether.) Only in certain Balkan countries does the Monarchy still retain any of the qualities it used to hold. We must try to think back into a world where the right of the Monarch personally to govern was unquestioned except by the descendants of the feudal nobility and by certain Christian sects. If this right were accepted, it was logically quite irrelevant if the King were a foreigner or if he happened also to rule over other States. Of course, if he ruled tyrannically and if he denied what the people felt to be inalienable rights, of which religious privileges were likely to be the most important, he would have to expect opposition, but the mere fact of his foreign birth would not be enough in itself to excite resistance.

Even before 1526 Bohemia had been united in this way with Hungary. To be united also with Austria would not have altered the situation fundamentally if it had not been for the fact that the ruler of Austria was a German and, after 1556, always the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. The Hapsburg kings of Bohemia did not interfere, for many years, with Bohemian national independence or administration. But in a country always open to German influence, this influence was inevitably strengthened. The Hussite wars had marked a decline in German preponderance in the towns and a forward movement of Czechs towards the frontiers. The sixteenth century saw this movement reversed.

There was another factor, however, of even greater importance. The Lutheran Reformation owed much to its Hussite forerunner, and it was inevitable that in Bohemia, where the ground was already prepared, the Reformation should be largely successful in winning over the people. But the Hapsburg power was the political engine of the Catholic Counter-Reformation, and it was inevitable that the Hapsburgs would not tolerate for long that one of their main dominions should be heretical.

It was the pressure of this religious reaction which brought about the great revolt of 1618, when the Bohemian nobles threw from the windows of the Hradčany Castle in Prague the two Austrian envoys, denounced the Hapsburgs, and elected a new king, Frederick, the Elector Palatine, a

German Protestant prince. By doing this they set in motion forces which led to the Thirty Years War in Germany. The revolt cannot be looked on simply as a nationalist rising. Many fought rather as Protestants for their religion, or as members of the privileged classes against a royal tyranny. But the revolt and its disastrous consequences are rightly regarded by the Czechs as decisive in their history. The Hapsburgs were not slow in reasserting their authority, and on 8 November 1620 the Bohemians were utterly defeated at the Battle of the White Mountain outside Prague.

This defeat did not lead to any very obvious changes in the constitutional position of Bohemia, which remained a separate kingdom in the Hapsburg dominions. But the almost complete extirpation of Protestantism went hand in hand with an attack on the national spirit of the Czechs. The upper classes in Bohemia became German. The centre of power and patronage was the Court at Vienna. Although it is true that the administration of the country remained centred in Prague and that Czech was still spoken in the law-courts and taught in the schools, the nobility and the larger land-owners came to speak German and to think of themselves as German. On the frontiers there was a German advance beyond any limits reached in earlier centuries.

The years after the disaster marked the victory of the Counter-Reformation in Bohemia. This meant, not only that the Czechs became once more a Catholic nation, but that they became part of a

widespread Jesuit culture, the centre of which lay in Vienna. Prague University was handed over to the Jesuits in 1623, and they set about a determined effort to destroy Czech literature. 'In no modern language', it has been said, 'are so many books known to have disappeared.' Czech architecture in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, even when the work of builders of Czech nationality, is of the international Jesuit Baroque style. Many of the buildings are masterpieces, and Prague itself, in spite of medieval buildings of great beauty, such as the Cathedral and the Tyn Church, owes its chief splendour to its Baroque. No doubt some differences in style are due to the national origin of some of the architects, but it remains true that architecturally Prague is for this reason not a city with a marked national style. It is significant that the last great figure in Czech culture for nearly two centuries, Comenius, one of the finest figures in the history of Education, was a Protestant who died in exile in 1672. He was one of those men whose genius is universal, but who from that very fact contribute more than any others to the highest form of national pride.

The Battle of the White Mountain did not destroy the Czech nation, but it made them for the first time a subject people and it put a stop to the development of Czech culture. When the rebirth of the nation came, it had to spring from the common people. Until the age of aristocratic supremacy was over, the Czechs could only wait. But the days of their greatness were never forgotten. 'I, too,

believe before God', wrote Comenius, 'that, when the storms of wrath have passed, to thee shall return the rule over thine own things, O Czech people!'

The period between 1620 and 1740 is, therefore, the most empty in Czech history. As a nation the Czechs seemed to be fitting with little trouble into a German framework, though the constitutional independence of the Bohemian Crown remained. In 1740 with the accession of Maria Theresa to the Hapsburg throne came an attempt, lasting for half a century, to make of the nominal union of the Hapsburg dominions a reality.

The Revival of the Czechs

The eighteenth century was the age when Efficiency became the rule of government for the first time since the days of the Roman Empire. Efficiency demanded the centralization of control, the abolition of class privileges and local peculiarities. It led inevitably to an attempt to turn the heterogeneous Hapsburg dominions into a unified state. In 1749 the Empress Maria Theresa united the administration of her Austrian and Bohemian territories, and later the powers of the Bohemian assembly (or Diet) were curtailed. But the eighteenth century was also the age of Enlightenment. Maria Theresa's son, Joseph II, weakened the power of the Church, granted religious toleration, abolished serfdom, and fostered education. The German language was encouraged in the elementary schools, Czech was forbidden in the secondary

schools, and in 1784 German became the official language of the country. This policy of German centralization was continued after Joseph's death, without the enlightenment.

But a far stronger force was at work than this Germanization from above. The French Revolution brought with it a stirring of popular self-consciousness all over Europe. It began to make politically conscious the middle classes, and in Bohemia these were still Czech. It caused men to doubt the rights of rulers, and it was on these rights that the German control of Bohemia was really based. From these new political beliefs sprang modern nationalism, and in Central and Eastern Europe that meant the rise of Slav nationalism. This might take two forms, a feeling of fellowship among all the Slav peoples, who looked naturally to the one great State they had produced, the Russian Empire, and a revived memory of the history of the individual Slav States of earlier days, one of which was Bohemia.

Modern Bohemia grew out of Slav nationalism, but it was given direction by the fact that Bohemia had once been an independent kingdom and had never quite lost its independence. It was created by intellectual leaders making use of the new political consciousness of the middle and lower classes who still felt themselves to be Czech. Their weapons were the two factors which above all else make men feel themselves to be a nation, Language and History. We find, then, that the leaders of the Czechs in the early nineteenth century are

philologists and historians. (When we think of the importance to Irishmen of their long history and of their language, Erse, this will not seem so strange to us). Dobrovský and others taught the Czechs that they had a language of their own, and an incident of that time is significant of what they undertook. Some of these first nationalists heard two girls of the bourgeois class who had been speaking Czech drop into German at their approach, saying, 'Take care that they do not hear us talk Czech; they will take us for peasants.' Literary Czech had to be recreated from a despised tongue. Germans still speak of it as a 'kitchen-language'. The greatest of all was the historian, Palacký. He first taught the Czechs the greatness of their national history and called them to their mission to create a State founded on the ideals of Democracy and Justice.

The nineteenth century is the history of the revival of the Czechs. It is an intricate story. They desired to become independent once more within the framework of the Austrian Empire. In 1848, the year of revolutions, they seemed, under the leadership of Palacký, to come near to their goal. In March 1849 an Imperial Parliament met at Kremsier in Moravia and drew up a revised constitution for the Empire, which would have transformed it into a Federation, giving the Czechs a national independence under Hapsburg sovereignty. The rejection of this constitution by the Emperor is one of the turning-points of modern European history. From that moment the Hapsburgs could only try to hold their Empire together against one

of the main currents of the age, Slav nationalism. Many experiments were tried and at times it looked to the Czechs as if they would after all gain the autonomy they desired, but no decisive change was ever carried out. The fact that in 1867 the Magyars did gain such autonomy and that the Austrian Empire became a Dual State only served to accentuate their own inferiority.

It was to be expected that Czech nationalism would find expression in an artistic revival. Naturally it took time for a national literature to appear, and it must be remembered that until after the War of 1914-18 there was no call for translations from what was an unknown language. But there is one medium which is peculiarly suitable for the expression of an awakening national spirit, and it is one that needs no translation. It was through their music that the Czechs made themselves known to Europe and in the works of their composers, especially Smetana and Dvořák, can be seen clearly the peculiar spirit of the Czech renaissance. The Czechs had belonged for centuries to an international culture, and these composers are clearly influenced in style and form by the great musicians of their age. But the new Czech culture was inevitably bound up with the spirit of the common people, from whose racial consciousness it had sprung. We find, therefore, the Czech composers bringing into a musical style which is essentially mature and civilized an atmosphere which is primitive and simple. (Much the same was naturally observable in the work of the great Russian composers.) Smetana was the

founder of the Czech school and much of his work in operas or orchestral compositions was based on the folk-songs of the people. He took Liszt's invention of the symphonic poem, as an attempt to express musically some particular piece of poetry, and developed it more freely as an attempt to describe the scenery of the country and incidents in the life of the people. Smetana is, perhaps, the most nationalist of all the nineteenth-century composers. An absolute sincerity prevents his work from becoming affected, a sophisticated effort to catch the charm of peasant music, as is the case with many nationalist composers since his day.

The nineteenth century saw, then, the rise of Czech nationalism and the attempt to express this by the creation of an autonomous Bohemian kingdom within the Austrian Empire. It saw also the appearance of a most serious racial problem within Bohemia itself. As has been shown, since the eleventh century Bohemia had contained a German minority. As long as nationalism was not a vital factor in European political life, this was not a particularly serious difficulty, though at those times when the Czechs had had to struggle against the Germans the presence of this minority had naturally acerbated the quarrel. The Hapsburg victory at the White Mountain had made the ruling classes German in speech and sentiment. But self-conscious national feeling turned the presence of Germans in the frontier districts and in the larger towns into a real problem. During the nineteenth century the Czechs appeared to recover much of the ground lost

during the last two hundred years, and towns and districts which had had a German majority seemed to lose this to the Czechs.

Racial Minorities

It is necessary to examine rather more closely the nature of these so-called racial distinctions. We have seen how the Hussite wars had led to a Czech advance, the Hapsburg victory to a Czech retreat, and the rise of Slav nationalism to an advance again. It is impossible to rule out altogether the effect of actual movements of people, and it must not be forgotten that migrations are phenomena which do not occur only in the Dark Ages of history. The Industrial Revolution made Bohemia the main workshop of the Austrian Empire, and the increased prosperity of the manufacturing areas caused many peasants, who were Czechs, to come into towns which had before had German majorities. But to ascribe the changes, either in the later Middle Ages or in the nineteenth century, merely to the movements of peoples is to misunderstand completely the nature of the 'mixed' districts of Central Europe. In such districts families often can scarcely say to which race they belong. Inter-marriage is frequent, and the children of the unions of peoples of two races may be hard put to it to decide from which race they sprang.¹ Innumerable factors come into

¹ The writer knew an Alsatian family living in Strasbourg who spoke to him of their immense enthusiasm as they had awaited the entry of the French troops in 1918. But one member of the family confessed to him that she had been surprised to find that she felt no enthusiasm whatever, and that she had then realized that she

play. The division often followed the lines of the classes, as the privileged classes were in close touch with the German rulers. As the Czechs gained prestige during the century, more and more people who were bilingual and divided in their racial loyalty began to think of themselves as Czech. The censuses held during that century, which distinguished between Czechs and Germans, made men more self-conscious about their nationality and forced them to come to a decision, and, since many questions, above all as to the language of the schools, often depended on these figures, the struggle to persuade men to give their allegiance to one side or the other became fiercer. The language in which a child received its education might become the decisive factor in determining its future nationality and the laws regulating the establishment of Czech or German schools in the different districts were fought over with the utmost bitterness. There is something intrinsically unreal about any attempt to determine the exact figures of any minority problem in Central Europe, but there is nothing unreal about the violence of the feeling engendered by the herself was 'German', while all the rest of her brothers and sisters were 'French'.

Two examples may be given to illustrate this mixture of races. The great soldier Wallenstein (1583-1634) was a Bohemian. His father came of a family which originated in Styria, moved to Bohemia in the twelfth century, and settled on the northern frontier. His mother came of a famous Czech family of the Smiřický. He was born a Protestant, but became a Catholic. The father of Dr. Masaryk, the first President of the Republic, was a Slovak, who moved to a village in Moravia where his son was born. His mother was a Czech, educated at a German school, who had some difficulty later in learning to speak her native language.

passion of nationalism in these areas of mixed race, nor about the existence of a large German minority in Bohemia, nor about the peculiar strength of national rivalries in that country.

The Republic of Czechoslovakia

No attempt is being made here to write a history of the Czech people, only to consider how far they may be said to have a tradition and culture of their own. It is not necessary, therefore, to show how under the leadership of two professors, Masaryk and Beneš, they were able to make use of the World War to create an independent Republic of Czechoslovakia. That this was made possible by the war was kept fresh in the memories of the Czechs by the strange custom that the guards at the Hradčany palace in Prague wore always the uniforms of the French, Italian, and Russian armies in which Czech deserters had fought for their country's freedom. It is too early to set down these events in the balance-sheet of the nation's history. In due course, no doubt, the heroic episodes of these days, the long retreat of the Czech legionaries across Russia and Siberia and their return by Canada, the control exercised by the scholar Masaryk over the soldiers, the escape of Dr. Beneš to Switzerland, the foundation of the Republic in another continent,¹ the resistance

¹ The independence of the Czechs was proclaimed in America on 14 November 1915. The existence of large numbers of Czech immigrants in the United States, living in a free country, is a factor not to be forgotten. The most famous piece of Czech music, Dvořák's 'New World' Symphony, was written after a visit to Czech settlements in America.

to the attempt to destroy the Czech language, these will be added to the store of national memories, to the tales of Hus and Žižka and George Podiebrad, the defeat of the White Mountain, the suppression of the rising of 1848.

But some consideration is necessary of the new State which appeared in 1918. It is often said that this was created by the politicians of Versailles. This statement may bear three meanings. It may be taken to suggest that the Czechs and Slovaks gained their independence as a result of the peace negotiations. This is obviously untrue. The Czech National Committee took over the government in Prague at the end of October 1918, and the Slovak National Council declared the independence of their country from Austria on 30 October. Or it may be taken to mean that the German minority was included in the State as a result of the negotiators' fiat.¹ This is also untrue. The boundaries between Czechoslovakia and Germany and Austria were the historic boundaries of the Kingdom of Bohemia, stabilized for nine hundred years except in the Egerland, added to Bohemia in the fourteenth century, and on the Silesian frontier, drawn up after the wars between Austria and Frederick the Great of Prussia. The Czechs gained nothing new except the Hlučín territory near Troppau, occupied

¹ A number of an English review, published in the summer of 1938, contained a photograph of Sudeten women saluting Herr Hitler at Breslau and the words, 'it brings home poignantly the depth of feeling, the passionate longing and the heartbreak that lay behind the struggle of the Sudeten Germans to *regain their Fatherland*'. Such misunderstandings were common at the time in England.

by a Czech-speaking people, the railway-station, though not the town, of Gmund, and a short stretch of a river near Nikolsburg.

It is obvious that the Czechoslovak Republic was something quite different from the old Kingdom of Bohemia and Moravia. It is not true that the allied statesmen at Versailles caused the Slovaks and Ruthenians to unite with the Czechs, though it may be allowed that they set their seal on the union. The Slovak nationalists had decided to join the Czechs during the War and they had declared the union in June 1918. The provisional government of Carpathian Ruthenia proclaimed its union in May 1919, though it may be reasonably doubted how far this body of men could be said to represent the people of this primitive territory. It is, however, necessary to consider what were the real links between the Czechs and these people.

Slovakia had formed part of the Moravian Empire of the ninth century. It had been conquered by the Magyars and had remained part of Hungary until the end of the War. It is amazing that through a millennium the Slovaks preserved their own language and their racial identity. In 1848 the Slovaks had demanded without success the introduction of the Slovak language into their schools and an independent regional parliament. The Hungarians, after they had gained independence under the Austrian Crown in 1867, did all they could to destroy Slovak nationalism. The Slovaks continued to look on themselves as a people with their own traditions, and in spite of their naturally strong connexions

with the Czechs they did not wish their own identity to be merged in that of their neighbours. In the eighteenth century Czech had been their literary language, and it had needed a conscious effort on the part of scholars to create a fresh one out of a Slovak dialect. This effort was successful. But while the Slovaks did not want to be absorbed by the Czechs, it was difficult to see how they could remain entirely separate. Slovakia was, and is, too small and poor to form an independent State. To be incorporated once more in Hungary would mean the end of all their hopes; to be a protectorate of Germany is an unnatural and unhistorical solution. Slovakia has never been German, and it was never even within the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire. A union of Czechs and Slovaks is the only reasonable solution of the problem, but it may be laid to the charge of the Czechs that they never fully appreciated the strength of Slovak nationalism. There was no attempt to destroy their language or their culture, but there was undoubtedly some failure to understand this people, far less advanced politically and industrially than the Czechs themselves.

The Carpathian Ruthenians are one of the insoluble problems of Europe. By the tie of race they should be united to the Ukrainians, now divided between Poland and Russia. Although their territory had belonged to Hungary for centuries, their reconquest by the Magyars is a reversal of history. There is no particular reason why they should have been joined to Czechoslovakia, except that they could

not possibly stand alone and they wished above all else to free themselves from their old rulers.

It is claimed that Czechoslovakia has failed to prove that it could exist as an independent State. It is possible, perhaps, to subject its recent history to a few simple tests. It is difficult for English people to realize the confusion that existed in Central Europe in the months after the Armistice. Things settled down so extraordinarily quickly in the west; men's minds were turned inwards to their own post-War problems, and they failed to recognize the difficulties of the east. But Czechoslovakia was administered from the very beginning with a calm assurance which was amazing in a new state. When the financial systems of Central Europe collapsed in the period between 1920 and 1924 it remained an island of financial security. But what is most remarkable was the lack of any hysteria, any panic in face of the new and troublous world. In Czechoslovakia the Truth remained free. Few things are more significant of a kind of adult national assurance than a remark made by Masaryk, the first President of the Republic: 'What's the use of talking? A normal individual does not go about trumpeting abroad the fact that he loves his parents, his wife, his children; that is taken for granted. . . . I was always held back by a kind of shame from saying the words, "my country", "my nation".'

There remains the question of the German minority. No one can claim that the Czechs solved this problem, nor could it have been solved in twenty years. The struggle was carried on much as

it had been in the century before the War, but with this difference, the Czechs were now the rulers. But it is impossible to give judgement on this question without comparing the treatment of the Germans in Czechoslovakia with that of other minorities in Central Europe, such as the Germans in the South Tyrol, for instance. The Czechs can stand the test without much discomfort. It must be realized also that social movements would inevitably have repercussions on the problem of the minorities. For instance, agrarian reforms, similar to those carried out in many other European countries, led to the planting of peasants, who were incidentally Czechs, on lands belonging to owners, who were incidentally Germans, though one can say further that Czech peasants, especially ex-soldiers of the Czech legions, had preferential treatment. It would be absurd to claim that the Czechs made no mistakes, that thoughts of revenge never entered their minds. But the essential factor was that a ruling minority had lost its superior position and could never be satisfied with a new status.

In 1938 the Germans demanded first a change in the constitution of Czechoslovakia to give security to the minority and then, when this was granted, a rectification of the frontiers to bring within the Reich the predominantly German districts.¹ The

¹ Herr Hitler has himself stated that he had decided at the beginning of the year, 1938, to secure the Sudeten areas for the Reich. The attempts by the Czechs to grant the Germans full minority rights were, therefore, in fact quite useless.

Czechs claimed that a breach in their mountain walls would lay them open to invasion whenever the Germans willed it, and so force them to become a subservient State. Events have proved that they were right. It is difficult indeed to defend the method by which the changes were made, without Czech representation, at the Conference at Munich which decided their fate and allowed their defences to be occupied before the line of the new frontier was traced. And yet from a long view it is possible to argue that some change in the frontier was inevitable.

The frontiers themselves were among the oldest in Europe. They go back to the days of the early Middle Ages when many of the frontiers of Europe were drawn. (The frontier between England and Scotland, for instance, except for Westmorland, was fixed by the Scottish victory at Carham in 1018.) But the rise of nationalism raised doubts inevitably about all these settled boundaries. The frontier between Austria and Hungary was fixed on the River Leitha by a treaty in 1043; it is difficult to see why a fluctuating boundary should suddenly have become static at this date. It remained unchanged until 1919, when a portion of the Burgenland peopled by Germans was given to Austria. The mass in the crucible is melted once more by the rise of Nationalism, a reversion to a tribal spirit. It is hardly to be expected that it will solidify into exactly the same forms as of old.

But the essential problem for Czechoslovakia was one of Foreign Policy. It is easy to see that the

Republic made mistakes. It was particularly regrettable that its relations with the other new Slav State of Poland were not more harmonious. But its position was infinitely difficult. That Czechoslovakia should become an ally of France was inevitable. Her first problem was to retain her independence against the Germans from whom she had gained it. The Republic leant on the League of Nations, partly because its political ideals were those of the Western democracies who created the League in the natural development of their own political ideals, but also because the League was dominated by France. As long as Germany was weak the position of Czechoslovakia was relatively secure and at first her chief need seemed to be to prevent the restoration of a Hapsburg dominion over Austria and Hungary, but when Germany became strong her real danger was manifest.

Conclusion


The tragedy of Bohemia lies in its geographical position, dividing the Teutonic world. She could not help being an obstacle to any German ambitions to dominate Central and South-Eastern Europe. Provided there was no such ambition a *modus vivendi* with the Germans was not only desirable, but necessary. The Czechs are too small a nation to be able to indulge in the luxury of economic self-sufficiency. But a strong and independent Bohemia must be an obstacle to German territorial expansion, and all the stories of Russian airfields near Prague for the bombing of Berlin were

but attempts to conceal the consciousness of this fact.


In the fifteenth century a Czech writer had written of his vision of a tree, laden with fruit and crowded with birds. Each time, as the birds fluttered up to reach the fruit on the highest branches, a youth came with a pole to strike them down to the earth. Is this the whole story of Bohemia? Again and again the Czechs have won their independence to lose it again. Ottokar II fell before Rudolph of Hapsburg, John Hus was burnt by the Emperor Sigismund, George Podiebrad was followed by the Hapsburgs and the battle of the White Mountain, Masaryk and Beneš by the humiliation of Munich and the terrible night when President Hacha signed away the independence of his country in the Chancellery at Berlin. But if Czech nationalism is a fact, it cannot be ignored. No settlement in Europe can be permanent which ignores it. If the people of Bohemia feel themselves a nation, if their exploits in the past and their literature and art are to them unforgettable, then no amount of the sophistry of political propaganda can destroy what they have themselves created.

On 15 March 1939 a free and independent State was destroyed. The conqueror held that its independence could only be ephemeral, that historically the State was destined to be subject to its stronger neighbour. This has demanded investigation, a study of the history and the culture of the State subdued. But no Englishman can consider this question and weigh the claims of the Czechs

to be a free people without feeling that he is guilty of impertinence. One who has heard the men and women of this race speak of their national history, who has read of Charles IV and John Hus and Palacký, who has stood in St. Vitus' Cathedral by the tomb of St. Wenceslas, who has watched the flowing Vltava and heard Smetana's Symphonic Poem to the river, where the songs of the people mingle with the surge of the waters, such a one *knows* that the Czechs are a nation and that their greatness through ten centuries of history is their own.



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No. 16

PROPAGANDA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

BY

E. H. CARR

OXFORD

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THIRTY years ago the word propaganda was hardly known to students of politics. To-day no word is of more frequent occurrence in newspapers, in books, in conversation, whenever international affairs are discussed. The importance of propaganda is recognized, willingly or reluctantly, by all; and every government in the world pays ever increasing attention to it.

Professor E. H. Carr, who served in the Foreign Office and Diplomatic Service for twenty years and has been since 1936 Wilson Professor of International Politics in the University College of Wales, here discusses the origin, character, and function of this new instrument of policy in the field of international relations.

This pamphlet is published substantially in the form in which it was written before the outbreak of war, a few phrases only having been added. It is based on a chapter of Professor Carr's forthcoming book, *The Twenty Years' Crisis (1919-1939)*, due for publication by Messrs. Macmillan & Co. in November 1939. Acknowledgements are due to Messrs. Macmillan for their permission to make use of this material.

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PROPAGANDA IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Power over Opinion

THE 'Jingoes' who, more than sixty years ago, sang 'We've got the ships, we've got the men, we've got the money too' accurately diagnosed the three essential elements of political power: armaments, man-power, and economic power. But man-power is not reckoned by mere counting of heads. The art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader. Power over opinion is not less essential for purposes of government than military and economic power, and is closely associated with them. Propaganda, defined by the *Encyclopædia Britannica* as 'a concerted scheme for the promotion of a doctrine or practice', is the modern instrument of power over opinion, which has never been so important a factor in politics as it is to-day.

The most obvious reason for the increasing prominence attached to power over opinion in recent times is the broadening of the basis of politics, which has vastly increased the number of those whose opinion is politically significant. Until comparatively modern times, those whose opinion it was worth while to influence were few in number, united by close ties of interest and, generally speaking, highly educated; and the means of persuasion

were correspondingly limited. Herr Hitler in *Mein Kampf* draws a distinction between what he calls 'scientific exposition' and propaganda. 'Scientific exposition' is for the intelligentsia. Propaganda is for the masses. Christianity seems to have been the first great movement in history with a mass appeal. Appropriately enough, it was the Catholic Church which first understood and developed the potentialities of power over large masses of opinion. The Catholic Church in the Middle Ages was—and has, within the limits of its power, remained—an institution for diffusing certain opinions and suppressing other opinions contrary to them: it created the first censorship and the first propaganda organization—the office *De Propaganda Fide*, from which the word itself is derived.

Propaganda in the Modern World

Propaganda in its modern form has been called into being by developments in economic and military technique—by the substitution of mass-production industries for individual craftsmanship and of the conscript citizen army for the volunteer professional force. Contemporary politics are vitally dependent on the opinion of large masses of more or less politically conscious people, of whom the most vocal, the most influential, and the most accessible to propaganda are those who live in and around great cities. The problem is one which no modern government ignores. In theory, the attitude adopted towards it by democracies and by totalitarian States

is diametrically opposed. Democracies purport to follow mass opinion; totalitarian States set a standard and enforce conformity to it. In practice, the contrast is less clear-cut. Totalitarian governments, in determining their policy, profess to represent the will of the masses; and the profession is not wholly vain. Democracies, or the groups which control them, are not altogether innocent of the arts of moulding and directing mass opinion. Totalitarian propagandists, whether Marxist or Fascist, continually insist on the illusory character of the freedom of opinion enjoyed in democratic countries. There remains a solid substratum of difference between the attitude of democracies and totalitarian States towards mass opinion; and this difference may prove a decisive factor in times of crisis. But both agree in recognizing its paramount importance.

The same economic and social conditions, which have made mass opinion supremely important in politics, have also created instruments of unparalleled range and efficiency for moulding and directing it. The oldest, and still perhaps the most powerful, of these instruments is universal popular education. The State which provides the education necessarily determines its content. No State will allow its future citizens to imbibe in its schools teaching subversive of the principles on which it is based. In democracies, the child is taught to prize the liberties of democracy; in totalitarian States, to admire the strength and discipline of totali-

tarianism. In both, he is taught to respect the traditions and creeds and institutions of his own country, and to think it better than any other. The influence of this early unconscious moulding is difficult to exaggerate. In the last war spontaneous belief in the righteousness of the national cause was most easily generated and most firmly maintained in those countries where universal education was of long standing. Every country in the world now recognizes the importance of education in moulding a united nation. Marx's dictum that 'the worker has no country' has ceased to be true since the worker has passed through national schools.

But when we speak of propaganda to-day, we think first and foremost of those other instruments whose use popular education has made possible: the radio, the film, and the popular press. These instruments of mass appeal have created propaganda in its modern form and have rendered inevitable a re-examination of our whole attitude towards power over opinion.

The Control of Opinion

In the nineteenth century the philosophers of *laissez-faire* believed that opinion, like trade, should be free from all controls, and that this absolute freedom would be an infallible guarantee of the public welfare. If every opinion were given an equal chance to assert itself, the right one was bound to prevail.

The prejudice which the word 'propaganda'

excites in many minds to-day¹ is closely parallel to the prejudice against State control of industry and trade. Opinion, like trade and industry, should under the old liberal conception be allowed to flow in its own natural channels without artificial regulation.

This conception has broken down on the hard fact that in modern conditions opinion, like trade and industry, is not and cannot be exempt from artificial controls. The radio, the film, and the press share to the fullest extent the characteristic attribute of modern industry: mass-production, quasi-monopoly, and standardization are a condition of their economical and efficient working. Their management has, in the natural course of development, become concentrated in fewer and fewer hands; and this concentration facilitates and makes inevitable the centralized control of opinion. The mass-production of opinion is the corollary of the mass-production of goods. Just as the nineteenth-century conception of political freedom was rendered illusory for large masses of the population by the growth and concentration of economic power, so the nineteenth-century conception of freedom of thought is being fundamentally modified by the development of these new and extremely powerful instruments of power over opinion. The issue is no longer whether men shall be politically free to

¹ As recently as 28 July 1939 the Home Secretary in the House of Commons 'wished that there was no necessity for any Government publicity anywhere' and referred to propaganda as 'this objectionable relic of the years of the War'.

express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of propaganda directed by vested interests of one kind or another. An interesting and revealing debate took place in the House of Commons on 7 December 1938 on the freedom of the press. The spokesman of the Liberal Opposition, who initiated the debate, argued for the freedom of the press on familiar nineteenth-century lines. The spokesman of the Labour Opposition, on the other hand, declared that the press had already lost its independence, being 'controlled by financiers, advertisers, and press magnates', and wanted to 'make every newspaper in the country responsible for every item of news it prints and answerable to this House or some public authority'.

Though the government of the day is always liable in democratic countries to be attacked for any specific measures which it takes to control and influence the expression of opinion through the press, the radio, or the film, there is substantial agreement among all parties everywhere—at any rate in Europe—that such measures are in some cases necessary. No future government, either in Great Britain or elsewhere, will be able to allow these immensely powerful organs of opinion to operate at the unfettered discretion of private interests and without any form of official direction. Some control by the State, however discreetly veiled, over the instruments of propaganda has become unavoidable

if the public good is to be served and if the community is to survive. In the totalitarian countries, radio, press, and film are State industries absolutely controlled by governments. In democratic countries, conditions vary, but are everywhere tending towards more and more centralized control. Immense corporations are called into existence, which are too powerful and too vital to the community to remain wholly independent of the machine of government, and which themselves find it convenient to accept voluntary collaboration with the State as an alternative to formal control by it. It is significant that what a distinguished historian has called 'the nationalization of thought' has proceeded everywhere *pari passu* with the nationalization of industry. Both are completest in Soviet Russia, and almost equally complete in the other totalitarian States. In democratic countries, both are achieved by indirect and partial methods which still leave a wide scope for individual initiative and for rivalry between conflicting interests and parties. The major problem in democratic countries is no longer whether the government should seek to influence opinion, but how to ensure that this power is exercised for recognizably national, and not for merely party, interests. War has inevitably led to the elaboration of far-reaching schemes for the controlling and moulding of opinion by the State, and thereby stimulated the nationalization of thought, as well as of other aspects of national life.

Propaganda as an Instrument of War

The organized use of propaganda as a regular instrument of foreign policy is a modern development. Prior to 1914, cases occurred of the use of propaganda by governments in international relations. The press was freely used by Bismarck, Cavour, and other statesmen, though rather, perhaps, for the purpose of making pronouncements, or putting out feelers, to foreign governments than as a means of influencing public opinion at large. Co-operation between the missionary and the trader, and the support of both by military force, may be cited as a familiar nineteenth-century example of unofficial—and in part, no doubt, unconscious—association between propaganda and economic and military power in the interests of national expansion. But the field of propaganda was limited. The people who exploited it most intensively were the revolutionaries; and they have many claims to be regarded as the fathers of modern propaganda. Prior to 1914, any systematic resort to propaganda by governments would have been thought undignified and rather disreputable.

It did not take long for the belligerents of 1914-18 to realize that, as a recent writer has put it, 'psychological war must accompany economic war and military war'.¹ It was a condition of success

¹ H. D. Lasswell in the Foreword to G. G. Bruntz, *Allied Propaganda and the Collapse of the German Empire*. This book is the most comprehensive available account of its subject.

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on the military and economic fronts that the 'morale' of one's own side should be maintained, and that of the other side sapped and destroyed. Propaganda was the instrument by which both these ends were pursued. Leaflets were dropped over the enemy lines inciting his troops to mutiny; and this procedure, like most new weapons of war, was at first denounced as being contrary to international law. In 1917 two British airmen captured by the Germans were sentenced to ten years' hard labour for dropping such leaflets in contravention of the laws of war. The sentences were remitted on a British threat of reprisals. During the latter part of the War the paper balloon was the instrument most commonly used on all sides for dropping propaganda over enemy lines. Such propaganda was explicitly sanctioned in The Hague rules of 1923 for the conduct of aerial warfare, and its legitimacy is no longer questioned.

Throughout the War of 1914-18 the close interdependence between the three forms of power was constantly demonstrated. The success of propaganda on both sides, both at home and in neutral and enemy countries, rose and fell with the varying fortunes of the military and economic struggle. When at length the Allied blockade and Allied victories in the field crippled German resources, Allied propaganda became enormously effective and played a considerable part in the final collapse. The victory of 1918 was achieved by a skilful

combination of military power, economic power, and propaganda.

Propaganda as an Instrument of National Policy

Notwithstanding the general recognition of the importance of propaganda in the later stages of the War, it was still regarded by almost every one as a weapon specially appropriate to a period of hostilities. 'In the same way as I send shells into the enemy trenches, or as I discharge poison gas at him,' wrote the German general who was primarily responsible for dispatching Lenin and his party in the sealed train to Russia, 'I, as an enemy, have the right to use propaganda against him.'¹ For General Hoffmann the use of propaganda in time of peace would apparently have been as unthinkable as the use of shells or poison gas. And this view was probably typical. The abolition of ministries and departments of propaganda at the end of the War was an automatic measure of demobilization whose necessity and desirability nobody questioned. Yet within twenty years of the Peace Treaties many governments were, in time of peace, already conducting propaganda with an intensity unsurpassed in the War period; and new official or semi-official agencies for the influencing of opinion at home and abroad were springing up in every country. This new development was rendered possible and inevitable by the popularization of international politics and by the growing efficiency of propaganda

¹ Hoffmann, *War Diaries* (Engl. transl.), ii, p. 176.

methods. Even in peace, propaganda seems likely for the future to be recognized as a regular instrument of foreign policy.

The initiative in introducing propaganda as a regular instrument of international relations must be credited to the Soviet Government. The causes of this were partly accidental. The Bolsheviks, when they seized power in Russia, found themselves desperately weak in the ordinary military and economic weapons of international conflict. Their principal strength lay in their influence over opinion in other countries; and it was therefore natural and necessary that they should exploit this weapon to the utmost. In early days they seriously believed in their ability to dissolve the German armies by the distribution of propaganda leaflets and by fraternization between the lines. Later, they counted on propaganda in Allied countries to paralyse Allied intervention against them in the civil war. Had not propaganda been supplemented by the creation of a well-disciplined Red Army, it might by itself have proved ineffective. But the importance of the role it played is sufficiently indicated by the fear of Bolshevik propaganda felt for many years afterwards, and not yet extinct in many European and Asiatic countries. Soviet Russia was the first modern State to establish, in the form of the Communist International, a large-scale permanent international propaganda organization.

There was, however, a profounder cause why control over opinion should have taken a foremost

place in the policy of Soviet Russia. Since the end of the Middle Ages no political organization had claimed to be the repository of universal truth or the missionary of a universal gospel. Soviet Russia was the first national unit to preach an international doctrine and to maintain an effective world-propaganda organization. So revolutionary did this innovation appear that the Communist International, though founded by Lenin and the other leading Bolsheviks, was in theory wholly unconnected with the power of the Soviet Government. For a time it did indeed seem as if a force of a new and unprecedented kind—a propaganda which took no account of nations and national frontiers—had made its appearance in international politics. But the separation between the Communist International and the Soviet Government, which may have been effective in details of administration, never extended to major issues of policy; and after the Soviet State had been consolidated under Stalin the separation became no more than a polite fiction. This development had far more than a local significance, and gives us the clue to the whole problem of the place of what are now known as 'ideologies' in international politics. For if it be true that power over opinion cannot be dissociated from other forms of power, then it appears to follow that there can be no such thing in international politics as international propaganda properly so-called, that is to say, political propaganda dissociated from any national interest. This conclusion, paradoxical as it may appear, can

be supported by extremely cogent arguments; and both it and its implications require careful examination.

National or International Propaganda?

Most political ideas which have strongly influenced mankind have been based on professedly universal principles and have therefore had, at any rate in theory, an international character. The ideas of the French Revolution, free trade, Communism in its original form of 1848 or in its reincarnation of 1917, the idea of the League of Nations, are all at first sight (as they were in intention) examples of international opinion divorced from power and fostered by international propaganda. But reflection will throw some doubt on this impression. How far were any of these ideas politically effective until they took on a national colour and were supported by national power? The military power of Napoleon was notoriously the most potent factor in the propagation throughout Europe of the ideas of 1789. The political influence of the idea of free trade dated from its adoption by Great Britain as the basis of British policy. The revolutionaries of 1848 failed everywhere to achieve political power; and the ideas of 1848 remained barren. Neither the First nor the Second International attained any real authority. As 1914 showed, there were national labour movements, but there was no international labour movement. The Third or Communist International has owed

its influence to the fact that the power of the Russian State was placed behind it; and Stalin has garbled and disseminated the ideas of 1917 in much the same way as Napoleon garbled and disseminated the ideas of 1789. Trotskyism, unsupported by the power of any State, remains intellectually satisfying but politically ineffective. Propaganda is ineffective as a political force until it acquires a national home and becomes linked with military and economic power.

The fate of the League of Nations and of propaganda on its behalf is perhaps the best modern illustration of this tendency. Men like Woodrow Wilson and Lord Cecil conceived the League of Nations as an expression of 'the organised opinion of mankind' controlling the military and economic power of governments. International public opinion was the supreme instrument of power. It was, said Lord Cecil at the first League Assembly, 'by far the strongest weapon we have'; and this international opinion was to be created by international propaganda which took no heed of frontiers. Throughout the nineteen-twenties this fallacy of an effective international public opinion was being gradually exposed. That it survived at all was due to the persistent use by League enthusiasts of slogans like 'peace' and 'disarmament' which were capable of a universal appeal precisely because they meant different, and indeed contradictory, things to different people. Every country wanted to achieve what it regarded as its legitimate aims without war,

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and therefore stood for peace. Every country wanted disarmament of other countries or disarmament in those weapons which it did not regard as vital to itself. It therefore seemed, on a superficial view, as if there were an international consensus of opinion, nourished by disinterested international propaganda, in favour of peace and disarmament. This illusion hardly survived the Disarmament Conference. It was by this time apparent that the League of Nations could be effective only in so far as its professed aims coincided with the national policy of its most powerful members. Opinion in favour of the League ceased altogether to be international, and was confined to those countries where the League was felt to be serving ends of national policy.

The fallacy of belief in the efficacy of an international propaganda divorced from national power may be further illustrated by more recent developments. Fascism and its allied movements are based on certain professedly universal principles such as the rejection of democracy and class-warfare, insistence on leadership, and so forth. In its early days Fascism was described by Signor Mussolini as 'not an article for export', and was for many years so treated by the countries which adhered to it. A few years later, this limitation was explicitly disclaimed by its author; and Fascism became the theme of a vigorous international propaganda in many parts of the world. It would, however, be a superficial diagnosis to pretend that, while the League of

Nations and the Communist International began as instruments of international opinion and ended as instruments of national policy, Fascism began as an instrument of national policy and ended as an instrument of international opinion. International propaganda for Fascism, like international propaganda for Communism, is an instrument of the national policy of certain States, and has grown with the growth of the military and economic power of those States.

The last two or three years have witnessed the *reductio ad absurdum* of this international ideological propaganda—the adoption of negative slogans designed to unite in a political alliance those who share no positive ideology in common. Thus ‘Anti-Communism’ was adopted as a rallying-cry on one side, and has been answered by ‘Anti-Fascism’ on the other. But the ‘anti-Fascist’ group has drawn into its ranks countries like Turkey and Poland which long ago adopted forms of government possessing the principal characteristics of Fascism; and the German-Soviet Pact of August 1939 shows that there was equally little difficulty of an ideological kind in drawing Soviet Russia into the ‘anti-Communist’ group. These slogans have no substance apart from the national policies of the countries by which they are used. To attempt to discuss current issues of international politics in terms of a struggle between Democracy and Fascism or Fascism and Communism is misleading. International slogans only become real and concrete when they

are translated into terms of national policy. Political propaganda cannot be dissociated from political power.

International Agreements to restrain Propaganda

Propaganda soon became so well recognized as a national political weapon that stipulations regarding its use were embodied in international agreements. Such stipulations were first introduced into agreements made with the Soviet Government for the purpose of limiting the activities of the Communist International. In the Anglo-Soviet Trade Agreement of March 1921—the first important agreement concluded by Soviet Russia with a Western Power—each party undertook to ‘refrain from conducting outside its own borders any official propaganda direct or indirect against the institutions’ of the other party. The British Government never accepted the Soviet plea that the Soviet Government had no responsibility for the activities of the Communist International; and complaints about Communist propaganda were a constantly disturbing factor in Anglo-Soviet relations. The British General Election of 1924 was enlivened by the issue of the alleged ‘Zinoviev letter’ (its authenticity was firmly denied by the Soviet authorities) which contained instructions to the British Communist Party regarding propaganda in Great Britain.

But relations with Soviet Russia were for many years thought of as an exceptional case. Outside

Soviet Russia, the first recorded international agreement to abstain from hostile propaganda seems to have been one concluded in 1931 between the German and Polish broadcasting companies, which undertook to assure that 'the matter broadcast does not in any way offend the national sentiment of listeners who are nationals of the other contracting party'. Propaganda was first raised to the dignity of a universal issue when the Polish Government made proposals to the Disarmament Conference for a convention on 'moral disarmament'. To limit the propaganda weapon by a general convention proved as hopeless a task as to limit the military weapon, though an international agreement to refrain from the broadcasting of 'incitements to war' or other hostile propaganda was signed at Geneva by most of the surviving members of the League in September 1936. A bilateral agreement for terminating hostile propaganda was concluded between Germany and Poland in January 1934; and this agreement was successful for some five years in damming the flood of mutual recriminations on the subject of Danzig, the 'Corridor', the German minority in Poland, and other contentious issues. In July 1936 an agreement was signed between Germany and Austria under which both countries were to 'refrain from all aggressive uses of the wireless, films, news services, and the theatre'. A more recent example is the Anglo-Italian Agreement of 16 April 1938, in which the two countries 'place on record their agreement that any attempt by either of them to

employ the methods of publicity and propaganda at its disposal in order to injure the interests of the other would be inconsistent with the good relations which it is the object of the present agreement to establish'.

Such agreements create an obvious difficulty for democracies, which in peace time purport not to limit the free expression and publication of opinions about international affairs, and cannot therefore formally undertake to prevent propaganda on their territory against any country; and this embarrassment is reflected in the contorted phraseology of the Anglo-Italian Agreement. Diplomatic protests against unfriendly or misleading statements made by the press or by the broadcasting organs of other countries have been of frequent occurrence since the War. Though democratic governments in their official answers always disclaim any power of control, it is clear that in many cases these protests have been passed on to those concerned, and have had the desired effect. The fact is that in the sphere of opinion, as in the economic sphere, the nineteenth-century principles of *laissez-faire* no longer hold good, even for democracies. Just as democratic governments have been compelled to control and organize economic life in their territories in order to compete with totalitarian States, so they find themselves at a disadvantage in dealing with these States if they are not in a position to control and organize opinion. Recognition of this fact was rapidly growing in Great Britain even before the outbreak of

war. In questions affecting international relations, a discreet influence was exercised from official quarters, particularly in times of crisis, over broadcasting, films, and press. The press, which has behind it a longer tradition of independence, and which has escaped the monopolistic character of broadcasting and the quasi-monopolistic structure of the film industry, was perhaps less amenable to such influence than the more modern organs of publicity. But, broadly speaking, we may say that guidance was accepted on any issue of importance on which there was a substantial consensus of opinion throughout the country. Where opinion was keenly divided, a greater measure of independence was maintained. Although the use of official influence was frequently criticized in particular cases, there can be no doubt that some such measures of guidance and restraint would be applied in similar circumstances by whatever government happened to be in power. Publicity and propaganda have become both so dangerous and so valuable as instruments of foreign policy that no government can any longer afford, even in time of peace, to leave them in the unguided hands of private interests.

The Organization of Propaganda

Soviet Russia is now the only first-class European Power which maintains no official propaganda department. This paradox may be explained either by saying that Soviet institutions, having been pioneers

in the use of propaganda as a normal instrument of policy, are so permeated with its spirit as to require no special organization for the purpose, or by regarding the Russian Communist Party and the Communist International respectively as the domestic and foreign propaganda departments of Soviet Russia. Germany has for some time maintained a Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, which controls the press, broadcasting, the films and the theatre, the publishing trade, and music and the arts, and comprises a foreign department for 'combating foreign political lies'. Italy has a Ministry of Propaganda, which was recently renamed the Ministry of Popular Culture and whose functions are similar to those of its German prototype. In Great Britain the first propaganda organization ever set up in time of peace was the British Council, established in 1934 as a semi-official body maintained out of official funds for the purpose of 'making the life and thought of the British peoples more widely known abroad'. But until recently its activities were confined by lack of funds within extremely narrow limits. In June 1939 the Prime Minister announced the creation of a new Foreign Publicity Department of the Foreign Office, which was embodied in the Ministry of Information set up immediately on the outbreak of war. Other democratic countries followed slowly and reluctantly in the same path. In control over opinion, as in economic matters, the United States are still powerful enough, and still sufficiently

remote from the main centres of disturbance, to maintain more of the *laissez-faire* tradition than any European country. But it would be rash to assume that official circles in Washington do not in fact exercise any influence over the public expression of opinion in the United States on international affairs.

A distinction has commonly been drawn between 'cultural' and 'political' propaganda, though the dividing line is difficult to maintain. Ever since 1918 (and in some cases earlier), the French, German, and Italian Governments have maintained or subsidized national schools in parts of the world where any considerable number of their countrymen resided or where they had particularly important political interests. A 'Dante Alighieri Society' has long served as a cultural rallying-point for Italians in foreign countries. In 1927 the Italian Government set up a department in Rome for the purpose of maintaining contact between Italians abroad and the mother country and, through them, of promoting Italian political interests. In Germany the assistance given under the Weimar Republic to the cultural institutions of German minorities has developed since 1933 into an immense organization of the National Socialist Party which directs the activities of Germans abroad, and which is regarded with suspicion in many foreign countries. In Great Britain emphasis was laid on the purely cultural functions of the British Council; and this interpretation of its purpose was strictly observed. But in

time of war all forms of propaganda are directed to the same purpose and tend to take on the same character.

The radio is at the present time the most popular and convenient instrument for conducting propaganda in foreign countries. Here, too, Soviet Russia was the pioneer. From the earliest days of broadcasting the Moscow transmitter has broadcast talks in the principal languages of the world—talks designed formerly to encourage world revolution, and more recently to win support in other countries for the foreign policy of Soviet Russia. It was surprisingly long before this example found imitators. From 1936 onwards the Italian authorities, nettled by the British attitude in the Abyssinian affair, initiated from the station at Bari a series of broadcasts in Arabic, the undisguised object of which was to create a feeling of hostility to Great Britain in Arabic-speaking countries. Not till the spring of 1938 did the British Broadcasting Corporation attempt to meet this attack by broadcasting in Arabic from London. Since then broadcasts in foreign languages have been multiplied everywhere. During the crisis of September 1938 the British Broadcasting Corporation for the first time gave out news in French, German, and Italian; and these broadcasts afterwards became part of the regular programme, and are believed to be widely listened to abroad, especially in Germany. Since the outbreak of the present war, every belligerent has been frantically trying to reach opinion in enemy

and neutral countries through its radio; and this new 'war in the air' seems likely to be further intensified.

Truth and Morality in International Propaganda

This pamphlet deals primarily with the function and methods of international propaganda, not with its content. We have been concerned with the efficiency of propaganda as an instrument of policy, not with the views which it seeks to disseminate, much as we might discuss the properties of a high-explosive shell without considering in what cause it was to be used. We have emphasized the close interdependence between propaganda and the instruments of military and economic power. This is a legitimate and necessary approach to the problem, if only because it is often overlooked. It is an illusion to suppose that if Great Britain (or Germany or Soviet Russia) were disarmed and militarily weak, British (or German or Soviet) propaganda might still be effective in virtue of the inherent excellence of its content. It cannot be too often repeated that the success of propaganda in international politics cannot be separated from the successful use of other instruments of power. The almost universal belief in the merits of democracy which spread over the world in 1918 was due less to the inherent excellence of democracy or of the propaganda on its behalf than to the victory of the Allied armies and the Allied blockade. Had the Bolshevik régime collapsed in 1919, far fewer people would to-day be

convinced of the merits of Marxism. If Germany is defeated in the present war, little more will be heard of the ideological merits of National Socialism.

These propositions could be supported by innumerable examples and are undeniably true. If they were the whole truth, then power over opinion would indeed be indistinguishable in character from military and economic power, and there would be nothing which, given sufficient military and economic power and sufficient technical skill in propaganda, men could not be made to believe. That that is the case has indeed sometimes been suggested. 'By clever persistent propaganda,' says Herr Hitler, 'even heaven can be represented to a people as hell, and the most wretched life as paradise'; and American advertising specialists are alleged to hold that 'only cost limits the delivery of public opinion in any direction on any topic'.¹ But these are the pardonable exaggerations of expert practitioners. As we shall see, Herr Hitler himself does not really believe in the unlimited power of propaganda to manufacture opinion. When we set propaganda side by side with military and economic power, we have none the less to remember that in discussing propaganda, we are dealing no longer with purely material factors, but with the thoughts and feelings of human beings.

Absolute power over opinion is limited in two ways. In the first place, it is limited by the necessity

¹ J. Truslow Adams, *The Epic of America*, p. 360.

of some measure of conformity with fact. There are objective facts which are not irrelevant to the formation of opinion. Good advertising may persuade the public that a face cream made of inferior materials is the best. But the most expert advertiser could not sell a face cream made of vitriol. Herr Hitler condemns the futility of German propaganda in the last war which depicted the enemy as ridiculous and contemptible. The propaganda was unsuccessful simply because it was, as the German soldier in the trenches discovered, untrue. However hard your propaganda department works, you cannot in the long run convince the public at large that black is white. This danger that 'truth will out', especially in an age of competitive propaganda, is a serious limitation on power over opinion. Education, which is one of the strongest instruments of this power, tends at the same time to promote a spirit of independent inquiry which is also one of the strongest defences against it. In so far as it strains and interprets facts for a specific purpose, propaganda always contains within itself this potentially self-defeating element.

Secondly, power over opinion is limited—and perhaps even more effectively—by the inherent strain of idealism in human nature. Propaganda, harnessed to military and economic power, always tends to reach a point where it defeats its own end by inciting the mind to revolt against that power. It is a basic fact about human nature that human beings in the long run do reject the doctrine that

might makes right. Brute force often has the effect of strengthening the will, and sharpening the intelligence, of its victims, so that it is not universally or absolutely true that those who have the power can by skilful propaganda mould opinion to their own advantage. As Herr Hitler says in *Mein Kampf*, 'every persecution which lacks a spiritual basis' has to reckon with a 'feeling of opposition to the attempt to crush an idea by brute force'. We cannot adequately assess the efficacy of propaganda unless we consider it, not only as an instrument of policy and an accessory of military and economic power (though it is both of these things), but also from the point of view of its content and 'spiritual basis'.

These brief observations will serve to indicate the two principal standards to which international propaganda must conform if it is to prove in the long run successful.

In the first place, the more nearly propaganda approximates to the truth, the better it will be. It can indeed never be more than an approximation. Propaganda is not a scientific inquiry into truth; and you cannot expect a propagandist to present a balanced exposition of the evidence for and against his thesis, any more than you expect an advertiser to discuss impartially the respective merits of his own face cream and those of a rival brand. But false statements of fact are bad propaganda. Allied propaganda during the War was least successful when it circulated unsubstantiated rumours or

direct lies such as the famous story that the German army boiled down the corpses of the fallen in order to extract fat. Few things have been more damaging to German propaganda in the last few years than the indignant denials in the early stages of the Spanish Civil War that the Nazi Government was sending men or arms to Spain, followed two years later by Herr Hitler's boastful assertions as to the amount of assistance rendered.

The same criterion of truth applies not only to past or present facts, but to promises about the future. To make for propaganda purposes promises which are not subsequently kept is to destroy one's future capacity for propaganda and to use up what may be called the spiritual capital of a nation. The credibility of German promises and the effectiveness of German propaganda among the smaller European nations has been impaired for a long time to come by the fact that Herr Hitler proclaimed as recently as September 1938 that he had no intention of incorporating 6,000,000 Czechs in the Reich, and that he had no further territorial ambitions in Europe. Promises made and not kept are as bad propaganda as falsehood in matters of fact.

Secondly, propaganda to be successful must appeal to some universally or generally recognized values. Although, as has already been said, propaganda becomes an effective force in international politics only when it is harnessed to national power, it nevertheless remains true that it must have an international appeal. The fact that national propa-

ganda everywhere so eagerly cloaks itself in 'ideologies' of a professedly international character proves the existence of an international stock of common ideas, however limited and however weakly held, to which appeal can be made, and of a belief that these common ideas stand somehow in the scale of values above mere national interests. German propaganda has always condemned the Versailles Treaty in terms not of national interest but of universal justice. Every country seeks to place its policy on an ethical basis, even if this can only be done by asserting that it has an historical mission to rule over inferior races for their own good. Whatever the policy, the need to clothe it in some altruistic guise is universally felt.

Such proceedings will lay the propagandist open to the sometimes well-founded charge of conscious or unconscious hypocrisy. From the day when the Jews first proclaimed their tribal deity as the One True God and themselves as His chosen people, nations have been easily inclined to regard themselves as bearers of a universal morality. This pitfall is a real one and is not always avoided by contemporary propagandists, who often show excessive eagerness to moralize the policy of their own country and damn the policies of others. No national policy is disinterested, and no country can justly identify its own welfare with the welfare of the world as a whole. But some countries in the pursuit of their ends show more consideration than others for the rights and interests of the rest of the world. In so

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far as they do so, they are entitled to claim that their policy is more moral; and their international propaganda, resting on this basis, is likely to prove more effective than that of their rivals.



OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

No. 17

THE BLOCKADE

1914-1919

Before the Armistice—and After

BY

W. ARNOLD-FORSTER

OXFORD

AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1939

THE facts about the great blockade of the Central Powers during the war of 1914-18, and especially the effects of the continuance of blockade measures by the Allied powers after the Armistice of 1918, are little known to the general public. But it is important that they should be widely known, because they have been widely misrepresented. It has often been alleged, for example, that the blockade was maintained with little or no relaxation until peace was signed. Actually, over four million tons of food and clothing were delivered, under the relief scheme, to the most hard-hit European countries, and Germany received by far the largest share, 1,200,000 tons.

Mr. Arnold-Forster writes with authority, having had a unique opportunity of seeing the whole of the complex machinery of the British blockade at work throughout the war. From 1914 to the beginning of 1916 he served on the Contraband Committee as an Admiralty representative; he was on the Black List Committee and Main Licensing Committee, and in the Restriction of Enemy Supplies Department. At the Peace Conference in 1919 he was a member of the Blockade and Raw Materials Sections of the Supreme Economic Council.

The word 'blockade' is used throughout this pamphlet in its loose popular sense, as covering all that is involved in the prevention of sea-borne commerce: not in the restricted legal sense as meaning only close siege of an enemy's coast.

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THE BLOCKADE, 1914-1919

WHAT did really happen in the great blockade and counter-blockade during the World War? And what is the truth about the continuance of the Allied blockade measures after the Armistice of 11 November 1918? On both subjects the facts are too little known.

Britain's Command of the Seas

When Britain entered the war she brought to the Alliance one tremendous weapon ready for use—her naval power and her commanding situation on the main sea-routes. This gave her sufficient command of the seas to enable her to ensure safe passage and uninterrupted supplies for all her armies overseas: and in 1918 America's armies were shipped to Europe without loss. The command sufficed also—though it only just sufficed—to enable the merchant ships in Allied and neutral service to maintain essential supplies for their countries, despite the counter-blockade. At first these ships suffered considerably from enemy raiders and submarines; later they sustained enormous losses from submarines; but enough ships remained at sea to enable the Allies, with rigorous rationing, to feed their peoples and supply their war needs.

In addition, the British command of the seas sufficed to paralyse the movement of all ships belonging to the Central Powers. On every ocean, on every sea except the Baltic, these found themselves compelled to choose between capture at sea, detention in an Allied port, or refuge in a neutral port which might presently cease to be neutral. Nearly half of Germany's merchant marine was interned in neutral

ports. Moreover, all Allied ships bound for enemy ports were, of course, diverted to Allied ports.

Thus, Germany, but not Britain or France, suddenly lost all her imports from overseas in her own ships; she had to rely for such imports upon neutral ships sailing from neutral countries and passing through seas patrolled by British warships—the narrows between Kent and Flanders, or the wide passage between Norway and the Orkneys, and the gateways of the Mediterranean.

The British had to insist on the ships being brought into port for examination; for on the high seas their detention would have been dangerous, adequate search of cargoes was impracticable, and the material for deciding whether this or that shipment should be detained could not be available. The decisions could not be taken by officers boarding the ships, but only by a central authority—in this case the Contraband Committee at the Foreign Office in London.

The direct control exercised by British warships was soon supplemented by powerful indirect controls, exercised on the quay instead of on the sea. Shipping lines wanted to avoid delay for their ships, so ships were ordered to call at the British ports of examination—Kirkwall or the Downs. After 1 October 1915 this became a general practice; for the British had almost a monopoly of coal supplies and facilities for bunkering ships, and they used this and other means of pressure to induce ships to come in of their own accord instead of being brought in. This saved time for the ships, and it so reduced the difficulties of patrolling in the winter fogs and storms of Icelandic seas that, after the beginning of 1916, the estimated number of ships evading the patrols seldom exceeded

10 per cent. in any one month and was generally much lower than this.

Thus, by direct naval means and by indirect means, Britain established a fairly complete machinery for examining the ships passing from overseas towards Germany and Austria-Hungary.

But this was only the first requisite: if the British were to make their sea-power effective as a means of pressure, they had to surmount two further difficulties.

Firstly, there was the legal, political, and moral problem involved in stopping the enemy's war commerce without unjustifiable departures from the existing code of international law, and without antagonizing the neutral countries whose trade and supplies were affected.

Secondly, there was the technical problem of distinguishing quickly and reliably between goods destined for the enemy and those genuinely required for consumption in the neutral countries within the ring of Britain's long-distance cordon.

The Declaration of London

The first of these difficulties was increased owing to the fact that, shortly before the war, rules for the conduct of war at sea had been codified in terms which, if Britain had fully accepted them, would have precluded her from making effective use of her chief weapon, blockade. This code, the famous Declaration of London, was planned at The Hague Conference of 1907 and completed in 1909. Its rules about blockade were based on two main ideas. Belligerents were to be allowed full liberty to cut off their enemy's sea-borne supplies if they could do so by *close blockade* of the enemy coast, without including any neutral port

within the blockaded zone. But they were to be allowed only a very restricted right to interfere with such supplies by a *long-distance blockade* which would include neutral ports within its cordon. How little was left of the right to use blockade as a long-distance weapon, and how prejudicial to the British these restrictions would have been, may be judged from the following summary.

The authors of the Declaration, working on assumptions traditional since the days of Grotius, drew a sharp distinction between supplies for military and civilian use. Accordingly, they divided commodities into three classes—'absolute contraband', 'conditional contraband', and 'non-contraband'.

Absolute Contraband consisted of articles used only for military purposes, such as artillery. These might be seized and condemned as Prize if they could be shown to be destined for the enemy, even when consigned to a neutral port on the way.

Conditional Contraband consisted of certain commodities that might be used either for military or civilian purposes, including food, fuel, and lubricants. If these were destined for civilians, they might never be seized, even though shipped direct to an enemy port, except in the case of 'fortified places'. Even if they could be shown to be destined for the enemy's armed forces, or to be the property of the enemy government, they might not be seized except in the improbable event of their being consigned direct to an enemy port.

Thus, in an Anglo-German war, the British patrols in the North Sea would be debarred from stopping the food rations of the German army so long as the shippers took the elementary precaution of writing

'Copenhagen', 'Malmö', or 'Rotterdam' on the ship's papers instead of Hamburg or Luebeck. They would also be debarred from stopping any food for civilians, although it might have been bought by the German Government for their munition workers, and although it would inevitably release equivalent food-supplies for the armed forces.

English critics of the Declaration before the war argued that these provisions would in effect discriminate unfairly in favour of a Continental Power such as Germany against an Island Power such as Britain.

Non-contraband consisted of certain commodities which, it was assumed, were primarily required for civilian use. The list included copper, nickel, rubber, iron ore, cotton—indeed all the chief raw materials of war industry. These might never be declared contraband or seized, whatever their destination.

Thus, if Britain were blockading Germany at long range, she might stop Germany's sea-borne imports of finished guns but not the materials with which Krupps would make guns; she might stop explosives, but not nitrates or cotton for making them; she might stop explosives for propelling shells, since explosives were on the absolute contraband list, but not oil for propelling aeroplanes, since this was on the conditional list.

The code prohibited any long-distance interference with an enemy's export trade.

Difficulties of making Rules of War

Nowadays, looking back at that code of thirty years ago, few readers will wonder why compromises so manifestly illogical broke down. Why did those code-makers ever suppose that such rules might stand the

strains of a naval war? Why did they fail to anticipate that, in a war between organized modern States, involving conscript armies and the labour of entire populations, it would be impossible to cut the weapon of commerce-prevention in half, impossible to maintain such distinctions between military and civil needs as were valid in the seventeenth century? In particular, the British reader may wonder why the British Government of 1909 were willing to promote and endorse rules which, on the one hand, authorized *close blockade*—a weapon that, as the event showed, could not be used against any well-armed opponent—and which, on the other hand, went far to prevent any effective use of *long-distance blockade*—the very weapon on which Britain had to rely a few years later.

But it must be remembered that the submarine was a new weapon in those days, and that Britain had other interests, other prospects, to consider besides those of a potential blockader. She was the greatest of sea-traders, owning half the merchant shipping of the world. She was an Island Power, dependent for three-quarters of her food upon sea-borne imports, and had long held the doctrine that food for civilians should be immune from capture.

It should be realized also that the code-makers of 1909 had to work under conditions which in reality made a durable code impossible. Each State claimed a self-judged 'sovereign right' to use war and commerce-prevention as instruments of its national policy: war was regarded as a lawful condition, irrespective of its occasion, so that to be 'at war' entitled a sea-fighter to certain 'belligerent rights' against all the sea-traders of the world. In such circumstances the code-makers could not unite to safeguard some durable interest

common to them all, such as the principle that aggression is an international crime. They had no common purpose, except perhaps a desire to mitigate the barbarities of war; and each code-maker had to base his policy upon guesses as to what rules would be most likely, in the changing conditions of warfare and policy, to serve as a handicap favourable to his own side in an unpredictable future war.

And so the Declaration of London had to mask an irreconcilable conflict of interests. It had to be built, not on the rock of an enduring international purpose, but on the shifting sand of ever-changing calculations of national advantage in a legalized game of war. It was not surprising, therefore, that at the first touch of war this elaborate structure began to crumble. And it crumbled, not because the combatants became maddened by passion, but because of the inherent impossibilities of the task of making rules for the orderly conduct of the supreme disorder, war.

The Rules begin to break down

When the war began, no nation except the United States had ratified the Declaration.

Germany and Austria-Hungary declared that they would act on it if others did so. They had, of course, much to gain from observance of the Declaration; for, as the American Ambassador in London emphasized to President Wilson, 'In its application to the situation presented by the war it is altogether to the advantage of Germany.' France and Russia said they would apply the Declaration, but added the sweeping reserve 'so far as may be practicable'. Britain had not ratified it; indeed it had been powerfully attacked for years before the war, and the House of Lords had voted

against it. After the outbreak of war the United States Government repeatedly pressed the British Government to ratify the Declaration as a whole, but the British steadily refused—as they were free to do, morally and legally.

On 20 August 1914 the British Government declared, by an Order in Council, that they would act on the Declaration as if it had been ratified, but only subject to changes which in fact transformed the whole plan.

The principal change was that conditional contraband was made liable to capture even though consigned to a neutral port. Thus one of the chief restrictions imposed by the Declaration upon the use of blockade as a long-distance weapon was repudiated at the start.

A month later the repudiation of another of these restrictions was begun. Britain added to the conditional contraband list some of the commodities, such as iron ore, copper, lead, and rubber, which, according to the Declaration, might never be made contraband or seized. So now the British patrols were no longer obliged to allow shipments of iron ore to pass straight through from Spain to Krupp at Essen.

Meanwhile the Germans were doing their best to blockade the British Isles, from a distance and at close range. Their raiders not only captured but destroyed the merchant ships, whether allied or neutral, which they found carrying cargo to Allied ports; floating mines were sown on the high seas off the British coast.

The German Government had, of course, to take steps to organize the purchase of supplies abroad and their shipment through neutral countries. For this purpose they sent a commission to New York in

September, and soon, with the stimulus of war prices, the trade to Dutch and Scandinavian ports, in transit for Germany, became very heavy.

The British, faced by this growing indirect traffic with Germany, had to proceed very cautiously. They had refused to accept the Declaration of London as a whole, though they still accepted extremely severe legal restrictions upon commerce-prevention as a long-distance weapon. Above all, the British had to avoid antagonizing the United States. Every time a ship from the United States was detained, some injury was done to American trade, some risk was incurred of a challenge from the greatest of neutral States. Sir Edward Grey realized that to preserve American goodwill was worth a very heavy sacrifice.

So, during the early months of the war, the British concentrated their effort upon restricting the enemy's supplies of a few commodities of primary military importance—copper, oil, and rubber. They began to hold up cargoes of these commodities and to release them only after guarantees of neutral consumption had been obtained.

The Order in Council of 29 Oct. 1914

By October the United States were protesting with growing emphasis against the Order in Council of 20 August and its application. So, during that month, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Page, the American Ambassador, had long discussions in order to find 'some formula which should enable us [the British] to restrict supplies to the enemy forces and to prevent the supply to the enemy of material essential for the making of munitions of war, while inflicting the minimum of injury and interference on neutral commerce'.

As a result, the British made two moves. On the one hand, they greatly reduced their freedom to stop conditional contraband, by a new Order in Council. On the other hand, they increased their power to deal with 'materials essential for the making of munitions of war' by adding several important commodities such as copper to the absolute contraband list.

The Order in Council of 29 October was one of the outstanding events of the blockade and went far to meet the American claims. Sir Edward Grey, referring to the Order in a Note to the American Government on 10 February 1915, could truly say that 'the principle of non-interference with conditional contraband on its way to a neutral port is in a large measure admitted'.

The right to stop conditional contraband on its way to a neutral port was now limited to three cases only. In particular, conditional contraband might be seized if consigned *to order* (i.e. to a consignee who might be named by the shipper after the cargo had passed the British patrols). This was interpreted at the time as meaning that any goods on the conditional contraband list, such as food, were immune from capture if consigned to *a named consignee* in a neutral country—any consignee would do. He might be a dock labourer lending his name, or an agent employed simply for the purpose of forwarding the goods to Germany, but all goods thus consigned to Mr. A. in Gothenburg or Mr. B. in Copenhagen were allowed to go through.

The effect of the Order thus interpreted was immense. At the moment when the Order was published, shipments of food for Germany by way of neutral ports were coming forward on a great scale. All these

were allowed to go through, but the Contraband Committee in London had just decided to hold up four large cargoes of lard and other meat products from New York to Copenhagen which could not possibly be required for normal consumption in Denmark and for which the Danish Government would give no guarantee against re-export. This decision was carried out, and the bulk of all four cargoes was afterwards condemned as Prize in the famous 'Kim' judgement. But from this time onwards until March 1915 not a single consignment of conditional contraband to a neutral port was held up (except one which was seized for special reasons). Day after day the British examination service at Ramsgate and Kirkwall reported the cargoes of a number of ships which had arrived carrying thousands of tons of food consigned to Holland or Scandinavia. The authorities in London had good reason to believe that these shipments were destined in the main for the German military authorities and they already possessed evidence (unsorted at that time) from which they could afterwards prove this. Moreover, the traffic was so abnormal that there was a clear presumption that the food could not be required by the neutral countries themselves. Four ships alone, those dealt with in the Kim case, had been carrying enough lard to Denmark to cover the normal imports of that country for thirteen years! The trade was so large that in December 1914 and January 1915 American exports to Holland and Scandinavia exceeded those for the corresponding months of the previous years by over 40 million dollars in value—an increase sufficient to compensate for two-thirds of the loss of America's direct trade with Germany during that period.

Evidently, therefore, the American protests in October had a far-reaching effect.

Oddly enough, the Prize Court and Privy Council afterwards held that the Order in Council of 29 October could not reasonably be interpreted in the extremely restrictive sense in which it was in fact interpreted by the Foreign Office during the winter months of 1914-16. By the end of 1914 the Foreign Office had become seriously disturbed about the effect of the Order, which was proving far more injurious to the British blockade than had been anticipated. But in fact the shipments that were being allowed to go through were precisely similar to those which the Prize Court felt justified long afterwards in condemning as Prize.

The Order was not repealed until July 1916, and its effects continued to hamper the Prize Court in dealing with all shipments of conditional contraband which were seized during the period of its validity.

1915: The Food Question

By the beginning of 1915 the British were finding that they could no longer avoid a radical decision upon one of the chief problems about which the Declaration of London had attempted a compromise. Should a belligerent be free to stop all food for his enemy? Or should he be debarred from stopping any food? The Declaration had attempted to establish an intermediate category for foodstuffs, half-way between absolute contraband and non-contraband: but now it had become evident that it was impossible in practice to draw a substantial distinction between consignments destined for a government, its agents, or armed forces, and those destined for the civilian population. The discrimination would cease to have meaning when

the distinction between the civil and the military element ceased to exist; the Government would be just as much concerned to ensure the food-supply of the munition worker at home as that of the soldier in the field.

Sir Edward Grey was forced to the same conclusion as that afterwards expressed by General Ludendorff in his *Memoirs*: 'In this war it was impossible to distinguish where the sphere of the army and navy began and that of the people ended. Army and people were one.'

At this point, two events helped to force a decision. Firstly, a ship arrived, the S.S. *Wilhelmina*, with a cargo of food openly consigned to Hamburg for the use of the civil population. If the British seized this as Prize, they would be exposed to criticism in the United States and elsewhere. If they let it go forward, they would be establishing a precedent for the direct revictualling of Germany to an unlimited extent.

The British did seize the cargo, on the ground (strictly compatible with the Declaration of London) that Hamburg was 'a base for the armed forces of the enemy'; and they pointed out that, according to a Decree just issued by the German Government, all grain and flour into Germany would henceforth pass under Government control. Having thus stopped the cargo from going to Germany, they blunted the edge of American criticism by promptly releasing the food for sale to the Belgian Relief Commission. The question whether to stop all food or no food had been dodged for the moment but not settled.

Now came the second event referred to above, the German submarine campaign, which, amongst its other consequences, helped the British Government

to come to a definite decision about the treatment of food.

On 2 February Germany declared her intention of destroying after 18 February all hostile merchant vessels which might be found in the waters around the United Kingdom, and added the grim warning that it might not always be possible 'to avert the danger which may menace persons and merchandise'. The Germans justified this action as a reprisal, on various grounds, notably that the British Government, in spite of having declared that they would abide by the Declaration of London, had in reality repudiated its most essential points.

Manifestly, this German threat of wholesale destruction was very different in character from the British interference with commerce. Whether the submarine campaign be regarded as a legitimate but ill-prepared gambler's throw or as an unparalleled series of terrorist crimes, there can be no question that it rallied opinion against Germany and did more than anything else eventually to rally twenty-seven nations, including the United States, for the common purpose of ensuring her defeat.

The Reprisals Order in Council of 11 March 1915

One immediate result of the German announcement was that the British were able, in the general outburst of anger which ensued, to produce the famous Reprisals Order in Council of 11 March 1915, without too much anxiety as to its effect upon neutral opinion. As a reprisal for the German move they now claimed—and could well claim—justification for such guarded relaxations of the legal code as would enable them to *prevent their enemy's commerce*, without danger to life

at sea, and without extending the principle of confiscation of property as Prize.¹

The Order claimed the right to detain—not to confiscate but to detain—all goods of enemy destination, origin, or ownership. This was a departure—surely an enlightened departure—from the old principle of seizure and confiscation as Prize. It also involved a far-reaching extension of the right to stop an enemy's commerce far from the enemy's coast.

Two immediate results of the Order were that the British became free to stop goods on the non-contraband list, and to stop the sea-borne exports with which Germany obtained the means of paying for imports.

Up till March 1915 cotton was free to pass straight through to Bremen. Not many cargoes consigned direct to Bremen had actually come forward, but the German imports through the neutral countries were very large and were probably increased by the abnormal exports from England. The British could now detain all cotton which they could show to be of enemy destination, and they did so, contrary to popular belief at the time, although raw cotton was not declared absolute contraband until August 1915. But if all the cargoes which were on their way in March had been suddenly detained without compensation, the political and economic effect in the Southern States of the United States would have been very serious. This had been foreseen, and an agreement had prudently been made with the exporters under which cotton shipped before 1 April, under certain conditions, would be bought by the British at contract prices.

¹ Two years later the Order in Council of 16 Feb. 1917 did extend the principle of confiscation as Prize, applying this to enemy exports: but this extension had little practical effect.

A quarter of a million bales were thus bought, and a lot more were detained without compensation under the terms of the Order of 11 March.

For various reasons, a lot of cotton and cotton goods reached Germany after 11 March. In particular there was a deplorable delay in adding cotton yarn to the list of the commodities which might only be exported from Britain subject to guarantees of neutral consumption. But the grave shortage of textiles which presently developed in Germany began with the Order in Council of 11 March 1915.

The stoppage of German exports to countries overseas proved much easier than the stoppage of imports, and remarkably effective as a means of crippling her war effort. Just as, in the American Civil War, the North prevented the South from paying by cotton exports for the imports of war materials, so the British found in the stoppage of German exports a means of destroying her resources as an importer.

Distinguishing between Neutral and Enemy Imports

Having thus claimed legal justification, as a reprisal, for making their 'long-distance blockade' comprehensive, the British had to find means of distinguishing equitably and promptly between the goods genuinely required for neutral consumption and those destined for transit to the enemy.

Something could be done by obtaining guarantees against re-export from responsible authorities in the neutral countries. The establishment of the Netherlands Overseas Trust in Holland at the beginning of 1915 was of assistance in this respect. Later a network of agreements of this kind was gradually created, after laborious negotiations. Something could be

done, also, by the interception of specific evidence of the enemy destination of this or that consignment. The British happened to be in an extraordinarily favourable situation at that time for the interception of cables from Central Europe (a situation which is not likely ever to be repeated). Moreover, the British could intercept wireless messages; and, strangely enough, in those early days of wireless it was some time before the German agents realized that the British could overhear their confidences. In some cases the British were able to produce dramatic proof that neutral claimants, who swore in the Prize Court that certain goods were genuinely required for their consumption, were lying on behalf of the Central Powers.

Fairly often, during the short time whilst a ship was detained for examination in a British port, sufficient evidence could be produced, out of the millions of intercepted communications which had been passing through British hands, to afford *prima facie* evidence of enemy destination.

But these scattered successes for the evidential method could not possibly suffice for cutting off just that surplus which would go to the enemy. In short, the basis of an equitable and efficient discrimination had to be statistical.

But if a system of rationing the neutrals was to be adopted, three difficulties had to be surmounted. No statistics had been prepared showing the actual as compared with the normal imports of each commodity. There was no sufficient legal authority for the condemnation of goods as Prize solely on statistical grounds.¹

¹ The Prize Court took the view that, if there were statistical evidence that a particular commodity had been imported in abnormal quantities into a particular neutral country, that was sufficient *prima*

And provision had not yet been made in the importing countries for equitable allocation of the rations.

During 1915 the British perfected elaborate statistics upon which the rationing system could be based. But it was not until the beginning of 1916, after Lord Robert Cecil had been made head of the Ministry of Blockade, that the rationing system was adopted as the logical basis of the blockade.

By that time the application of the principle had become much easier; for rationing agreements had been completed with Holland, Switzerland, and Denmark; an agreement with the American meat exporters had followed the earlier agreements about oil and copper; and the system of submitting bookings of cargoes in advance, for approval by the British authorities, had been extended to cover the whole of the traffic from the United States to Scandinavia. This system of giving shippers letters of assurance in advance, so as to avoid delays to their cargoes, was originally worked out by agreement with a few shipping lines. In January 1916 the system was extended, in response to an American request, to cover other shipping lines: and this enabled the British to avoid delays to neutral shipping, to avoid use of the clumsy weapon of confiscation as Prize, and to prevent shipments in excess of the normal without having to furnish specific evidence of the enemy destination of each item of the surplus. From this time onwards the control became more equitable and expeditious, and far more efficient, and it was very seldom necessary to order a ship to discharge part of its cargo in a British port for Prize Court proceedings.

facie evidence of enemy destination of further shipments to shift the burden of proving neutral destination on to the claimant.

1916

Thus, by the beginning of 1916, the British had at last equipped themselves with a fairly complete apparatus for commerce-prevention at long range. They had been very slow about it. They had made serious errors, in connexion with the Order in Council of 29 October 1914, in connexion with the control of Britain's own export trade to the neutral countries, and in failing to appreciate soon enough the importance of restricting their enemy's supply of oils and fats. But they had managed to evolve a complex and unprecedented system of control of trade between neutral States without actually antagonizing any of those States. Italy, indeed, after a brief taste in April 1915 of what Britain's stranglehold on the gateways of the Mediterranean might mean to her, had joined the Allies. And the United States, after a period of serious tension in May 1915, when there were serious threats of the cutting off of all American war-supplies to the Allies, were becoming less critical of the British measures. So now the new Minister of Blockade could tackle remaining problems with more confidence than had been possible hitherto.

A drastic policy of imposing embargoes on neutral imports of certain commodities was begun. Finding that they could not make agreements with Sweden and Norway for the rationing of their imports of coffee and cocoa, the British imposed a ration without any such agreement, and fixed the quota for the time being at *nil*. They then extended this high-handed practice to cover not only articles which had been imported in excessive quantities but also some which they desired on other grounds to restrict. For a time

they imposed an embargo on Swedish imports of materials for making margarine, on the grounds that the margarine would release Swedish butter for export to Germany: but the Prize Court held that this extended claim was invalid and released a cargo (the *S.S. Bonna*) which had been detained.

There was one important exception to the application of the rationing principle: no limit was imposed upon imports of fodder or fertilizers into Denmark, in the hope that Denmark would, in return for this concession, be able to maintain the division of her food exports between Britain and Germany in the same proportions as before the war. But the calculation was ill founded; for the Germans, with their command of the eastern part of the North Sea, were in a position to intercept the Danish shipments to England as soon as they thought it advantageous to themselves to do so. Throughout 1916 the British, wisely or unwisely, allowed fodder and fertilizers to pour into Denmark and Holland, thereby enabling these two great food factories within the ring of the blockade to maintain and increase their food production. It was not until the beginning of 1917 that the British concluded that the war would last so long that it was worth risking a temporary increase in the export of live stock from these countries to Germany, and decided to stop the unlimited imports of fodder.

Having dealt with the main problems of control of the enemy's supplies from overseas, the British could now devote more attention to the problem of restricting the enemy's supplies of commodities produced within the lines of the blockade. Roumania had been supplying great quantities of corn and oil to Germany and Turkey, in spite of costly attempts by the British

to prevent this. But now, in August 1916, Roumania joined the Allies. Five months later, however, she was crushingly defeated; the enemy occupied the whole of Wallachia, and although the supplies afterwards obtained by Germany and Austria-Hungary were much less than had been expected, owing to the destruction carried out in the oil-fields under British direction, yet the conquest did much to enable the enemy to tide over a critical period of shortage in 1917.

Another important source of the enemy's supply was Norway. The British made an immense and very costly effort to restrict the export of Norwegian fish to Germany. The agreement was meant to stop all but 15 per cent. of the catch from going to Germany. It was not wholly successful, but undoubtedly the British were prudent to make an extraordinary effort to avoid ruining the Norwegian fishermen, when they wanted to cut off their enemy's supplies of so valuable a food as the herring.

The problem of restriction was especially difficult in the case of Sweden, whose supplies of iron ore and other commodities to Germany were of crucial importance, and whose Government was at that time strongly pro-German in sympathy. The Swedish Government put all sorts of difficulties in the way of the blockade. They prohibited Swedish subjects from giving guarantees against re-export to Germany: they laid a mine-field off the south-east coast of Sweden which for many months prevented ships in Allied service from leaving the Baltic: they used the Swedish navy to convoy German ships carrying iron ore. The British were in a difficulty, being themselves dependent upon Sweden for certain commodities. They did, however, gradually bring very severe pressure to bear

upon Sweden. By the end of 1916 over fifty commodities, including meat and rubber, were under embargo. By these measures, which should probably be judged partly as a reprisal for Sweden's unneutral policy, the British contrived to restrict most of Sweden's imports during 1916 to normal amounts. As for 1917, page after page of the records of Sweden's monthly imports show a blank; and the totals for the year were in most cases only a fraction of the normal. There must be bitter memories in Sweden of the shortage that resulted from these measures.

1917

By the end of 1916 the blockade of Germany's imports from overseas had become really stringent, though she was still obtaining various supplies, including food, from the producing countries within the cordon. More important than the restriction of Germany's imports of food was the restriction of imports of fertilizers and concentrated fodder. The Germany of 1914 only imported about 15 per cent. of her food, but her real dependence upon imports was much greater than this figure indicates, since her home production of food was largely dependent upon imported fertilizers and fodder. These imports were now cut off; labour was short; the weather had been unkind; and so, meat, fats, and milk were much reduced. The diet consisted mainly of bread and potatoes: then the potatoes failed and had to be replaced by swedes. That winter of 1916-17, the 'turnip winter', was the time of Germany's severest food shortage. The weight of the population diminished, the civil death-rate increased, and a collapse of morale at home, especially in Vienna, seemed imminent.

Counter Blockade : the Submarine Campaign

In these circumstances Germany took a desperate decision. After stiff controversy between the fighting services and the two civil governments (German and Austrian), she decided to resort to 'unrestricted' submarine warfare. She announced that in certain areas, including all the waters round the British Isles, every ship, whether Allied or neutral, was liable to be sunk without notice after 1 February 1917. 'With the help of our submarines', Ludendorff afterwards wrote, 'we reckoned on a decision in our favour at the latest before America with her new armies could intervene in the war. Without the U-boats we calculated that the Quadruple Alliance must be defeated in 1917.'

This was a gamble, but by no means a wild one. Indeed, it came very near to success. When first the blow fell with full force, its effect was staggering. During one fortnight in April 1917 the submarines sank so much that one out of every four ships leaving British ports for overseas never returned. If this rate of sinking had continued, Britain would soon have been unable to maintain her part in the war and all the Allied campaigns would have ended in disaster. The total war losses of Allied and neutral merchant ships throughout the war amounted to 12½ million tons gross: 6 millions of this were lost in the one year, 1917.

The danger was overcome in three ways: by the convoy system, by increased ship-building, and by pressing neutral shipping into service.

In May 1917 the Admiralty belatedly adopted the convoy system for protecting shipping, and this greatly

reduced the losses, though it by no means eliminated them. Other measures, developed in 1918, are referred to below.

The United States enter the War

In April 1917 the United States came into the war, as the German High Command had anticipated, as a result of the intensified submarine campaign. Their entry quickly brought to the Allied cause a tremendous reinforcement of economic and political power. The German Admiralty had failed to allow for the fact that this kind of power could operate long before an American army could strike in France.

There was not much that America could do to perfect the existing control of trade from overseas to the neutral countries. But she could, and did, do much to induce the neutrals to put their shipping into Allied service and to reduce exports of their own produce to Germany. In particular, her help enabled the 'great alliance' to obtain control of all the world's exportable surplus of wheat, which proved a very powerful lever in the subsequent negotiations. She used her power with grim efficiency in the long-distance blockade, intensifying the practices against which she had earlier protested.

1918

By the end of 1917 Russian resistance had collapsed, so that the blockade in the East was finished. It seemed as if the food of the Ukraine, the oil of Baku, the cotton of Turkestan, would afford relief to the Central Powers in the winter of 1917-18, just as supplies from Roumania had done in the winter of 1916-17. But deliveries proved very disappointing:

much less than the million tons of food expected as a result of the 'Bread Peace' of Brest-Litovsk could be extracted from the unwilling population of the Ukraine. And so the Central Powers, having ruthlessly drained supplies out of the Ukraine and Roumania, as well as Poland and the Baltic States, Belgium, Northern France, Northern Italy, Serbia, and much of the Middle East, still found themselves so far from self-sufficient that they could not hold out much longer.

Meanwhile, the blockade in the West was being still further strengthened. The indirect control over neutral shipping was so complete that the British cruiser squadron could be withdrawn from the northern patrol without reducing the proportion of ships calling for examination. Neutral imports were cut to the bone, by embargoes and by the shortage of tonnage, and exports to Germany of Dutch and Scandinavian food fell to about a third of what they had been at the beginning of 1916.

During this decisive last year of the war the Allies and the United States had to find shipping not only for their own strictly rationed supplies but also for transporting the American army to Europe. So their chief concern, in negotiations with the Dutch and Scandinavian Governments, was to secure that neutral ships should be brought into use instead of being laid up. They requisitioned neutral ships which were in Allied ports, with ample compensation to the owners; a procedure sanctioned in international law by the rule called 'right of angary'. As for neutral ships which were in neutral ports, the Allies were driven to insist on the allocation to their service of a share of this idle tonnage as a *quid pro quo* for the allocation to the neutrals of a share of the supplies which they

themselves controlled, including grain. Ultimately, about half of the entire neutral shipping of the world was in the direct service of the Allies.

Besides thus pressing neutral ships into use, and convoying ships through the danger zones, the Allies, and especially the United States, enormously increased and accelerated their ship-building, so as to replace the ships sunk by submarines. America's production became so enormous that by the second quarter of 1918 the world was building more ships than it lost; and the third quarter showed a net gain of nearly half a million tons.

So the submarine campaign was mastered, and defeated, before the war ended. Germany had gambled upon bringing England to her knees and paralysing the American war effort, through the ruthless destruction of shipping. The gamble was at one time not far from success; but Germany's militarists misjudged the forces, moral and material, that would be raised against them by their policy of 'frightfulness'. The great counter-blockade had definitely failed.

And on the other side, the blockade had done its work. By November 1918 Austria had long been ready to capitulate; and the military disasters of Germany and her Allies, combined with shortage of food, clothing, fuel, and such military necessities as lubricants, had combined to make Germany ready to accept the Armistice of 11 November.

AFTER THE ARMISTICE

The counter-blockade had ended, and the fighting, but hunger, cold, and disease went on.

No sudden cessation of Europe's suffering was

possible; the injuries caused by four years of world-wide war were far too serious for that.

Food for Europe

As the smoke of war lifted, the enormous extent and mortal urgency of Europe's need could be dimly discerned. Some 230 million people were facing the prospect of 'the worst famine since the Thirty Years War', and Europe's economy was so paralysed that these people could not save themselves by their own exertions before the harvest of 1919. Poland, for instance, had been ravaged again and again by desperate armies; Roumania had been plundered, Yugoslavia had lost a fearful proportion of her manhood, and Czechoslovakia had been part of blockaded Austria. The Baltic States and Finland were found to be in desperate distress, and conditions were much worse in Anatolia and Armenia. Hunger had long been draining the energies of life out of Vienna. As for Germany, the ration of fats in 1918 was (according to German estimates) only 12 per cent. of the pre-war consumption, that of meat 18 per cent., and that of cereals 64 per cent.; the death-rate from tuberculosis had doubled, and rickets was general amongst children. The whole world had been swept by a severe type of influenza, and now typhus was killing millions in Russia and Eastern Europe.

The need was enormous, and the difficulties of relieving it extraordinary. At first, there was an extreme shortage of shipping, as a result of the submarine campaign. Much of Europe's railway system was crippled: new frontiers helped to paralyse trade recovery: and the States in most urgent need had little or no means of immediate payments for imports.

There was also the difficulty that no peace treaty had yet been concluded. The Allies and the United States had therefore to consider not only how to meet their own pressing needs and those of the newly liberated States; not only how to fulfil their moral obligation as regards provisioning the defeated countries; but also how to ensure acceptance by the enemy governments of peace terms acceptable to themselves.

Despite these extreme difficulties, a colossal work of relief and provisioning was carried out during the nine months before Europe could gather its 1919 harvest. Considering the difficulties, there was not much delay in starting this work. Mr. Hoover, head of the American Relief Administration, sailed for Europe a week after the Armistice, having already arranged for prompt shipment of 250,000 tons of food for European relief. When he reached Europe, it took some weeks to obtain the necessary information and to secure agreement between the governments concerned. The Americans, who would have to furnish the bulk of the finance and food, were unwilling that the distribution should be determined by a majority vote of representatives of other countries, and unwilling therefore to use the inter-Allied organization which had efficiently controlled supplies and shipping.¹ On 11 January 1919 the Supreme Council of Supply and Relief (which afterwards became the Food Section of the Supreme Economic Council) held its first meeting and Mr. Hoover became Director-General of Relief. Information as to where the need

¹ For the two points of view on this question, see *American Food in the World War*, Surface and Bland, p. 29; and *Allied Shipping Control*, Salter, p. 221.

was greatest had been collected by special missions. A proportion of the world's shipping was allocated for the relief scheme. Huge credits were granted by the United States; Britain advanced £12½ millions; Canada, France, and Italy helped. Food sufficient for all Europe's need could not be found; but, thanks to the astonishing increase of food production in the United States and Canada, the New World was able to redress the balance in the Old to a great extent. Food exports from the United States to Europe were more than trebled. Between 1 December 1918 and 31 August 1919 no less than 4,178,448 tons of food and clothing were delivered under the relief scheme to the most hard-hit European countries, apart from Belgium and Russia. (Belgium was separately provided for. Russia was at that time regarded as outside the pale.)

Germany received the largest share of this total—1,215,000 tons; all of this was food, except 110,000 tons of clothing and medical supplies. Austria had 562,000 tons, and Northern France 552,500; Czechoslovakia 503,000; Poland 403,000; Roumania 225,000; Finland 185,000; Yugoslavia 121,000; Armenia 84,000; Esthonia 61,500. Other recipients included Bulgaria, Turkey, Lithuania, and Latvia.

Half a million tons out of this total consisted of clothing, medical supplies, and soap.

Nearly two-thirds of the food was supplied on credit, but most of Germany's imports were financed with German gold as collateral. Over £5 millions worth was supplied as a gift.

Belgium received 50,000 tons out of this total, and in addition 1,111,000 tons.

Besides these shipments under the relief schemes,

12½ million tons of American food went to Britain, France, and Italy, mostly on credit.

Considering the circumstances, this was a notable achievement. It would have been impossible without the grant of large governmental credits by the United States and Britain, for half of Europe had no money, and the rest of the world had lost the normal motive for lending.

The food supplied under the relief scheme was not enough to prevent bitter privation, and continuing injury to millions of minds and bodies; but it did suffice to prevent wholesale death by starvation; it did undoubtedly save some millions of lives.

Food for Germany

The reader will have noted that large amounts of food went into Germany before the end of August 1919. The facts about this are worth recording in some detail, for it is still widely believed that the 'hunger-blockade' was maintained with little or no relaxation until peace was signed, and that Germany's continued suffering was due to the deliberate policy of the Allies. That is not true. But the story is a tragic and complex one.

The moral obligation to help in relieving Germany's food shortage was recognized in the Armistice in these words: 'The existing blockade conditions set up by the Allied and Associated Powers are to remain unchanged, German merchant ships found at sea remaining liable to capture. The Allies and the United States contemplate the provisioning of Germany to the extent that shall be deemed necessary.'

But the war was not over, and the victorious Powers were not only concerned to bind up Germany's

wounds and their own; they had also to induce an enemy to sign an acceptable peace treaty. For this purpose they had substantially disarmed Germany and occupied the Rhineland. For the rest, they had, as Marshal Foch grimly observed, two weapons—'le canon et le blocus'.

The military authorities insisted that they could not dispense with the blockade weapon entirely, for if they did so, the intricate machinery could hardly be reassembled in case of need, and Germany might find herself in a position to reject the peace treaty (as in fact she nearly did). So the Allies began by retaining the *apparatus* of the blockade in full force, but with the intention of relaxing its application so as to admit imports of food as soon as the necessary shipping and finance could be arranged with Germany.

Whilst regretting most deeply the failure to rush some food into Germany immediately after the Armistice, we should recognize that the position for the Allies in November 1918 was very different from that in which Bismarck had been able to rush food into starving Paris at the end of the Franco-Prussian war. In particular, there was the immediate problem of finding extra shipping for the additional service, after Germany had sunk so much of the world's tonnage.

This difficulty had been foreseen before the Armistice by the Allied Maritime Transport Council and the Inter-Allied Food Council, which controlled shipping and supplies for the Allies and the United States. Anticipating that food would probably be allowed soon to enter Germany, they jointly recommended on 28 October 1918 that Germany's idle shipping should be brought into use under Allied direction. It was urged that a demand for this use should be included in

the original Armistice terms. Unfortunately this advice was not accepted; and so a million tons of ships ready for sea lay idle for two months, and Germany remained without imports of food.

On 16 and 17 January 1919 the Armistice was renewed at Trèves, and it was then provided that the German ships should be hired for re-victualling Germany and the rest of Europe. It was agreed also that Germany might import in the first instance 270,000 tons of breadstuffs and fats, subject to the necessary finance being provided.

But the delay continued. There were disputes about the agreement: the Germans delayed sending their gold to Rotterdam as agreed, and delayed transfer of their ships to Allied control, regarding the ships as one of their last good cards, and fearing that Germany would never get them back. Thus another month passed with the ships still idle and the food still waiting.

On 16 February the Armistice was renewed a second time at Spa, and new provisions about the use of ships and about Germany's food imports were made. But still the deadlock continued. Probably a thorough inquiry would show that the responsibility for this further delay was mixed; that the French, thinking always of reparations and their devastated provinces, were unduly reluctant to allow Germany's easily realizable assets to be spent on Germany's urgent needs, and that the Germans were unduly reluctant to transfer their ships and gold.

March came, and still no ships had left Germany, and no food had gone in. But at this point the French attitude, and the German, was modified, so that a new agreement could operate. Mr. Lloyd George has

described in *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* how the French attitude was changed, after he had produced a dramatic appeal from General Plumer, who commanded the British Army of Occupation in the Cologne district. The General protested that the rations of the population were insufficient to maintain life; that 'the mortality amongst women, children, and the sick is most grave'; and that the people felt that 'an end by bullets is preferable to death by starvation'. If the British troops saw children wandering in the streets half starved, they would give away their own rations.

The Germans also were now ready for an agreement. In the words of the authoritative American record, *American Food in the World War* (Surface and Bland, p. 194), 'After having side-stepped the issue for over two months, Germany finally accepted the inevitable, signed the Brussels Agreement, began the delivery of her ships, and on 22 March made the first deposit of gold.'

The agreement thus reached at Brussels on 13 and 14 March resulted in immediate action. On 21 March the first of the German ships left Germany, and on 25 March the first shipload of food, 6,626 tons, was delivered in Hamburg. From that time onwards the supply steadily continued. When peace was signed on 28 June, the Allies and the United States had delivered about 779,000 tons (including 170,000 tons 'miscellaneous'), and by the end of August, when deliveries under the Brussels Agreement ended, the total, including 110,000 tons of clothing, &c., was 1,215,000 tons. This included 618,000 tons from the United States, 299,000 from Britain, 155,000 shipped from the Argentine by means of the relief scheme, and 69,000

tons from France. The Allies' agreements with the Scandinavian countries and Holland were relaxed so as to allow free food supply to Germany; facilities were given for imports of fish from neutral countries, and for fishing by German vessels. By the end of 1919 Germany had received through the Allied Governments and the United States about £60 millions worth of food.

The amounts thus imported were far less than Germany's full requirements, though they sufficed to make possible a substantial improvement of the rations for the time being. But it should be noted also that they were much less than the total which she was free to import under the Brussels Agreement. The amount authorized was 300,000 tons of breadstuffs and 70,000 tons of fats (including milk) per month; which would have amounted by 1 September to 1,500,000 tons of cereals and 350,000 tons of fats. Even these limits were really nominal, for Germany would certainly have been allowed to import more if shipping, supplies, and especially finance had not been so short. The authors of the American record quoted above express the view that 'she did however purchase all that the world supply of food and shipping would permit, and all for which she could provide finance'.¹

That problem of finance was, of course, crucial. Germany's gold reserve was small; her foreign securities fetched much less than was expected; the hire of her ships did not cover what she owed for transport charges and repairs; her losses of territory involved heavy losses of home-produced coal and iron; her trade connexions overseas had been largely destroyed in the trade war, and her export trade was still paralysed; and the prospect of having to pay a vast

¹ Surface and Bland, p. 194.

reparation weakened her credit as a borrower and her incentive as a producer.

An attempt was made in the Brussels Agreement of March to open the door for some export trade, so that Germany might obtain additional means of paying for imports of food. She was authorized to export all commodities except those which were to be specified in a 'prohibition list'. But when this list was produced, it was found to cover more than three-quarters of the commodities which Germany could then export. Germany was to be free to export overseas one-third of the exportable surplus of these commodities, the other two-thirds being offered for four days to the Allies for purchase at equitable prices (to be determined by the Allies). The arrangement proved unworkable, partly because it was impossible to tell whether any particular item which Germany wanted to export could be counted as part of the freely exportable one-third or not. So Germany's exports to countries overseas remained virtually blocked until after peace was signed.

Much of Germany's production could not recover until raw materials had been imported. So in April the Allies prepared a scheme allowing her to import a monthly ration of each raw material, equal to half her average monthly import before the war. But the Germans replied by asking for a loan of £200 millions to cover their imports of raw materials for the next six months. That was out of the question, and the scheme dropped.

A lesser scheme was then proposed. The Allies offered a million pounds worth of raw materials at cost price, for use in the Ruhr coal-field which was to produce coal for the Allies. But the Germans then decided that they could not afford the purchase.

Yet another effort was made to get round the financial difficulty to some extent. It was proposed that the Germans might import raw materials, up to the monthly rations, in so far as they could do this from stocks already paid for. The Germans asked whether, if they disclosed these stocks and began to move them, the Allies would let them pass in the event of the peace treaty being rejected and the blockade reimposed. The Allies could give no such assurance. So this project, like the others, came to nothing. No raw materials were imported from outside the ring of the blockade till after the peace.

It will have been seen from this summary that a large amount of food was sent into Germany before peace was signed. The widespread belief to the contrary is erroneous.

It is true that the blockade machine was kept in being, and was not formally scrapped till 12 July 1919. But this was not in itself the main cause—it was not even a very substantial cause—of Germany's continued shortage of food. If the blockade had been completely lifted on 11 November 1918, or in April 1919 (as the Supreme Economic Council advised), and if Germany had been left to her own devices, without help from the Allies but with the prospect of reparations hanging over her, she would actually have been worse off than she was after March 1919. Indeed, when both the blockade and the relief scheme ended, her food shortage became worse than it had been during the period when relief was coming in through the relaxed blockade.

It is true that the amount of food imported was much less than Germany needed. But this was not

due to any direct restriction imposed by the blockade, after the middle of March 1919. On the contrary, she was authorized to import far more than she could finance. Her neighbours found similar difficulty.

It is true that concessions intended to enable Germany to resume her export trade were ill designed. And it is true that she did not import raw materials from overseas till after the peace. But the Allies offered to authorize large imports; Germany could not, in the circumstances, finance them.

It is true that the German people suffered greatly. They will not forget, and the rest of the world should remember, that bitter consequence of war. But it should also be remembered that Germany was far from being alone in her suffering. If German fields were impoverished and German live stock much reduced, many a French field and village had been blasted into a desert of mud, and birch forest was invading the once-cultivated lands of Poland. If Germany's financial position was desperate, that of France and Italy was grave. Whilst tuberculosis and rickets ravaged Central Europe, Eastern Europe was swept with typhus.

AFTER THE BLOCKADE


Germany's suffering and Europe's did not end when peace had been signed, and the blockade lifted, and the harvest gathered. For the economic breakdown caused by war and revolution on so vast a scale could not be repaired in a few months (though in fact the general productivity of the world was restored quicker than economists expected).

The food shortage dragged on. At the end of 1919, when much food had been sent to Austria, the

British Director of Relief still found there 'a whole nation, or what is left of it, in utter, hopeless despair'; 'But Vienna', he added, 'has no monopoly of suffering.' Even Budapest, in the midst of food-producing country, was in grave distress. In Berlin the legally authorized rations in the spring of 1920 were no higher than in the dreadful 'turnip winter' of 1916-17.

So relief work, official and unofficial, had to continue. Between 1 September 1919 and July 1923 the Allies and the United States were responsible for sending a further $1\frac{1}{2}$ million tons of relief, mostly to Russia, but also to Poland, Austria, and Germany; and this was largely supplemented by charity.

General Smuts, surveying what the war and the blockade and counter-blockade had done to Europe, was moved to declare that 'it is the most awful spectacle in history, and no man with any heart or regard for human destiny can contemplate it without the deepest emotion'.



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NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND CHRISTIANITY

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THE claims of Nazism upon the individual member of the Nazi State are 'all-embracing'. All other claims must be subservient to those of the State, as defined by the Nazi Party. Hence, inevitably, the conflict between Nazism and organized religion. The origins of this conflict are here explained, and the persecution of the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany described.

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NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND CHRISTIANITY

National Socialism itself a Kind of Religion

TILL very recent times Christianity has for centuries known no serious rival in Europe. To-day the allegiance of men's hearts is claimed by Bolshevism and by National Socialism as it is by Christianity. National Socialism, like Bolshevism, is a religion or quasi-religion as well as a political theory. This explains the inevitability and inwardness of 'the Church Struggle' in Germany since Herr Hitler came to power in 1933.

It may be possible to distinguish between Bolshevism as an economic system and Bolshevism as a materialistic conception of the world, but it has proved quite impossible to distinguish the political aspects of National Socialism from the *Weltanschauung* or 'philosophy' of the Party. This was not so plain in the earlier days of the Revolution as it has since become, partly because up to the seizure of power the Nazis were almost wholly occupied with a political campaign, and partly because their 'philosophical' ideas were then neither prominent nor well known.

Moreover, the Nazis themselves are not altogether of one mind upon this matter. Many of their leaders frankly hate Christianity and would gladly destroy the Christian Church, but there are others who would adopt and accommodate and use Chris-

tianity in the service of their Revolution. There has long been tension between these two parties, and this has tended to confuse the issue, but the fundamental principles of National Socialism are clear, and the sort of Christianity which Nazis have been willing to encourage has been so pliable to the State and so submissive in doctrine that its right to the name of Christian has inevitably been challenged.

The Nazi Revolution was the occasion of an extraordinary romantic revival among the German people. They had been bitterly divided, they had lost self-confidence, they had felt themselves impotent, they were suffering not merely from the determination of their late enemies that they should not recover their power but also, and perhaps more deeply, from the shame of what they called 'the war-guilt lie'; a proud race, they felt themselves regarded still as moral pariahs in Europe. With the Revolution all that was changed. New hope arose in them, new determination, new self-confidence. National enthusiasm was raised to the highest pitch, and patriotism, as we know, has close connexions with religion.

It is not altogether surprising, therefore, that the Protestant Church as a whole welcomed the Revolution, and that such men as Dr. Martin Niemöller voted for the Nazis. The Roman Catholics were much more hesitant, partly because they were better acquainted with the Nazi writings; but when shortly after his seizure of power Herr Hitler accepted a Concordat with the Vatican, the Roman Church hoped that open discord might be avoided.

The Nazi Conception of Religion

Yet from very early days of the Revolution the fundamental incompatibility of National Socialism and Christianity was apparent. National Socialism has been carefully expounded and may be fairly judged by two now famous books, *Mein Kampf* by Herr Hitler and *The Myth of the Twentieth Century* by Herr Alfred Rosenberg, the Nazi minister in charge of the 'philosophical' education of the German people. Neither of these books is easy to read, and neither is likely to commend itself to educated readers,¹ but their practical importance is very great. Here National Socialism is revealed as based upon a racial theory. The Aryan race appears as the superior and creative section of mankind; the Aryans are best represented by the Germans; it is the God-given task and destiny of Germans to dominate the world. Racial purity is, therefore, the first necessity for Germans. All other breeds are inferior; the Negro is a 'half ape'; but rottenness and corruption come pre-eminently by the Jews. Entirely in the

¹ *Mein Kampf*, unabridged, has now been translated into English. Important excerpts from Herr Rosenberg's *Myth*, as also from *Mein Kampf*, can be read in pamphlets 34, 37, 38, 41, 44, 46, 48 issued by The Friends of Europe, 122 St. Stephen's House, Westminster. Some account of both will be found in my *National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church* (Oxford University Press); see also Oxford Pamphlet No. 3, *Hitler's Self-disclosure in 'Mein Kampf'*, by R. C. K. Ensor. To such an extent has *Mein Kampf* been the 'Bible' of National Socialism that a copy was given to every young couple on their marriage. It is, however, not impossible to believe the report that since the Russo-German Pact the book has been withdrawn for reconsideration.

spirit of Herr Hitler, Dr. Ley, head of the Nazi Labour Front, said in a speech:

'For me the Hebrews are not members of a race.' The Negroes should protest if they are put on a level with the Hebrews. The Hebrew fills me with disgust; not so the Negro. The Negroes are a race; the Hebrews are parasites like tuberculosis germs, like bacilli. They are a biological phenomenon. It is absurd to have compassion on the Hebrews. Those who suffer from tuberculosis do not have compassion on the germs of their disease.'

Such views cease to be laughable when in practical pursuance of them Czechoslovakia is handed over to Herr Himmler and his Gestapo (the secret, political police), and the Jews are subjected to pogroms.

Herr Hitler in *Mein Kampf* has little to say about religion. Herr Rosenberg in his *Myth of the Twentieth Century* makes up for this deficiency. The source of all true religious insight, at least for Germans, he says, is the ideals and demands of 'the German soul'. The inspirations of the natural German soul are, indeed, Christianity itself, the genuine, authentic Christianity in distinction from that debased and Judaized version of it which, largely through the influence of St. Paul, has become traditional in Europe. Our Lord was of Aryan, not Jewish, birth; not as the crucified but as the warrior, pre-eminently the warrior against the Jews, does he deserve the honour of the German people. It is not surprising that, Christ being of Aryan race, the true and typical Christian virtues are those which

have inspired the German race and been exemplified in German antiquity. These virtues are summed up in the idea of 'honour'. They stand in decisive contrast with those feminine or spurious virtues which are normally regarded as specifically Christian—meekness, humility, long-suffering, gentleness. In particular, the idea of universal love is, says Herr Rosenberg, 'a blow at the soul of Nordic Europe'. God is theoretically regarded as Providence, that is, as a universal God, but Herr Rosenberg can make no real distinction between God and the racial soul of the German people; thus God manifests Himself in the racial soul, and of the demands and inspirations of this soul the National Socialist Party is the sole interpreter. There is no transcendent God whose equal law of righteousness is binding upon all peoples and before whom all men stand in need of mercy and forgiveness. The idea of redemption, especially of redemption through a crucified Saviour, is repulsive to the noble and unfallen German race. Sin, indeed, is recognized, but it is sin not against a righteous God or a universal law, but against the unity of the German people or, in practice, against the requirements of the Nazi Party. Such is the 'positive' Christianity of Herr Rosenberg and the National Socialists, standing in clearly defined opposition to the 'negative' variety of the historic Christian Church.

Hostility of Nazi Party to Christianity

This apparently friendly, if highly critical, attitude to Christianity is counterbalanced by a very

different point of view constantly inculcated at private Party meetings. It is a commonplace of National Socialist teaching that Germany has been suffering from three mortal enemies, Marxism, Judaism, and Christianity. A Christianity, such as that of the so-called 'German Christians', according as it accommodates itself to Herr Rosenberg's views, is tolerated and even receives official countenance and support, but the dominant tendency in the Party, as shown, more particularly, in the private literature prepared for the instruction of the young, constantly inculcates the view that the coming of Christianity to Germany led to a degradation of German life; the old heathenism of pre-Christian Germany is lauded, and rites and ceremonies are devised to take the place of Christmas and other Christian festivals.

National Socialists have neither the competence nor the interest to enter into theological debate. Any religion and any absence of religion is free in Germany provided only that the fundamental Nazi creed be whole-heartedly accepted. This creed has been defined in lapidary style by Dr. Ley, one of the chief Ministers of State; his words that I here quote were printed in enormous letters in an official but private publication called *Schulungsbrief* (or Letter of Instruction), April 1937, intended for school-teachers, Storm Troops, the Hitler Youth, and the Labour Front. There can be no question here of a chance indiscretion or of the embarrassing utterance of an unrepresentative enthusiast. Dr. Ley speaks with authority, and his words were

officially published with peculiar marks of National Socialist approval. He said:

'Adolf Hitler, to thee alone we are bound. In this hour we would renew our solemn vow; we believe in this world on Adolf Hitler alone. We believe that National Socialism is the sole faith to make our People blessed. We believe that there is a Lord God in heaven, who has made us, who leads us, who guides us, and who visibly blesses us. And we believe that this Lord God has sent us Adolf Hitler, that Germany should be established for all eternity.'

Christians who could accommodate themselves to this belief have been left unmolested; others have suffered persecution, not, officially, as Christians, but as disloyal to the German people.

The Nazi Party as such has entered into no theological disputations with the Church. It has made practical demands to which the Church could not consent without disloyalty to conscience. The issue has presented itself somewhat differently to the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches.

It has been typical of traditional Lutheranism to demand freedom to preach the Gospel without let or hindrance and freedom to administer the sacraments of the Gospel. The merely ecclesiastical or political side of the Church's life could be left to the goodwill and disposition of the State. But what precisely is implied in 'freedom to preach the Gospel'? Herr Hitler would claim that with 'evangelical preaching' he has never interfered, and that trouble has arisen only when the pastors abandoned theology for politics. The Protestant Church replies

that the Government and the police have interfered in matters that concern the faith itself. Thus the State has required the Church to accept 'the Aryan paragraph' and dismiss all ministers who are not of pure Aryan descent. The Christians protest that the breaking down of 'the middle wall of partition' between Jew and Gentile belongs to the very essence of the Gospel, and that racialism has no place in the Christian Church. Again, just before the Munich 'settlement' a responsible group of Protestants issued a form of Intercession Service in which confession was made for the sins of the Church and people, and prayers for peace were offered. The Government declared that to pray for peace rather than for the victory of the national cause was constructive treason. In general, while the preaching of a purely individual or esoteric Gospel has been free, the Church has been absolutely forbidden to make any utterance, whether on moral or religious grounds, that was critical of the thought or policy of the Nazi Party. In this struggle, therefore, the Protestants are disposed to say that the integrity of the Gospel is at stake.

The case is put somewhat differently by the Roman Catholics, for they in their Thomistic philosophy have a theory of the State and of society which can be set forth systematically against the Nazi doctrine. The incompatibility is most clearly seen in respect of the ideas of Law and Right. For National Socialism Law is identical with the will of the sovereign power that recognizes no authority beyond itself; Right is that which serves the destiny

of the German people as understood and interpreted by the Nazi Party. The will of Herr Hitler, as the quasi-Messianic embodiment of the racial soul, is itself the only source of Law and Right. The Roman Catholics reply that there is an 'eternal law' of God which finds expression in a 'law of nature' written in the hearts of men, that the source and authority of human law are ultimately the law of God, and that all people and all States are subject to the universal law of righteousness. A human law has no authority except as an expression of justice, and justice is to be defined, not by the supposed demands of destiny or of a 'racial soul', but by the law of God declared in Scripture and written plain upon the heavens. The Roman Catholics, therefore, are disposed to say that Christian civilization in Europe is at stake.

Such being in brief the underlying grounds of the struggle, some account of its course must now be given.

Nazism and the German Catholics

The first official Roman Catholic public statement about National Socialism seems to have been made by the Ordinary of Mainz on behalf of his Bishop in 1930. He concludes:

'What we have said contains the answer to the three questions submitted to us: (a) May a Catholic be a member of the Hitler Party? (b) Is a Catholic priest authorized to allow members of that Party to take an official part in Church ceremonies, including funerals? (c) May a Catholic who holds the principles of the Party

be admitted to the Sacraments? To these questions we must reply: "No". (See D'Harcourt, *The German Catholics*, p. 8.)

When, however, the Revolution came in 1933, and some accommodation between the new Government and the Church became imperative, this ban was lifted.

It is not to be thought, however, that this utterance of the Ordinary of Mainz represents what at any time has been the sum total of German Catholic thought about the Nazi Revolution. A recent writer in *Blackfriars* has spoken of 'the real tragedy of the situation as most German Catholics know it—the inner conflict of beliefs and allegiances. It must not be forgotten that the issue is not, as we might like to think, between Nazis and Catholics, but between Nazis and *German* Catholics who are in greater or lesser degree National Socialists, or at least appreciative of Nazi achievements, and, in many cases, whose adhesion to National Socialism is grounded in their very Catholicity'; he speaks, further, of the aspirations of those 'who seek a positive policy towards the Third Reich and to sanctify the values it has awakened', and of 'the new spirit of sacrificial patriotism which may surely claim to be at least as genuinely Christian as an attitude of mere negative opposition'. Christians in Germany, in fact, whether Roman Catholic or Protestant, have had to consider the question whether National Socialism is a movement which could be, and ought to be, baptized, or is nothing else but anti-Christ. There is not yet unanimity of

opinion, but the development of National Socialist policy, the treatment of the Church, and more particularly the attempt to make the Nazi *Weltanschauung* dominant throughout the land, have made increasingly difficult any co-operation or even sympathy between the Roman Church and the Nazi Party. It is to be thought that the Russo-German Pact will tend to alienate those Christians who have in general supported Herr Hitler's régime as a bulwark against Bolshevism.

The Concordat with the Vatican

One of Herr Hitler's first and most startling achievements was the signing of a Concordat with the Vatican. No previous Concordat had offered the Church such generous terms; Herr Hitler, it seemed, had both declared his policy and added to the prestige of his new Government by this arrangement. There can be no doubt that the Concordat in its first days strengthened the régime both within Germany and without. It is a great question whether it has in any degree affected Nazi policy. No pretence is now made that the terms of the Concordat are binding on the State. The XXIIIrd Article, for instance, guarantees the rights of the Church in existing schools and provides for new schools under Church influence; the XXIVth Article declares that the teaching in Roman Catholic schools shall be in the hands of Roman Catholic teachers, and promises that there shall be no interference with their training. Article XV guarantees the religious orders in their pastoral, educational, and

charitable work. Not merely are these undertakings a dead letter, they are contradicted by the declared policy and principles of the Nazi Party. The Concordat has proved the Roman Church's 'Munich'.

Dissolution of the Centre Party

With the settlement of the Concordat the 'Centre Party' of Dr. Brüning voted itself extinct. This party was not an official political agency of the Church, not all its members were Roman Catholics, and, indeed, the party was not regarded with full favour in certain high ecclesiastical quarters. None the less, it represented in the main the political aspirations and activity of the Roman Church in Germany. It was hated by the Nazis because of its opposition to themselves, because it was connected with a loyal attempt to carry out the Treaty of Versailles, because it was to some extent European in its outlook, and because it was willing to co-operate with the Social Democrats, henceforward to be known and hated as 'the Reds'. In future one party only was to be allowed.

No evidence has ever been brought to show that the dissolution of the Centre Party was not genuine, or that the Roman Church has since been engaged within Germany in political intrigue. The Church turned to purely spiritual and religious activities. The Centre Party was gone, but 'Catholic Action' remained and was developed. This movement represents an apostolate of the laity which aims at 'the gathering together of Catholic forces for the preservation, propagation, achievement, and vin-

dication of Catholic principles in personal, family, and social life'. 'Catholic Action', then, is no more and no less political than, for instance, the Social Service Schools and organizations of the various Churches in Great Britain. It has nothing to do with party politics nor with the organizing of any political opposition; but since it is inevitably concerned with the lordship of Christ in every sphere of public life, it is concerned with politics, as any man must be who would apply the Christian ethic to this world's affairs. The Nazi Party is pleased to identify the Centre Party with the Roman Church and to declare that 'Catholic Action' is but the old firm operating under a new name. With the Roman Church as a purely religious organization, the Nazis would say, the National Socialist Party has no quarrel, but 'political Catholicism' it will not tolerate. But in the Third Reich any criticism of Nazi policy or Nazi *Weltanschauung* is in itself political, and the Church could only be non-political in the Nazi sense by abandoning the affairs of this world altogether.

Persecution of the Roman Church

The National Socialist persecution of the Roman Church has passed through various episodes. The first issue was the relation of the young men of the Church to the Hitler Youth. For a time there was hope that the Hitler Youth and the Church Youth Movements might work in some co-operation, or even that some double membership might be possible; but, more especially since the appointment

of Baldur von Schirach as Reich Youth Leader in June, 1933, the unqualified claim of National Socialism to the youth of the land has been explicit. The Church Youth Work has been confined to purely religious activities; even the organizing of picnics or of ping-pong contests has been illegal in the Church Youth organizations.

In the Saar District the Roman Church is strong. It was, therefore, a matter of great importance to the régime that Roman Catholics should not be alienated unduly before the plebiscite. The return of the Saar territory in March, 1935, was the signal for a concerted and malicious attack upon the Church in respect of alleged offences against the Currency Laws. Here the victims were in the first instance the German Provinces of the religious orders. The currency laws at this time were immensely complicated and were ever increasing; they could be mastered only by expert lawyers. There is no doubt that the orders had sometimes been guilty of technical, possibly even in a few cases of deliberate, evasion of these laws and regulations. But technical evasions, which in the case of Party members and great business houses were settled quietly and without publicity, were in the case of the Church, in defiance of the letter of the laws themselves, laid in public before the criminal courts and made the subject of the same sort of newspaper obloquy as were later the governments of the Czechs and Poles. This campaign, it would seem, was followed by the planting abroad in foreign banks of enormous fortunes by the Nazi leaders.

The Immorality Trials

In 1936 began the so-called Immorality Trials against the Church, an episode that seems to lack all parallel in the civilized world. That amongst the clergy and lay brothers of a great Church there are occasional moral lapses is matter for regret but not surprise. If, however, the private papers of the bishops be ransacked by the Secret Police and all the cases where disciplinary action has been taken over a number of years be printed together on the front page of a newspaper with startling headlines, the result is unsavoury but impressive. But if all sorts of obscene charges may be made against the clergy and treated as front-page and authentic news by the daily press while the cases are still *sub judice*, and if the defence of the accused, the kind of evidence adduced by the accusers, and the verdict of the courts if favourable to the accused are suppressed, the mental suffering of the Church through long months can be imagined. This was one of the earlier instances where Dr. Goebbels's propaganda overreached itself and did more lasting harm to the Party than to the victim.

The Attack on Church Education

Notwithstanding the express terms of the Concordat the influence of the Church upon national education has been systematically and ruthlessly destroyed. Up to the Nazi Revolution school education in Germany was, broadly speaking, Christian education. To-day it is almost universally Nazi education—anti-Church in tendency and often strictly

anti-Christian. The method by which the Church has been ousted has generally been by bogus popular election. Parents have been asked to vote whether they would prefer a Church school or a national school, and every method of threat and intimidation has been used to secure the desired result. Thus, as a leading bishop complained in his pastoral letter,

'it is said: officials who should protest against the introduction of the community national school [in place of the Church school] would be dismissed, old age pensioners would lose their pensions, the children of those who had signed the lists [on behalf of the continuance of the Church school] would get no jobs, shopkeepers and tradesmen would be boycotted, workers in factories would run the risk of dismissal. Here and there officials have been asked—even on their oath—whether they themselves or any members of their families had signed the lists. Agents for special streets and blocks of houses frequently went round and paid house to house visits in order to intimidate the women and force them to withdraw their signature. Those who objected are even accused of sabotaging Government measures, of being politically unreliable and hostile to the State. Notice is given of disciplinary measures on the part of Party and State.'

No wonder, therefore, that these bogus elections achieved the purpose of the Party in respect alike of the Protestant and Roman Catholic schools.

1937: The Papal Encyclical

The year 1937 was notable for the issue of the papal encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge*.¹ The aged

¹ English translation, *The Persecution of the Church in Germany*, Catholic Truth Society, 2d.

Pope spoke in no uncertain terms. He complained of 'machinations that from the beginning had no other aim than a war of extermination', of violated agreements, of 'a thousand forms of organized bondage in matters of religion', of 'blasphemies in word, writing, and picture', of those who 'create the impression that leaving the Church, and the disloyalty to Christ the King which it entails, is a particularly convincing and meritorious form of profession of loyalty to the present State'. He denounced the Nazi *Weltanschauung*:

'He who replaces a personal God with a weird impersonal Fate supposedly according to ancient pre-Christian German concepts denies the wisdom and Providence of God. . . . Such a one cannot claim to be numbered among those who believe in God. He who takes the race, or the people, or the State, or the form of Government, the bearers of the power of the State or other fundamental elements of human society—which in the temporal order of things have an essential and honourable place—out of the system of their earthly valuation, and makes them the ultimate norm of all, even of religious, values and deifies them with an idolatrous worship, perverts and falsifies the order of things created and commanded by God. . . . Every positive law, from whatever lawgiver it may come, can be examined as to its moral implications, and consequently as to its moral authority to bind in conscience, in the light of the commandments of the natural law. The laws of man that are in direct contradiction with the natural law bear an initial defect, that no violent means, no outward display of power, can remedy. By this standard must we judge the principle, "What helps the people is right".'

The whole document offers a searching and fundamental criticism of the Nazi philosophy from the Christian standpoint.

1938: Annexation of Austria; Attitude of the New Pope

The year 1938 was marked by the annexation of Austria, which was immediately followed by an onslaught upon the property and influence of the Austrian Church more rapid and open than the rest of Germany had known. In this year, too, leaders of the Church such as Cardinals Innitzer and Faulhaber, Archbishop Gröber, and Bishop Sproll were the victims of organized violence.

An institution of great importance for the attack on the Churches in Nazi Germany is called *die kochende Volksseele* or 'seething soul of the people'. Train-loads and car-loads of Party members and hired ruffians can be brought to any desired spot in order to demonstrate with violence against a distinguished person objectionable to the Government. The police can be required to take no notice of the rioting, and the offending party can then be punished by the Government as being in himself a danger to the public peace. The 'seething soul of the people' is indiscriminately intolerant of Roman Catholics, Protestants, Social Democrats, and Jews.

At the end of 1938 plans were ready for the liquidation of the Roman Church in Germany. The new Pope on his election secretly summoned all the German Bishops to Rome, suppressed the

publication of news unfavourable to the Reich, and has obviously been seeking a way out of the *impasse*. His efforts have not prevented the further persecution of the Church; whether they would have had any good result we shall presumably never know.

Nazism and the German Protestants

Much that has been said of the attitude of the Nazi Government to the Roman Church applies also in the case of the Protestants. But the story of the Evangelical Church or Churches has been much more complicated. At the time of the Revolution German Protestantism was divided between Lutherans and Reformed (or Calvinists), and again into many independent regional Churches. Since the Revolution there have been many tendencies, leagues, and parties which have crossed the local and denominational divisions.

The Revolution brought with it a romantic and quasi-religious national revival. It was natural that the Christians should wish to claim the new life for their Master and to divert it into Christian channels. Moreover, it was felt by many that the theology of the Church was rigid, antiquated, and out of touch with the living needs of the new day. Some argued, therefore, that if the new life of the nation was to be won for Christ, the message of the Church must be cast in the terms now current and understood; that is, it must in some degree be recast in terms of Race and Blood and Soil; it must be accommodated, too, in some degree to the anti-Semitism which was a dominating principle of the new régime.

Those who took this view in an extreme form are the so-called 'German Christians'. They are prepared to swear 'unqualified allegiance' to Herr Hitler and to subject the Church wholly to State control. They accept 'the Aryan Paragraph', repudiate the Old Testament as Scripture, and would interpret Christianity, even the Communion Service, in terms of Blood and Race and Soil. The 'German Christians' are strong in Thuringia, but they are not, and have never been, a numerous party. They have, however, both importance and power because in the course of the Church struggle the intervention of the Nazi Government has given them almost complete control of the official Protestant Church organization throughout the land.

If the 'German Christians' represent the left wing of Protestantism, the right wing are those who stand in unswerving loyalty to the old Confessions of the Church, and who have been profoundly influenced by the teaching of Dr. Karl Barth. They are sometimes called 'the Confessional Church', but the term needs further definition (see p. 24).

Between these two extremes is found the majority of German Protestants. There are innumerable degrees of approximation to, and repulsion from, the 'heresy' of the 'German Christians'. Moreover, the course of the Church struggle has led to varying alignments.

Every department of State in Nazi Germany has its 'leader'. The Government desired, therefore, that the 'leadership-principle' (*Führerprinzip*) should be introduced into the Church. This was the

occasion of the first dispute between the State and the Protestant Church. Herr Ludwig Müller, an old Army chaplain and friend of Herr Hitler's, was made *Reichsbischof* with plenary powers over the Church. The resistance of the congregations achieved his virtual retirement, but not before by a stroke of the pen he had handed over to the Nazi Party the whole organization of the Youth Work in the Protestant Church.

In May, 1934, there was held a great synod of the Church in Wuppertal-Barmen. It represented substantially the whole Protestant Church of Germany except for the 'German Christians', their warm sympathizers and such pastors and congregations as were in definite opposition to the then dominant influence of Dr. Barth. The Synod declared in memorable terms that the Christian Church rests upon the revelation of God in Christ, and that neither the events of the Nazi Revolution nor the philosophy of the Nazi Party could be regarded as subsidiary sources of revelation:

'Jesus Christ, as He is declared to us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God that we must hear, that in life and in death we must trust and obey. We repudiate the false teaching that the Church can and must recognize as a source of its message, in addition to and beside this one Word of God, also other events and powers, figures, and truths as divine revelation.'

At this time German Protestantism spoke with an almost united voice, and the Church that made this declaration is sometimes called the 'Confessional

Church' as being loyal to the old Confessions of the Reformation.

It should be explained, however, that the term 'Confessional Church' is normally used in a more restricted sense. In later days, when through the interference of the Government acting through the 'German Christians' the organization and constitution of the great Prussian Union Church had been disrupted, the faithful pastors and congregations joined to create a skeleton Provisional Church Government loyal to the standards of the Church. ('Prussia' in this connexion means a very large part of Germany, vastly more than the old kingdom of Prussia.) This organization also admitted individual members from outside Prussia. It is this body which is usually called 'the Confessional Church' in English writings and this which has borne the chief brunt of the persecution.

When the *Reichsbischof*, with his legal assistant Dr. Jaeger, had manifestly failed to settle the Protestant Church question, the Government attempted to find a settlement by means of new Church committees under Dr. Zoellner, a moderate and much respected 'General Superintendent' of the Church. Such questions were at issue as the extreme nationalism of the Government, the quasi-Messianic claims that were made for Herr Hitler, and the anti-Semitic legislation of the Party. The Church was also profoundly disturbed about the overt paganism which had apparent Government support. Though the less compromising pastors such as Dr. Niemöller looked askance at these new committees as repre-

senting a Trojan horse, Dr. Zoellner might perhaps have united the great bulk of the Protestant Churches had the Government given him a free hand. But the interference of the Secret Police and the official backing for the 'German Christians' made Dr. Zoellner's task impossible. He resigned and died.

Since then the Protestant Front has gradually disintegrated through the action sometimes of the Secret Police and sometimes of the Department of State for Church Affairs. At the time of the Munich crisis, when the Provisional Church Government issued the Service of Intercession to which reference has been made above (p. 10), the Lutheran Bishops of the Regional Churches were persuaded to dissociate themselves from this action of their brethren in Prussia.

Then came the question of the oath of personal allegiance and obedience demanded of the pastors by Herr Hitler, a disturbing and divisive question because the exact relation of this oath to the prior ordination oath received no careful definition, and, once again, those who feared compromise above all things were divided and in part estranged from those who thought that so far as possible they should accept the Government's demands.

Persecution by the Gestapo and by Financial Control

Throughout the whole struggle both Churches have suffered from the constant attentions of the Political Police (Gestapo). Their correspondence has been opened, their telephones have been tapped,

microphones have been surreptitiously installed in their rooms, their houses have been searched. There is no habeas corpus in Nazi Germany, and the Political or Secret Police are wholly independent of the Ministry of Justice. In unnumbered cases pastors have been arrested, imprisoned, misused, without trial and indeed without the preferment of any charge. The faithful remnant in the Protestant Church has been nearly driven into the catacombs.

In this year up to the outbreak of war, however, the Church has suffered rather from the Department of State for Church Affairs than from the Secret Police. Through the financial powers of this Department the Nazi Party has a stranglehold upon all Church finances. Without Government permission no salary may be paid, no money spent, and no voluntary Church collection taken up. The 'leadership principle' has been surreptitiously introduced into the Church by the autocratic powers given to the higher Church officials who are, to all intents and purposes, Government nominees. Any pastor may now be removed from his office 'for official reasons', and, in effect, the whole of the Church organization and machinery has been handed over to the 'German Christians'. The Bishops of the Regional Lutheran Churches have cut themselves off from the stalwarts in Prussia and in varying degree have accepted the Government control of the Church. The position of the so-called 'Provisional Church Government' has been made almost impossible. When war broke out, many of its leaders, it is believed, were in prison,

others were forbidden to travel or to speak in public, others had been dismissed from office; their theological training institutions had been suppressed by the police, their ordinations were unrecognized, and their younger pastors almost penniless.

News that has come since the outbreak of war suggests that the State is making yet another effort at once to unify and control the Church. An Emergency Committee of four has apparently been set up to manage Protestant Church affairs. At the head of this is Dr. Werner, whose recent decrees have gone so far to 'Nazify' the constitution of the Church. His colleagues are a Dr. Hymmen, who is presumably legal adviser to the Committee, Bishop Schultz of Schwerin, a somewhat unbalanced and extreme 'German Christian', and, surprisingly, Dr. Marahrens, Bishop of Hanover, who was one of the Church leaders participating in the Barmen Synod, but who since then seems to have compromised more and more with the demands of the Nazi Government. Whether the national peril will lead to a calling off of the Church persecution or to a treatment of the 'Confessional Church' as treasonable to the State we cannot tell.

The New Paganism in Germany

By blandishments and by promises, by threats and by persecution, the State has attempted to bring the Protestant and Roman Catholic Churches into line with the régime. Meanwhile within the Party and even openly a new pagan cult has been developing. The Church has had to meet not only

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the 'heresy' of Herr Rosenberg and of the 'German Christians' but also the fostering of a romantic neo-heathenism by responsible members and organs of the Party. At the Nordic Festival of the Summer Solstice in 1938, for instance, Herr Julius Streicher, editor of the notorious *Stürmer* and Herr Hitler's personal friend (who seems since the declaration of war to have been arrested by Marshal Göring), addressed a vast concourse of Germans on the Hesselberg, a mountain declared sacred by the Führer. Standing by a great bonfire, he said:¹

'We need no men in black to whom to make our confessions, that we may gain strength for the coming year. When we look into the flames of this holy fire and throw our sins into them, we can descend from this mountain with clean souls. We do not need priests and pastors. We have become our own priests. We approach nearer to God after climbing this mountain. Let people abroad criticize our worship as much as they like. The fact remains that God has always accompanied Germany on her way, even thousands of years before there were prophets or churches. The time will come when Germans will climb the sacred mountain not once a year but whenever they feel the need of worship which formerly drove them into the churches. Be beautiful, godlike, and natural.'

It would, perhaps, be a mistake to take very seriously this frank heathenism, except in so far as it might easily ally itself with the anti-Christianity of Moscow. The danger that Christianity itself be paganism in the service of National Socialism is

¹ See *The Times* and the *Manchester Guardian* for 27 June 1938.

probably much greater. The real attitude of the State to the Christian Churches was revealed in a well-attested speech delivered privately at a Party gathering at Nürnberg in 1938 by Herr Alfred Rosenberg. He said:

‘In replying to various questions relating to our attitude towards the Churches I wish to emphasize that my replies are in harmony with the Führer’s opinions on this very complicated subject. There are hot-heads amongst us who would like to compel the Führer simply to root out the Catholic and the Protestant Confessional Churches just as we have the Bolshevik parties. Now, apart from the fact that the prohibition of these parties was by no means synonymous with the extirpation of Marxism from the thought and feeling of our people—a point we can note every day—we must remember that the international position of the Catholic Church calls for very careful tactics on our part towards that Church. Every attack upon the Church affects international relations and can intensify the difficulties of a position which is already serious enough. That the Catholic Church and also the Confessional Church in their present form must disappear from the life of our People is my full conviction, and I believe I am entitled to say that this is also our Führer’s viewpoint. . . . We have already gone far ahead in permeating the German Youth with the National Socialist philosophy of life. Whatever still functions of the Catholic Youth Movement is nothing more than various fractional groups which will be absorbed in the course of time. The Hitler Youth Organization is an absorbent sponge which nothing can withstand. Furthermore, the development of our teaching scheme in schools of all categories is of such an anti-Christian-Jewish type that the growing generation will be forewarned against the

blackcoat swindle. And you should also remember that even in the Catholic Church there are sincere Germans working as priests, who are utterly devoted to the National Socialist philosophy. With their help we shall occupy the last—and, I admit, extremely solid—positions of the Church. But we have another means of pressure also, and that is the financial one. But here also we must proceed prudently, although systematically, so as to cut the financial arteries supplying those clergy whom we cannot win over.'

It is fair and necessary to take this utterance as representing the mind and policy of the Party.

The Fundamental Clash between Nazism and Christianity

All political questions are at bottom theological. The clash between National Socialism and the Christian Church rests upon the incompatibility of two views of the world, two conceptions of God, two 'anthropologies'. In National Socialism there are no ultimate, universal standards. Right is defined as that which accords with the demands of the people's soul; law has no basis in an ethic binding upon man as man; what Germans wish is right, what Germans think is true; there is no transcendent God whose Law is universal, whose Love knows no favouritism and no limits. The Church struggle in Germany is of no merely ephemeral interest. It raises in an acute form an issue which both National Socialism and Bolshevism present to every country. What is to be the foundation of our European civilization? Both Germany and

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Russia as represented by their Governments have repudiated the moral standards and the moral sanctions upon which for a thousand years what we call the civilized world has rested. National Socialism in Germany is doomed, for Herr Hitler's régime will not survive the war. Germany, as we may suppose, will either go Bolshevist or revert to Christendom. It is this idea of Christendom which now appears not as a mere dream of the Middle Age but as the burning issue of our time.


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MAIN IMPORTS LIKELY TO BE CUT OFF FROM GERMANY BY BLOCKADE

Value of Germany's imports in 1937 from countries now cut off from her, and the relation which they bear to Germany's total imports in the same class.



OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

No. 19

CAN GERMANY STAND THE STRAIN?

BY

L. P. THOMPSON

OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS

1939

CAN Germany stand the strain of a blockade to-day, what are the actual effects of a blockade going to be, how far can 'accessible neutrals' supply Germany's needs, what part can Russia play as a source of supplies, how can Germany pay for what she wants in war-time? These are questions to which no precise answer can be given, but Mr. Thompson gives the essential facts of the position and indicates the conclusions to be drawn from them. Mr. Thompson is an economic and statistical expert who has contributed on industrial subjects to *The Economist*, and was the author of two of the bulletins issued by the Air Raid Defence League.

The nature and effects of the Naval Blockade in the last war are dealt with in Pamphlet No. 17 (*The Blockade, 1914-19*) by Mr. W. Arnold-Forster.

The Nazi policy of 'autarky' has been described and analysed in Professor Fisher's pamphlet *Economic Self-Sufficiency* (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs, No. 4).

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CAN GERMANY STAND THE STRAIN?

The Effects of Blockade

BY the end of the last war Germany had been reduced to economic prostration. Food was exceedingly short. Fats were so scarce that grease was extracted from rags and household slops, and soap was made of clay and resin. The shortage of clothing was described by the German Chancellor in 1918 as even more serious than the shortage of food. Already in 1916 household utensils of copper were being requisitioned, and at various times tin cans and even organ-pipes were collected for the tin which could be recovered from them. The weapon which brought Germany to these straits was the economic warfare conducted mainly by the Royal Navy. This warfare is popularly known as a 'blockade' and will be referred to by that name, although in the language of international law it should strictly be termed not blockade but contra-band control.¹

In 1939 Germany has once again to face blockade by sea. This time she has Russia for a friend, and hopes, no doubt, that the Balkan States will be

¹ See Oxford Pamphlet No. 17, *The Blockade, 1914-1919*, by W. Arnold-Forster.

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ready to supply her with as much of their produce as she may require. She has also spent great sums on Field-Marshal Göring's 'Four Year Plan', undertaken in the autumn of 1936 to make Germany independent of foreign supplies in peace or war. 'Germany's genius and inventiveness', said Hitler, 'can easily solve this problem.' Is Hitler right? Is Germany now safe from blockade? Let us see how it will affect her.

Blockade does not simply mean that the enemy's shipping is swept from the ocean. Even when that has been done (as it already has been in this war), the enemy can still import through neutral countries and in neutral shipping. If the goods in a neutral ship are obviously consigned to Germany as their final destination, it is simple for the Navy to seize them (and pay for them) so that they never reach the Germans. Germany can, however, overcome this obstacle by persuading neutral merchants to import the goods ostensibly for their own business, and then resell them to Germany once they are safely in port. In the last war a system of rationing for neutrals was set up by Great Britain in order to make such practices impossible. A central trading association was established in each country, dealing direct with the British Department of War Trade, and the neutrals were able to

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satisfy essential requirements for their own needs, but had nothing over to resell to Germany. 'The postal control and censorship established by Great Britain in conjunction with the blockade gave an immense amount of information about the character of neutral firms. Compliance with the regulations was enforced by the publication of a "black list" containing the names of those neutrals who were known to trade with the enemy.'¹

That is what blockade meant in the last war. A huge and complicated machinery is needed to enforce it to the full, and Germany cannot be completely sealed off from overseas supplies at once. But with every week that passes the net is drawn tighter. As the organization is perfected, Germany will find herself more and more completely cut off from outside her immediately accessible neighbours in Europe.

Can Accessible Neutrals supply what the Nazis Need?

Apart from the goods which the Nazis may be able to smuggle through the ever-tightening net, their purchases must now be confined to Russia and accessible neutral neighbours of Northern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe. If they try to buy from overseas, the consignments will inevi-

¹ C. R. M. F. Cruttwell, *History of the Great War*.

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tably be detected by our contraband control, and will go to swell our supplies instead of Germany's. How great a handicap is that to the Nazis?

Before we consider the commodities, let us see where, in general, Germany buys them in peace time. The following figures give Germany's 'import surplus' with the chief raw material suppliers.

Principal Sources of Germany's 'Import Surplus' in Peace

(Millions of Reichsmarks)

<i>German import surplus from</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1937</i>
<i>British Empire:</i>		
India	20	21
Malaya	34	78
Australia	8	38
South Africa	2	30
West Africa	64	59
Canada	(expt. surplus 16)	16
Total of above Empire Countries	—	—
	112	242
Spain	29	64
Dutch East Indies	74	66
Argentina	21	148
U.S.A.	60	73
Rumania	(export surplus 12)	50

These figures show that, directly the blockade is put on, Germany is at once cut off from all her principal 'import surplus' suppliers.

The following notes show how the supplies themselves are affected.

Mineral Oil, Petrol, &c.

Germany's peace-time consumption is about 7 million tons a year, of which about one-third is produced at home, the rest being imported. In war, consumption rises. Estimates by German authorities have put war needs between 20 and 30 million tons a year; but such estimates are probably very much too high. It remains true, however, that while total exports from Rumania and Russia, if diverted in their entirety to Germany, could cover Germany's peace-time consumption, they would probably not meet war needs. The Polish oil-wells have only a small output. Neighbouring countries, including Russia, cannot supply Germany with enough oil for a full-scale war. Even if they could, the difficulty of transporting the oil would remain, as will be explained later. Finally, there is no hope of relief through increasing the output of oil from coal. It is estimated (Sternberg, *Germany and a Lightning War*, p. 212) that 70 to 90 million tons of coal a year would be needed to meet Germany's war requirements of petrol from home resources; and German mines are already producing all the coal they can. Stocks of oil and petrol, amounting at the highest estimate to 4 million tons, have been accumulated and will serve for a while to cover

shortages in imports. But the stocks cannot be replaced.

Iron Ore.

The development of home-produced ores under the Four Year Plan has not kept pace with the increase in home demand. Between 1934 and 1938 home production of ore rose from 4.3 million tons to 11.1 million. Yet at the same time iron ore imports rose from 8.2 million tons to 21.9 million. The yield of iron from the low grade home ores is poor, and in terms of iron content the home-produced ore in 1938 covered little more than a quarter of total consumption. In 1914-18 Germany had the great ore-fields of Lorraine to draw on. They are now on the French side of the Maginot line. If all Germany's accessible neighbours sent all their exports to her, they would still not cover her peace-time requirements on the scale of recent years. But it remains to be seen whether Sweden (who accounts for about-two thirds of such exports) will be willing to send all her exports to Germany when a ready market exists in England. Russia, though her output of iron ore has risen greatly in recent years, needs all the ore herself, and her export is negligible. Even if Russia could increase the amount available for export, the difficulty of transporting

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the ore from the Urals to Germany would be great.

Copper and Copper Ore.

Total *net* exports of accessible countries would only cover about 15 per cent. of Germany's peacetime imports. This is a very serious loss to Germany since there is no substitute for copper as a component in certain important types of electrical and armament equipment.

Other Metals.

In addition, almost all nickel, chromite, tungsten, manganese, antimony, and mercury has to be imported, though some of the supplies come from easily accessible sources. Russia could supply all manganese requirements.

Rubber.

There is no rubber whatever available in accessible countries. 'Buna' substitute is satisfactory for some purposes, but is expensive compared with real rubber, demanding considerable coal and labour. In 1938 'buna' appears to have covered about a fifth of total consumption. More factories are said to be coming into operation, but Germany's dependence on imports of crude rubber will only be slightly diminished thereby.

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Oilseeds and Animal and Vegetable Fats.

Germany produces the greater part of her butter requirements, but has to import all oilseeds (six times the volume of butter, estimated in terms of oil content), and all whale oil (double the volume of butter). Accessible countries cannot supply oilseeds, or substitutes for them, in any significant quantities. British command of the seas also cuts off whale oil, of which the United Kingdom has in any case already secured most of the 1939 catch by buying it up last Spring.

Textile Fibres.

The *Deutsche Volkswirt* (6 January 1939) has claimed that home production of textile raw materials has risen from 17 per cent. to 42 per cent. since 1932. Foreign imports have not fallen, but the greater home demand has been met from home resources, mainly through increased output of staple fibre (which is closely akin to rayon). A certain percentage of staple fibre is compulsory in all woollen or cotton fabrics manufactured for the home market. Substitute materials are unpopular, as Field-Marshal Göring admitted in his speech of 9 September. The shortage of natural fibres cannot be relieved by any accessible neutral, including Russia. Though some accessible countries export

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both wool and cotton in small quantities, they in turn depend on imports. None has a significant exportable *surplus* to offer to Germany. In war the consumption of cotton rises sharply. During the peak of explosive production in 1914-18 Germany was using almost as much cotton for explosives as for textiles.

Skins and Hides.

There is no significant exportable surplus among accessible neutrals. Substitutes are possible for many purposes, but they usually require either textiles or rubber.

Coffee, Cocoa, Tea.

There are no supplies available. These are not essentials, and substitutes of a kind can be made. But it is a considerable hardship to be cut off from *all* these beverages.

Can Germany pay Neutral Suppliers?

Our examination of imports shows that, even if the Nazis could pay, their neighbours could not supply all, or nearly all, the commodities required. But consideration of Germany's export problem leads to the conclusion that, even if her neighbours could provide the goods they need, the Nazis would have difficulty in paying for them once the gold hoard (see p. 19) is used up.

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Broadly speaking, Germany's foreign trade system depends on selling in Europe more than she buys from Europe, in order to obtain foreign exchange to pay for goods from overseas, where she buys more than she sells. The European 'export surplus' covers the cost of the extra-European 'import surplus'. The following figures, taken from

(Millions of Reichsmarks)

	1935	1936	1937
Europe:			
German imports from European countries . .	2,564.0	2,521.5	3,038.6
German exports to European countries . . .	3,124.5	3,372.9	4,093.7
Export surplus . . .	560.5	851.4	1,055.1
Overseas:			
German imports from outside Europe . . .	1,582.7	1,682.3	2,409.8
German exports to outside Europe . . .	1,140.4	1,389.7	1,811.6
Import surplus . . .	442.3	292.6	598.2

the latest official German Statistical Yearbook, show how the system works.

When we look into the detail of this European 'export surplus' we find that it is not drawn from all European countries. It depends, in fact, on German trade with a few of the leaders. The following figures (from the latest issue of the League of Nations *International Trade Statistics*) show the countries which make the big contributions.

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(Millions of Reichsmarks)

<i>German export surplus with</i>	<i>1936</i>	<i>1937</i>
Belgium	73	91
France	156	157
Great Britain and Ireland	148	127
Holland	227	252
Switzerland	120	137

Apart from these countries, the old German trading connexions in the Far East earn her a useful, though smaller, surplus with Japan and China (19 millions with China and 51 millions with Japan in 1936; and 23 millions with China and 91 millions with Japan in 1937).

Germany's Currency Difficulties

On the day war was declared, Germany lost her export trade with Great Britain and France. That loss deprives her of any direct access to sterling, which is the leading currency of international trade, and to the franc, which, with the dollar, is one of the three great international currencies of the world. In 1939 the loss of direct access to the great world currencies is a much more serious thing for Germany than it was in 1914. Then the German mark was itself one of the great currencies. Traders anywhere in the world had been accustomed to free dealing in marks, and German credit was good. A German promise to pay was accepted in inter-

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national trade, and a trader sending goods to Germany could count on being able to convert the currency in which he was paid into any other currency which he might require. To-day all that is changed. Even in peace-time the Reichsmark was not a 'free' currency. Ever since the Nazis came to power the restrictions on the mark have been growing, and creditors of Germany have been faced more and more with the alternative of accepting payment in German goods or not being paid at all. For the German debtor has only been allowed to pay in marks, and those marks have been 'blocked' so that they can only be spent inside Germany. It is therefore a serious matter for Germany to be deprived of direct access to the international currencies.

Through trade with neutral neighbours Germany may still have indirect access to sterling or another free currency. But even there she is faced with a dilemma. The Scandinavian countries together make a substantial contribution to the German 'export surplus', though individually none yields a surplus as great as those of the leaders shown in the table on p. 13. The Scandinavian countries, in turn, have in the aggregate a big 'export surplus' with Great Britain. Consequently Germany's trade with Baltic and Scandinavian countries gives her indirect access

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to their surplus sterling, as Germany's Scandinavian customers use their surplus sterling, in effect, to pay their bills in Germany. Now, if Germany persists in her attempt to cut off the Scandinavian and Baltic countries from trade with us, she will cut off their supply of sterling and prevent their paying her in sterling exchange.

Cut off in this way from currencies which can be used in payment for goods anywhere in the world, Germany is compelled to fall back on a greater use of barter. As the goods which Germany would have exported to France and ourselves can no longer be sold for free exchange, they must as far as possible be exchanged for other goods required by Germany and obtainable from the countries to which she still has access in Northern, Central, and South-Eastern Europe and Russia. What, therefore, are the exports which Germany will now find on her hands (in the case of countries at war with her) or very much more difficult to deliver (in the case of overseas neutrals)? And what prospect has she of finding a ready demand for them in the trading area still open to her?

Germany's Lost Exports

The table on p. 16 gives, in broad terms, the answer to the first question. It shows, first, the value of Germany's principal exports (in 1937) to

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countries which are now cut off from her ships; and, secondly, the approximate proportion which those exports bear to Germany's total exports in

Exports likely to be left on Germany's hands

<i>Goods</i>	<i>Approx. value of trade affected (mill. RM.)</i>	<i>Approx. proportion of total trade</i>
Coal and coke	187	one-third
Textiles	76	one-third
Paper and paper goods	95	one-half
Chemicals, dyes, fertilizers and drugs	342	one-half
Iron and steel semi-manufactures, &c.	126	one-third
Tools and iron ware	239	one-half
Machinery, precision instruments, optical and electrical gear	360	one-third
Vehicles and ships	101	one-third

the same class. The table is compiled from official German trade figures. It only covers the chief markets, not the minor countries for which the figures are small.

What are the prospects of Germany's being able to use those exports which are now left on her hands?

Coal and Coke.

With the coal and coke group Germany's prospects are reasonably good. Before the war the Baltic States and Denmark, Finland, and Sweden imported large quantities of British coal (some 7½ million tons in 1938) which we may be unable to

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deliver in future in view of the ruthless policy adopted by the Germans towards neutral shipping. If, therefore, Germany has coal to export after meeting her own heavier wartime requirements she can probably find a market for it. The Saar coal-field is out of action owing to the French advance, but Polish coalfields can more than make up the loss. The coal trade is, therefore, one of the few cases in which Germany's losses will be comparatively slight.

Textiles.

Here the problem is much more difficult. British and French textile exports to the Baltic and Scandinavian countries were not large, and there is no gap waiting to be filled by Germany. In general, demand for textiles only rises when general prosperity rises. In no other circumstances is it easy to force the market to expand. Yet if Germany is to make good her loss she must increase her sales to the remaining countries by 50 per cent. Possibly Russia might provide a capacious market. But Germany could not, in any case, supply it because (as we shall see later) she will be very short indeed of cotton and wool and cannot get significant supplies of them from any accessible country. Only a small opening would exist for rayon and substitute fabrics.

Paper.

There is not much opening here. Germany's neighbours are either self-sufficient in paper or already get a large part of their supply from Germany.

Chemicals.

Germany's own requirements will rise in wartime, leaving a smaller surplus available for export, so that loss of foreign markets would have to be faced in any case. A market might be developed in Russia, but some big cut in this export seems inevitable.

Iron and Steel and Tools and Ironware.

There are two serious obstacles to replacing lost exports here. First, Germany's own consumption of iron and steel must rise in wartime, leaving less over for export. And, secondly, Germany is likely to be distinctly short of iron ore (as will appear later), and will not be anxious to send iron and steel goods out of the country, once convinced that she has to fight a long war.

Machinery, Vehicles, and Ships.

Here the iron-ore shortage is not so serious an obstacle, as raw materials only represent a rather small part of the finished value of machinery,

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vehicles, and ships. But engineering craftsmen are urgently needed for war industries, and as the war develops it may be difficult to spare them for export jobs. If they can be spared, Russia might take a large amount of machinery on suitable terms.

It looks, therefore, as if Germany could hope to make a certain increase in the amount of goods which she exports to accessible neutrals, but could not hope nearly to replace the markets lost to her. The immediate effect of war and blockade is already to make the Nazis poorer in means of paying for the goods they want. Even if accessible neutrals could supply all the raw materials which Germany used to import from overseas (and, as we shall see, they cannot), the Nazis would not be able to find acceptable exports with which to pay the bill.

German Gold

For a time a dwindling export trade may not worry the Nazis. Over the last five or six years, while pleading poverty whenever creditors have pressed it to meet its debts, the German Government is known to have been gathering a secret war reserve of gold. The published gold holding of the Reichsbank is very small—between £6 and £7 millions at the outbreak of the war—but the plunder of Austria and Czechoslovakia included at least a large

part of the gold belonging to the central banks of each, and there is believed to be a secret hoard in the old Reich apart from the plunder. How far these reserves were drawn on before the war is not known. But it would be rash to assume that Germany has no gold now beyond the small amount shown in the Reichsbank statement, although the total hoard can only be a small fraction of the reserves of London and Paris. If exports are too small to pay for all that the Nazis need, gold will no doubt be found to make up the balance—for as long as the hoard lasts. In addition, Hitler may receive Russian gold as the price of selling to Stalin the interests of Germans in the Baltic and the Balkans.

Russia as a Source of Supplies

In examining above (pp. 5 to 11) how far accessible neutrals can supply what the Nazis need, Russia has been treated as accessible to Germany. But, even so, serious shortages remain. Now Russia if she is to make good those shortages—or such of them as she is in a position to supply—must make big changes in her own economic arrangements. There are great transport problems to be overcome, especially where iron ore and oil are concerned. Assuming that transport problems can be overcome (which is a very big assumption for iron ore and

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oil) Russians would have either to increase their output or to decrease their own consumption if any large quantities were to remain over for export to Germany. For, despite her great size, Russia only exports on a very modest scale. In total value of her export trade, for example, she now ranks behind Denmark, and she does not compare with any of the great exporting British Dominions or Colonies. The figures, in gold dollars as calculated by the League of Nations Economic Bulletin, are shown in the following table. They refer to the year 1937, as Russia has not yet returned her 1938 figure:

Monthly Average

1937 Exports in Gold Dollars

Russia . . .	16,180,000
Denmark . . .	17,040,000
Canada . . .	55,370,000
South Africa . . .	29,540,000
Australia . . .	28,620,000
India . . .	37,190,000
British Malaya . . .	25,650,000

This restriction of Russia's exports is not due to lack of foreign markets, but is a direct result of Russia's own internal development which is absorbing all the raw materials that the Russians can turn out. Last March, at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party, Mikoyan, Commissar for Foreign Trade, said:

'We are not exporting butter or eggs or bacon or fowls,

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since we are increasing domestic consumption, and every surplus goes to our warehouses, as well as those excellent goods which we formerly used to export. Despite the large increase in the production of benzine, kerosene, iron ore, and certain other goods, their export has been either curtailed or altogether discontinued. They, too, are kept for home consumption.'

Benzine and iron ore are two of the products which Germany will most urgently require. Are the Soviets prepared now to reverse their policy?

Presumably they would only do so if a really profitable market were to be opened to them, not a customer who would soon find the greatest difficulty in paying his bills. Admittedly, Russia was exporting much more to Germany in the early thirties than in recent years—in the exchange of letters which accompanied the Russo-German Agreement of 29 September 1939 it was stated that: 'Both parties will shape their economic policies in such a way that the German and Soviet trade turnover will again match the highest turnover of past years (over 1,000,000,000 marks in 1931). Both countries will take the necessary measures without delay, and negotiations shall be begun and concluded as soon as possible.' But what did Russia export to Germany in those years of high trade turnover? The following figures show

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the biggest items in Russia's exports to Germany in 1930 (the highest year for Russian exports to Germany):

	<i>Tons</i>	<i>Million RM.</i>
Barley	409,292	48·55
Hides and skins	6,728	68·67
Meat offals	7,826	19·02
Wood and timber	1,302,185	70·52
Mineral oil	372,352	51·31
Furs	626	22·32

Of these goods, the biggest class, wood and timber, would not be of particular significance against the blockade as Germany already has access to adequate supplies, even without Russia. The same applies to barley. Russian furs are not war needs. The two classes which would be relevant to Germany's present requirements are hides and skins and mineral oil. But:

Hides and Skins.

Russia is now a net importer of hides and skins. Unless she were willing to slaughter her stock of cattle for Germany's benefit, or to go without leather herself, she would find it difficult to increase this export substantially. The same, of course, applies to meat offals.

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Mineral Oil.

Since 1930 Russian oil output has risen by over 50 per cent. But her own requirements have risen yet faster (owing to mechanization of agriculture, the army, &c.), and her exports have consequently fallen far below the 1930 level. In any case the German import of Russian oil in 1930 was only a small part of Germany's total import of oil and oil products, and a recovery of the 1930 import level would make little difference to Germany's oil problem. If Germany's war needs of oil are to be met a vast increase in Russian oil exports will be required. There remains the question of how this great volume of oil would be transported.

Iron ore.

Iron ore is not shown in the table above because, so far from being a big item, exports to Germany in 1931 only amounted to 39,031 tons valued at 1.68 million RM.

Transport Difficulties

But even if Russia is able and willing to increase her exports of what Germany wants, there remains the serious difficulty of transport. The only really satisfactory route for heavy traffic between Russia and Germany is the Baltic. But the Baltic ports are at the opposite corner of European Russia from the

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Russian iron ore and oil fields. Provided that the Balkan countries offered no objection, the Danube would be a practicable route—assuming that the Black Sea was safe. But it is at present impossible to take oil tankers up the Danube the whole way from the Black Sea to Germany. Either constructional work must be carried out on the river bed or complicated transshipment arrangements would have to be made. If a big iron ore traffic is to be carried as well as the oil, a great new fleet of river craft will be needed.

The railways are even less likely to solve the transport problem. Immense distances are involved; the German gauge is different from the Russian; and both Germany and Russia are suffering from a shortage of goods wagons—the goods wagon stock of all Russian and German railways combined is about the same as the total goods wagon stock of Great Britain alone, i.e. 1,236,050 in Germany and Russia combined on December 31, 1937 (latest return available), against 1,296,838 (including private wagons) on the British railways. It has been calculated (*Economist*, 2 Sept. 1937) that if Russia could set aside as much as one-tenth of the total wagon stock exclusively for the needs of German trade the total annual carrying capacity over the very great distances would be

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less than Germany's annual peace-time imports of iron ore alone. As far as the Russian railways are concerned, the conclusion reached by Colonel Hesse may be quoted from a recent issue of the *Kriegswirtschaftliche Jahresberichte*, issued by the German War Ministry:

'A comparison of the Russian railway system with that of other countries shows how far it lags behind them. In view of the fact that Russia must now be counted as one of the mass-producing countries, the insufficiency of its railway system poses an economic problem which it will take years to solve. In a war, when mass-transportation has to be conducted in a short space of time, this problem may prove of decisive importance. It may be said without exaggeration that for many years to come the state of the Russian railways will remain the weakest point in the military-economic capacity of the Soviet Union.'

German Stocks

It was part of the Four Year Plan to build up great stocks of such commodities as Germany cannot produce at home or obtain from near neighbours. The amounts accumulated have been kept secret and, though calculations made in the London Commodity markets suggest that the resources of iron, copper, and petroleum are not more than would cover six months' consumption, we should face the probability that these stocks, used to supple-

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ment current supplies, may considerably prolong Germany's power of resistance. To speculate on how long they could prolong it would be unprofitable. But the reserves can only last a limited time. As they become exhausted, one section after another of Germany's productive machine must be brought to a standstill. Bottle-necks will be created and the cessation of one activity will hold up others where no shortage of supplies has yet been felt. That is Germany's weakness. For a time she can maintain production to the full. But the higher the output now the more quickly will stocks run out, and then the 'seizing up' must begin.

When we are considering stocks, however, we must not think only of hoards of this or that commodity. Besides 'visible' stocks, any nation, or indeed any family, has yet more important 'invisible' stocks. For example, if a man has a brand new pair of boots, his boot 'stock' is obviously greater than that of a man whose boots are all in holes. There Germany's position is weak. For several years past the Nazis have severely limited the amount of maintenance work which private or non-warlike industry might do in keeping its property and plant in good order. The effort instead has been directed to preparation for war. As a result, the national estate has been allowed to deteriorate. Even the State

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Railway has suffered and has been unable to keep pace with the increasing demands made on it. As the Weekly Report of the Institut für Konjunkturforschung admitted on 14 June last, 'the increase in transportation and the rising frequency of special problems has led temporarily to a great overburdening which had unfavourable effects on the operation of the railroad'. Similar complaints have been heard from leading shipowners and industrialists. The 'invisible stock' represented by a well-maintained national estate has already been heavily drawn on by the Nazis.

Coercion of Neutrals

It now begins to look as though the Nazis may try to use the time that remains to them to organize a 'Continental System' by which they may direct and monopolize their neighbours' trade 'from the Baltic to the Mediterranean'. The redoubtable Dr. Schacht has been put to work on the scheme, the attractions of which will shortly be urged on the neighbour States. It is referred to as a 'Continental Blockade of Britain', and is said to be devised to enable continental countries which are cut off from England by the war at sea to dispose of their exports profitably elsewhere. In particular, Germany will gladly accept all such surplus exports, partly for

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her own use and partly for redistribution to other countries. The Nazis, in fact, aim to compel their neutral neighbours to centralize their entire external trade in German hands.

Such kindly consideration for the trade of neighbour States is not new—though it has not been openly pressed on Scandinavian countries before. In a speech at Königsberg on 21 August 1938 Dr. Funk outlined a scheme in which Germany would be the sole purchaser of Balkan products in bulk, absorbing for herself as much as she required and reselling the surplus on world markets. The free exchange obtained for the surplus would be used by Germany to buy such products as the Balkan countries could not supply, and Germany would be the sole supplier of Balkan needs. There has not, however, been any great enthusiasm on the part of Balkan States for a project which would have completely undermined their elementary freedom to sell their own produce where they wanted and to buy whatever they wished with the proceeds. It is questionable whether the scheme will be found any more attractive to neutrals now that Germany's ability to market even her own surplus has been crippled by war pressure. Will the Nazis, therefore, cease to be content with the normal processes of exchange and attempt to extort goods from

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neutral countries by force? The submarine onslaught on neutral shipping is beginning to suggest that they may.

Forcible seizure of goods, however, gives little promise of solving Germany's real problem. Indeed, it is more likely to aggravate it. For, particularly where the products of peasant labour are concerned, any surplus of goods which a country has available for export under normal conditions of trade tends to disappear when compulsion is substituted for free purchase. The official German 'Felddienstordnung' specifically advises that when everything that can be removed has already been confiscated, payments in cash, or promises to pay in cash, will invariably produce fresh supplies. In the industrial world bad work and sabotage are the counterparts of peasant hoarding. Moreover, forcible extraction of produce from a coerced population requires very large numbers of troops. Even after the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by which Russia surrendered to Germany in 1918, the rich lands of the Ukraine could only be forced to yield up a reasonable surplus by the employment of armies of soldiers and police. 'Considerable forces were needed to squeeze supplies of food out of the hoarding peasants and to administer and police the vast areas which they (the Germans) had taken under

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control. Even at the time of their bitterest need in France, in the following October, forty divisions . . . were detained in the east.¹

It is, in fact, inescapable that neither by ordinary commercial methods nor by coercion can Germany hope to evade the slow but sure pressure of naval blockade. In the corner of the world which remains open to Germany there simply do not exist some of the materials essential to the conduct of war and indeed to the maintenance of civil life. And as the war progresses it will become harder and harder for Germany to pay for the supplies that do exist there. That does not mean that the task of the Allies is easy. Though Germany cannot sustain a long war, the Nazis have built up a machine which can, while it lasts, strike hard in an effort to break our stranglehold. But it *is* a stranglehold. And both the Nazis and we know it.

¹ Cruttwell, *History of the Great War*, p. 484.

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OXFORD PAMPHLETS ON WORLD AFFAIRS

No. 20

WHO HITLER IS

BY

R. C. K. ENSOR

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At the end of the last war Hitler, aged 30, was a lance-corporal in the German army. In 1919 he joined a little body called the German Workers' Party, which later became the National Socialist (Nazi) Party. In 1921 he designed its swastika flag, and became its Führer. In 1923 he was imprisoned, and wrote the first part of *Mein Kampf*. In 1928 the Party had only 12 seats in the Reichstag. In 1930 the Party polled 6½ million votes and had 107 seats. In 1933 Hitler became Chancellor of the Reich, and all the world knows what has happened since then. This Pamphlet is at once a short biography of the man who at the end of August 'decided for war, and signed the death-warrant for, perhaps, millions of lives', and an account of the methods by which the Nazi party rose to power and absolute control over the destinies of 80 million people.

Mr. Ensor has described the ideas at the back of Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* in Pamphlet No. 3 in this series, which should be read in conjunction with this one.

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WHO HITLER IS

IN his broadcast to the British nation on the outbreak of hostilities, Mr. Chamberlain made clear his conviction that this was one man's war. 'Up to the very last', he said, 'it would have been quite possible to have arranged a peaceful and honourable settlement between Germany and Poland; but Hitler would not have it.' There is every reason to believe that attribution correct. At the end of August the final choice between war and peace lay with an individual. He decided for war, and signed the death-warrant for, perhaps, millions of lives.

Who and what is this war-maker? He is on any showing a very remarkable person. He has risen to power despite extraordinary handicaps. If any seer had predicted in 1914 that within twenty years all the chief Conservative elements in Germany—her Army officer-class and her landed aristocracy, her lower middle-class and her millionaire industrialists—would have combined together (with eager approval and support from leading Hohenzollerns) to give absolute power to an ex-working man, few indeed would have believed it. Fewer still if it had been added that the working man was not German by birth, but German-Austrian; that he had served through the 1914-18 war without ever rising above the rank of lance-corporal; and that in his civilian

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trade, as an artisan working for builders and decorators, he had never been able to keep any position for more than a few months.

Antecedents and Youth

He was born in 1889 in the small Austrian town of Braunau on the Austro-Bavarian frontier, and spent boyhood and adolescence in other towns on the same frontier, where he was much nearer Munich than Vienna. He came on both sides from the peasant stock of a forest region, whose people are said to be noted for sturdiness and longevity. The father was a man out of the common. The illegitimate son of a mother of 42, he climbed at 40 into lower middle-class status as an Austrian Government official employed in the Customs. Thereupon he married his third wife; and to them twelve years later was born Adolf. He sent the boy to a *Realschule*—a secondary school with a modern curriculum—hoping to get him eventually into Government service. But Adolf was wayward and idle, and having a turn for drawing dreamed of becoming an artist. Before he was 13, his father died; and, soon after, he developed a temporary lung-trouble, which caused him to be coddled. For five years he lived indolently, working so little even at his art lessons that at 18 he could not pass the examinations to go farther. Then his mother died; and almost suddenly he found himself an impoverished orphan, who, through wasting his school

opportunities, possessed no qualifications for any profession, artistic or other. He went away to Vienna, and became a bricklayer's labourer.

His early experiences in the great city were cruel. For three years he lived in a men's lodging-house with the lowest of the poor. The miseries and brutalities which he describes in his book *Mein Kampf*,¹ he had obviously seen with his own eyes. Friendless and unskilled, he just kept afloat, but the premature harsh struggle made him a cynic and a fighter without scruples. In a world of knavery, where his fellow men fell into two classes—deceivers and dupes—he saw the advantage of belonging to the former. In *Mein Kampf* he discusses without compunction what are the best methods to employ for deceiving the public on the grand scale—methods which he and his movement afterwards regularly practised in the pursuit of power, alike in Germany and in Europe. They assume a complete indifference to right and wrong.

Politics in Vienna

In Vienna at that time, apart from a large body of Czechs and smaller contingents from the other subject peoples in the Habsburgs' dominion, two main races composed the population, German-Austrians and Jews. The latter were a minority,

¹ *My Struggle*. For some account of the ideas in this book see Pamphlet No. 3 in this series (*Herr Hitler's Self-Disclosures in Mein Kampf*, by R. C. K. Ensor).

but a large one. Their political expression was the Social Democratic party, to which they supplied nearly all the leaders and the most enterprising of the rank and file. Among the German-Austrian population parties rose and fell, but two rival political tendencies persisted. The stronger was Catholic-clerical and pro-Habsburg; the other, anti-clerical and Pan-German, hating the Habsburg dynasty as an obstacle to union with the Fatherland. The circumstances of Vienna made both schools anti-Semite; those of Austria made them both anti-Slav, and in particular anti-Czech. The 'anti' feelings were intense, the conflicts between races and parties resembling those in Belfast or Londonderry.

Coming from the west frontier of Austria, where desire for union with Germany was commonest, the young Hitler naturally sided with the Pan-Germans. But he thought that the 'Christian Socialist' party, which at that time ruled Vienna as the popular representative of the Catholic and pro-Habsburg element, was better led. He particularly admired its chief, the burgomaster Dr. Lueger, for his demagogic gifts and his zealous anti-Semitism. His own hatred for Jews and Social Democrats was nourished by early trade experience. He was working on a large building, when a demand came that he should join the Social Democrat trade union, and on his refusing he was thrown off the job. This happened repeatedly. Working-class Vienna was not a nur-

sery of sweet reason. It was a school of violence and gangsterism, and the young orphan from the country marked, learned, and digested its lessons.

He was very miserable at that period, being conscious alike of social injustice and personal failure. Reared in a middle-class home, his idleness and truancy at school had cost him the descent to this proletarian abyss. The daily tragedies of slum life and unemployment tormented him. The more he witnessed, 'the greater grew my repulsion towards the city of millions, that first attracted men greedily to it, and in the cruel sequel ground them to powder'. In his twenty-first year he gave up working as a bricklayer's labourer. He took to painting and peddling cheap water-colours and executing architectural drawings. The income from these sources was minute, and in fact he lived by house-painting and paper-hanging. But he liked to fancy himself an artist, as indeed he always has.¹ Accounts by contemporaries of what he then looked like describe a slender, sickly, aesthetic youth, very different from the heavy jack-booted hero afterwards idolized by the Brownshirts.

Why he is against Parliaments

His change of trade gave him more time for reading, and he began to explore the world of

¹ So recently as 25 August 1939 he told the British Ambassador 'that he was by nature an artist, not a politician, and that once the Polish question was settled, he would end his life as an artist, and not as a war-monger'!

politics. The angle of his approach is interesting. From schooldays he had been a 'nationalist', i.e. a German race-patriot. And what shocked him most of all about the life of the Vienna workmen was that it rendered nationalism impossible. 'The question', he writes, 'of making a people nationalist is before all a question of creating healthy social conditions as the foundation of the possibility of educating the individual.' Before 20 he witnessed a sitting of the Austrian Chamber, and for a year he did so frequently. This Parliament was elected, like the French Chamber, by second ballot, and in consequence contained a large number of parties, no one of which could have a majority. Hitler in his book passes severe, but keen-sighted, and in the main well-justified censures on that type of Parliamentarism. Unfortunately he did not realize that there were other types; and so he was led to reject parliamentary government altogether. His mistake was, and is, the one made by most of those Continentals who have abandoned Parliamentarism.

Move to Munich

At 23 he moved from Vienna to Munich. This city cast a spell on him which has never faded. It is artistic and beautiful, and its people, unlike the motley cosmopolitan Viennese, appealed to him as unmistakably German. Their accent rather resembled that of his native region; so that he felt more at home, though technically in a foreign land. He

brought away with him from Vienna an assortment of hatreds—for Jews and Marxists, for Czechs, for city-industrialism, and, above all, for the Habsburgs—and also a hoard of observations and reflections on the art and method of gangster politics. But apart from arguing in cafés he had not discovered that he was an orator, nor indeed that he was good at anything. His life oscillated purposelessly between bursts of energy and spells of idleness, until the sudden advent of the 1914-18 war enabled him to find himself.

‘Finding himself’ in War

He welcomed instantly the fighting outlet.

To me those hours came as a redemption from the sorenesses of youth. I am not ashamed to say to-day, that overmastered by a storm of enthusiasm I sank down on my knees, and from an overflowing heart thanked Heaven for granting me the good fortune to be permitted to live at that time. (*Mein Kampf*, 181st German edition, p. 177.)

He had never soldiered before, having in Austria been excused service on account of his early lung-trouble. He now volunteered for the German Army, and was in its ranks for nearly six years. Although for exceptional gallantry he was awarded an Iron Cross of the first class, he was never (as already mentioned above) promoted beyond lance-corporal. Probably he was too self-centred and peculiar to get on perfectly with either officers or men. There

is a remarkable photograph, taken during that War, showing him in a group of seven 'field-greys'. The other six, laughing and joking, look much like English Tommies. The face of Hitler—grave, visionary, gazing apart into some indefinable distance—presents a haunting contrast. No one, if asked to guess which of the seven had a famous future before him, could fail to single him out.

Yet soldiering was really his native element. He feels and says so himself. Two utterances may be quoted in illustration. On the opening day of his attack on Poland (1 September 1939) he told the Reichstag:

I am from now on just first soldier of the German Reich. I have once more put on *that coat that was the most sacred and dear to me*. I will not take it off till after victory is secured, or I will not survive the outcome.

The other saying is recorded in the biography by Konrad Heiden.¹ Rudolf Hess, formerly Hitler's private secretary and now his official deputy, having acquired a beautifully situated villa near Munich, showed the Führer over it. He remarked what a good place it would be to end life in, with one's dying gaze on the distant Alps. Hitler remonstrated sternly. The only right place for men like Hess and himself to die in was, he suggested, a battle-field. This temper, though it matured late, began early.

¹ *Adolf Hitler*, 2 vols. (Zürich, 1936): the fullest single account of his life. Messrs. Constable publish a good (but somewhat abbreviated) English version of it.

He tells us that the first book to interest him as a child was a popular illustrated history of the Franco-Prussian War.

The great epic struggle became my greatest inner experience. Thenceforward I grew more and more enthusiastic about everything that in any way was connected with war or soldiers.

The combination in Hitler of the genuine soldier with the gangster—the fighter on actual battle-fields with the fighter in the ‘gloves-off’ arena of demagogic politics—may account for some of his successes as a man of action. It is an unusual combination; though it is perhaps not fanciful to see some parallels in the career of Julius Caesar. Hitler differs from Caesar in that he has never commanded armies from the top;¹ and instead of being an aristocrat who patronized and exploited the discontents of the poor, he is a man of humble origin who once drank the dregs of poverty in his own person.

The Militarists' Man

But the important thing to grasp here is his relation to German militarism. In the public life of his country he has always been the militarists' man. At every stage in his rise from 1919 onward it was they who kept pushing him up.

¹ Though it is said—and may be true—that the success of the Polish campaign was largely due to strategic policies, which he imposed on his generals against their will. Already in 1938 a member of the General Staff complained privately that he harangued it on strategy at its own head-quarters.

WHO HITLER IS

In 1916 he was severely wounded on the Somme. On discharge from hospital he was sent to a reserve battalion, but applied for and obtained his immediate return to his comrades at the front. In October, 1918, he was badly affected and temporarily blinded by British mustard-gas near Ypres. Again he went to hospital; and was still there, too blind to read newspapers, when the German revolution broke out and the war ended. When later he was again discharged, he had no home to go to; even his sisters had long lost touch with him. Therefore he went to the reserve battalion of his regiment, at Traunstein in Bavaria, and continued his service in the Army. It was then on the way to be transformed from a conscript to a professional organization—the Reichswehr, as eventually sanctioned by the Treaty of Versailles.

Politics of the Reichswehr

What were the politics of the Reichswehr in 1919? Was it a non-partisan Army, loyal to the Republic, or had it political aims of its own? Unquestionably it had. True, it had cast off the Hohenzollerns, and in April-May, 1919, it supported the Republic's Socialist Government against the revolt of the Communists and Minority Socialists. But at heart it was a counter-revolutionary body. Not the generals so much, but the colonels, majors, and captains, who were the real powers in it, ill-paid and precariously serving, were the arch-foes of the Versailles settle-

ment—not merely because as a beaten Army they wanted to reverse the record of their defeat, but because as members of the great hereditary German officer-caste they resented a treaty which, by restricting the German Army to 100,000 men, deprived the great majority of their fellow officers of military employment. Hence the systematic hiding of arms which ought to have been surrendered to the Allies; hence the organization of the then numerous ‘volunteer-corps’—para-military bodies designed partly to increase Germany’s war-strength, and partly to secure political power for their creators (who at need could always arm them from their secret stores); hence too the murder-plots which killed off Republican leaders—Kurt Eisner in 1919, Erzberger in 1921, Rathenau in 1922, and a multitude of lesser persons. The aim at bottom, beneath all these activities, was to restore a great German Army and re-equip the country to turn the tables on the victors of the 1914–18 war. The Republican Governments of Germany ought in their own interests, as well as in those of treaty-loyalty and European peace, to have frankly and sternly stopped them. But after Ebert and Noske had been obliged to lean on the Reichswehr in order to crush the Communist rebellion of 1919, they became the captives of their protectors. Neither they nor any Ministers after them dared either reform the personnel of the Reichswehr or put their foot down on its plots. That was perhaps the most

fundamental reason for the Republic's eventual collapse.

In many places the local Reichswehr officers gained a whiphand over the police. So it was in Bavaria, and Hitler's career was made possible thereby. The story begins in May, 1919, when the Bavarian Reichswehr, authorized by the Berlin Government of Ebert and Noske, bloodily suppressed the Soviet Government that had been set up in Munich by the revolting Communists and Left-Socialists. Two months earlier Hitler had gone to Munich, and spent the interval—at risk to his life—in arguing for the Social Democrats and against the Communists in cafés and clubs. His real function had been that of a spy; and when the victorious Reichswehr set up a commission of inquiry to find who the most active Sovietists had been, with a view to executing them, Hitler's informations proved of great service. That, he says, was his 'first more or less purely political active employment'. His officers encouraged his desire to take up others.

Hitler under Reichswehr Patronage

The Munich Reichswehr was commanded by Colonel (afterwards General) von Epp, who became a great helper of Hitler's party. His right-hand man was Captain Röhm, afterwards chief organizer of Hitler's 'S.A.' (Storm Troops). Röhm was a desperado, already concerned in political assassina-

tions. The Reichswehr men had been taught by the 1918 revolution that they could not afford to neglect public opinion. They discovered that their queer fanatical lance-corporal, who knew so much about the Munich underworld, had gifts as a demagogue orator. They employed him to lecture to the troops, and also in a Press department. They sent him to sample a meeting of a little body called the German Workers' Party. Hitler joined it; brought into it Röhm; brought in also Dietrich Eckart, a poet-journalist who supplied many of his ideas (in particular his theory of the Aryan race, derived by Eckart himself from Alfred Rosenberg); got himself made its director of propaganda; imposed on it a programme of twenty-five points; and in a very short time made himself its leading figure, attracting large crowds to hear him wherever he spoke. Till 1 May 1920 he remained a member of the Reichswehr, drawing his military pay. Even after that its officers backed him. It was General von Epp himself who, early in 1921 (at Röhm's request), raised and advanced the money with which the *Völkischer Beobachter* was bought, to be the National Socialist newspaper.

First Rapid Rise

For the next two years and a half his movement grew like a mushroom. It still owed much to the Munich Reichswehr, who procured for it the favour of the police. It was helped, too, by the contem-

porary inflation and eventual destruction of the German currency. But its distinctive asset was Hitler himself. Released by his Army self-realization from the obsession of failure, the artist in him gave full rein to the performing instinct. He became not only a magnetic mob-orator, but an all-round propagandist and stage-manager of genius. He was endlessly fertile in little ruses and stratagems to render his personality more piquant to the public. Flags, bands, choruses, and pageantry made his meetings unlike any political meetings held in Germany before. In 1921 he designed with his own hands the swastika flag, and in 1923 re-designed it in better proportions. Meanwhile Röhm organized the S.A. on military lines, and already at the Nuremberg Congress of 1922 a mass of them paraded in steel helmets and field-grey uniforms. In the course of 1923 he raised their numbers in Bavaria to 10,000 well-drilled men, equivalent to a division of troops. In 1921 Hitler had become the party chairman and Führer, on the failure of an intrigue to shunt him and shift the head-quarters to Berlin. It failed, because (a) the party knew it could not get on without Reichswehr support; (b) only Hitler could procure that support; (c) he could only procure it from the Munich Reichswehr.

The 'Putsch' that Failed

How decisive was his dependence on the Reichswehr backing appeared in 1923, when for a time

he quarrelled with them. The breach began in May, when for the purposes of an armed demonstration against the Socialists the S.A. (with the complicity of Röhm) seized rifles from the Reichswehr's armoury. The Reichswehr commander, General von Lossow, thereupon surrounded Hitler and his men, and compelled their surrender. Half-reconciliations followed, but in November, at a moment very critical for Germany, occurred the Hitler *Putsch*. It was a bluff that failed. Hitler combined with the great General Ludendorff to bring armed S.A. and some other volunteer corps into Munich to set up a revolutionary Government. Ludendorff was to be head of the Reich Army and Hitler head of the Government. They hardly expected real fighting; they reckoned that the Reichswehr would acclaim Ludendorff as their national hero, and the police would follow. Hitler had separately promised Lossow and the Minister of the Interior and the police-chief that no *Putsch* would be attempted. He then surprised them, and also Kahr, the Commissioner for Bavaria, at a public meeting; and making them virtually prisoners forced Kahr at pistol-point to join in the new Government. But as soon as he escaped, Kahr collected Reichswehr and police; there was a street clash; and a few shots settled the matter. Sixteen S.A. men and four police were killed. Ludendorff marched unblenching up to his enemy's rifles and was taken prisoner; Hitler fell flat at the firing, and in the subsequent

confusion fled straight out of the city in a motor-car without troubling about his men. His arm was dislocated. He was found and arrested two days later.

Not only defeated but disgraced, his first impulse was to commit suicide by hunger-strike. Friends dissuaded him. After trial he and three others were sentenced to five years' detention in a fortress, Röhms and three more to fifteen months. Had even this short sentence been carried out, Hitler's career might have ended. He resigned the leadership of the party. But behind the scenes almost every official person was ready to strain the law in his favour. His confinement only lasted nine months. During that interval the party fell fast to pieces. A general election reduced its representatives in the Reichstag from 32 to 14, of whom only 4 remained loyal to him. In Bavaria a Catholic Government had laid the party under a ban. He himself was liable to be expelled from the country as an Austrian subject.

Hitler displayed ability in meeting this situation. He had the courage to humble himself before the head of the hostile Bavarian Government, and obtain a renewal of toleration for his party and himself. He then summoned a monster meeting of his followers, spellbound it by a great speech, and adroitly used the moment of excitement to impose a reconciliation on the schism-makers. Thus in February, 1925, the party renewed its course. He had nearly

four years behind him as its Führer; nearly eight more were to pass before he became anything else.

His Change of Tactics

He had promised the Government not to make another *Putsch*; and this, unlike most of his promises, corresponded to a real intention. In the leisure of his confinement he had reflected much, and had written the first volume of his book *Mein Kampf*. It is obvious that to carry out the programme of that book—to rearm Germany and obtain for her by war vast additions of European territory—it would have been no good merely to jockey himself into office. He must first convert at least a large fraction of the German people to his way of thinking. That meant propaganda, for which he felt he had a genius, and not military dispositions, at which he had just proved so inferior to the Reichswehr officers. He determined to concentrate on winning votes and seats, and to seek office by at least formal compliance with the constitution.

Once having formed this resolve, he stuck to it. Events turned out discouragingly. For four years and a half National Socialism made little, if any, net advance. Germany had grown more prosperous and harder to agitate. He had to make the S.A. less military and more political; this brought disagreements with Röhm; and Röhm left him. The

rest of his turbulent lieutenants were constantly intriguing against each other. Partly to escape from them, he bought his now famous house on the Obersalzberg, near Berchtesgaden. It was extremely out-of-the-way, though well placed for a bolt at need into Austria. Here in seclusion he spent most of his time, some of it in writing (the second volume of *Mein Kampf* was composed there), but largely in idleness. At intervals he emerged to stage great party demonstrations and transact business. But he could not recover his 1923 popularity. Devotees of that period turned disillusioned critics now. People no longer stopped to look at him in the streets of Munich. When President Ebert died, the National Socialist party ran Ludendorff as its candidate for the vacancy; but though they were not his only supporters, he only polled 200,000 votes in all Germany. When *Mein Kampf* came out, its sales were small. For years it was reckoned a failure. At the 1928 election the party's Reichstag representation dwindled still further—to only twelve seats.

The World Economic Crisis

What reversed this decline and sent Hitler forward to victory was the world economic crisis which began in the United States in 1929. Reaching Germany at the very end of that year, the storm struck her with more violence than any other great European country. Very quickly there were

3 million unemployed, including great numbers of young men—engineers, chemists, electricians, accountants, &c.—sons of the classes who had lost all their savings in the 1923 inflation. At this new blow, which made the sunshine of the Locarno interlude seem a mocking illusion, a large part of the German nation became almost demented. They turned to whatever in politics seemed bitterest and most uncompromising; and they found Hitler. The election figures tell the tale. In 1928 the National Socialists had polled 800,000 votes for the Reichstag; and if an election had been held as late as October 1929, there is no reason to think that they would have polled more. But in the election of September 1930 they polled 6½ millions! With 107 seats in the new Reichstag they jumped to the position of second largest party; and for the first time since his ill-fated *Putsch* Hitler took the centre of the political stage.

Hitler's Second Rise

He was not the man to miss a flowing tide. And it so happened that he was the better equipped to sail on it, because in 1929 he had formed a new and lucrative contact with the industrial potentates of the Ruhr. The latter had a large fund for political purposes, and henceforward (with a break in 1932 only) Hitler's party drew regular subsidies from it. That he had for their sake to co-operate a good deal with the Nationalist leader Hugenberg did not work

out to his disadvantage. At the same time his other capitalist subsidies grew. In 1930 he was joined by Dr. Schacht, who had just resigned from the presidency of the Reichsbank, and who obtained for him large sums from the Central Association of German Banks and Bankers. With such resources great expansions were possible. The Brown House at Munich was developed as a very large central office, filing the name and photograph of every registered member of the party. Hitler recalled Röhm to be Chief of Staff to the S.A.; and within a year that scoundrel of genius, with the mass of young and truculent unemployed to recruit from, had built up a militarized force of 600,000 men. Nothing succeeds like success. The continuance of the economic crisis, bringing the unemployed to over 6 and later to 7 millions, gave the Governmental parties no chance to rally.

Early in 1932 Hitler's strength was such that at the close of Hindenburg's first term as President he stood against him for the Presidency. On the first ballot he polled 11 million votes (against Hindenburg's 18 millions), but on the second he raised his figure to 13 millions. Moreover it was he, and not Hindenburg, who carried those Junker areas of north and east Germany, where the old President's own class held sway. The 'Bohemian corporal', as the Field-Marshal slightly termed Hitler, was displacing him in the confidence of the militarist Conservatives. The sequel is well known

—how on 29 and 30 May Hindenburg drove out the Brüning Cabinet (to which he had owed his election), and substituted a Papen Cabinet, which had (though not securely for long) Hitler's support. On 31 July another general election was held, giving the Nazis 230 seats in the Reichstag, so that they became far the strongest single party. And then, after three months, during which the President, the Government, and the public all began to take fright at Hitler's continued violence, yet another general election was held, and they dropped two million votes! And in December at the State elections in Thuringia, hitherto a Nazi stronghold, the party's vote was halved!

How he became Chancellor

These waverings of the electorate illustrate the distraction of the German people. In their economic misery they did not know where they stood. But Schleicher, the Reichswehr general, and Papen, the Catholic Nationalist, the two intriguers who by this time were rivals for the Chancellorship, thought they knew where Hitler's party stood. Discredited at the polls, gravelled for lack of money (the Ruhr industrialists having temporarily stopped supplies), and torn by a schism between Hitler and his most influential lieutenant, Gregor Strasser, they thought it on the point of breaking up; and each wanted to annex as much as possible of its debris. Papen aimed to annex Hitler himself, and to do this he

had eventually to concede the chancellorship to Hitler. But he never meant the Nazis to dominate him. They were to be a caged minority in a Coalition Cabinet, which was also to contain Hugenberg, the Nationalist leader, and Seldte, the leader of the Stahlhelm (the Conservative rival to the S.A.). The Finance Minister was a friend of Papen's; the War Ministry went to a general supposed to be non-party, the Foreign Office to a Conservative who already held it. Frick as Minister of the Interior and Goering as Air Minister were Hitler's only Nazi colleagues; and Papen, nominally only Vice-Chancellor, expected to hold in the Bohemian corporal without difficulty.

Such were Hindenburg's and Papen's reckonings when they made Hitler Chancellor on 30 January 1933. How little they knew, and how little they foreknew!

The Nazi Revolution

Hitler went instantly ahead. He had promised not to dissolve the Reichstag; but on the strength of opposition from the Catholic Centre he persuaded his colleagues to let him do so. He promised them that, whatever the election results, the Cabinet should be unchanged. But he at once gave rein to a propaganda of unparalleled violence. Goering, who besides being Reich Air Minister was Prussian Minister of the Interior, proceeded without a moment's check or scruple to Nazify the

Prussian police. Armed S.A., let loose against any political opposition, were made sure of police tolerance. More: by an order of 22 February, he enrolled S.A. and S.S. men in great numbers as special constables. The bandits, who for years had waged gangster warfare against Communists, Socialists, Radicals, and Catholics, were thus given State authority over the lives of their opponents. The excuse was a Communist peril. On 25 February came the Reichstag fire. Hitler used it to stampede Hindenburg into signing a decree that suspended all the liberties ordinarily guaranteed in a constitutional State, and sanctioned the arbitrary infliction of the extremest penalties.

It is still under this decree that he rules Germany. Its firstfruits were the concentration camps. A wave of violence swept the country, devastating the lives and homes of his opponents. In the first flood of it the polling took place; the National Socialists obtained 288 seats out of 647. But by throwing into prison the holders of 81 Communist seats they made their majority absolute. By a constitutional law the new Reichstag transferred the right of legislation from itself to the Government. To get the two-thirds majority for this law Hitler made promises which he afterwards ignored. Soon the non-Nazi members of the Cabinet became more or less his prisoners. One by one all save Papen either lost their seats or, like Neurath and Blomberg, functioned as if they were Nazis.

It would take too long to discuss how Hitler organized and riveted his despotism: how he abolished all save the one party and made himself Führer of the nation; how he abolished the German States, controlling their areas through officials directly appointed by himself; how he abolished the trade unions; how he put an end to the elements of liberty in German local government; how he brought the whole newspaper industry under a special control, which practically turns every journalist into a Government servant; how theatres, films, art, and broadcasting have been similarly Nazified. Nor can we examine his constructive internal measures—the relief works, the ‘Winter Help’, the Labour Front, the ‘Strength through Joy’ organization; nor the less direct purposes and effects of his persecution of the Jews; nor his conflicts with the Christian Churches, both Catholic and Protestant. In economic matters he benefited enormously by the accident that the date of his accession to power coincided with the turning of the world-tide towards economic prosperity. But he showed great sense in first carrying forward the official economic plans already framed just before he took office, and then entrusting his finance to Dr. Schacht. One has only to consider the many crank ideas on economics that had flourished in the party (and were present in its Twenty-Five Points) to appreciate his flair in dropping them.

Continuity of Hitler's Ideas

But the essential thing to note in his Government policy down to the launching of his Polish war on 1 September 1939 is the unity and continuity of his main ideas. He had said in *Mein Kampf* that the Jews must be extirpated from Germany as being incompatible with his ideal of race-purity; and he has not shrunk from the most inhuman courses to attain that end. He had said that the first essential for Germany was to re-arm, to break all the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, to make herself once more the military mistress of Europe; and that if the ex-Allied Powers were boldly defied, they would not stop her. He carried out his plan and verified his prophecy; and by August-September, 1938, the date that he had fixed for the trial of strength, he was so strong that France and Britain dared not try it. He had said that Germany's essential needs were not colonies, or a Navy, or even revenge, but (1) unity, i.e. the absorption of the Austrian Germans; (2) land expansion, i.e. the conquest by force of sufficient territory in Eastern Europe to permit a vast enlargement of Germany's homeland. His successive annexations of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Memel, and Poland were the logical steps towards realizing these ideas. Not till we reach his recent compromises with Soviet Russia do we find any divergence from the long-charted course. And it is

difficult to suppose that even that is intended to last after it has served its purpose.

Gangster Ruthlessness

How ruthless Hitler can be in the pursuit of plans may be seen from his famous 'purge' of 30 June 1934. Mention has been made above of Röhm. On 1 January of that year Hitler sent letters of public appreciation to seven principal lieutenants. In one alone did he use the pronoun *Du* (thou), which in German marks the closest intimacy. That was to Röhm, then Chief of Staff for the S.A., which he had expanded to 3 million drilled men. Röhm was a murderer and a sex-pervert, but he made perhaps more decisive contributions to Hitler's ascent from obscurity than any other man, and since 1930 had again rendered unique service. He had always viewed the S.A. as a step to German rearmament, and now he wanted his vast host to be taken over and form part of the new Army. The Reichswehr leaders opposed. Still a small body, they feared to be swamped; still class-conscious, they refused to acknowledge as officers and equals the 'warehouse porters and fitter's apprentices', with whom the revolutionary Röhm had staffed his corps. The conflict became very fierce, and Hitler had to decide it. He resolved, as always at a pinch, to stand on the side of the Reichswehr. But he knew his peril; the decision meant extinction for Röhm; and Röhm as a gangster would not take it

meekly. Whether the Chief of Staff went as far as conspiring can only be guessed. At any rate, Hitler got his blow in first. In the early dawn of that June day nearly all the controlling officers and highest commanders in the S.A. were surprised and arrested in their beds. Röhm and others at his head-quarters were seized by Hitler in person. There was no trial; they were all killed the same day—some out of hand, but most (including Röhm) by firing squads in prison courtyards. When they were dead, Hitler (following an odious but invariable habit, since exemplified in turn against trampled Austrians, Czechs, and Poles) proceeded to throw mud on his victims' memory. The charge of sex-perversion, which he brought, was true of many of them. But he had known and tolerated it for ten years, and nobody seriously thought that it explained the massacre. To complete the kicking down of ladders by which Hitler had climbed, Schleicher and Papen's secretary were also murdered on 30 June. Papen only escaped because he could not be found.

His Political Technique

Wary and ingenious as he is, there is something at bottom simple in Hitler's nature. He sees political issues, as the unsophisticated see them, in black and white, not in brown and grey. He has surprised and baffled statesmen, both in Germany and in Europe, by straightforwardly doing what he openly prepared to do, and not (as they would

have) something less obvious. He rearmed Germany in order to make aggressive war; yet, while he was doing it, French and British diplomatists vied in fancying that it had other purposes. Similarly his tactics have always conformed to a few plain gangster precepts. Remember the value of threats, but remember that it is conditional upon their always being executed. When you are planning to attack a man, take away his character first; overwhelm him with a 'drum-fire of lies and calumnies'; then, when even his friends are ready to jettison him, strike him down. If you want to gain time or ground, promise the moon; only, so use what is gained that you never need redeem your promises. Hitler's record in regard to broken promises is something quite special, and in international affairs has reached a point at which finally the French and British Prime Ministers have declared that no further pact can be made with him.¹ But they might have come to that conclusion much earlier had they studied his record in German politics. When in March, 1936, he wanted to be left undisturbed in a re-militarized Rhineland, he made almost exactly the same speech as in October, 1939, when he wanted to be left undisturbed in a conquered Poland. Only, in 1936 foreign Governments were hoodwinked; in 1939 they were not.

¹ A very useful anthology of his broken promises in the international field is contained in *Hitler Step by Step* (published by *The Times*).

Yet the evidence of his character was as plain to read in 1936 as in 1939; and had they read it and acted then, when German power was still not formidable, the world would have been spared incalculable danger and bloodshed.

Personal Tactics

Puzzles about his private character persist. There are psychologists who consider him a paranoiac. Certainly, when he lets himself go in anger, he raves like a madman. But he does so in order to achieve a desired result, namely terror. The baffling torrents of mere verbiage, which he emits at other times, have also, it would seem, their calculated utility. In daily life he oscillates between extreme energy and utter listlessness. He cannot stick to a routine, and refuses to let secretaries map out his hours. For days and sometimes weeks together he is as idle as he was in his wasted school period. It may be that such lying fallow is essential to visionaries;¹ and Hitler is certainly a visionary in his way.


In his bearing towards his fellow men he has changed very much. As an only son, his youth was shy and solitary. Down to 1914 he had many traits of an aesthete and a weakling. He has never married. In the 1914-18 war, when he was a dispatch-runner, he displayed great bravery, and

¹ As Wordsworth thought; see his *Expostulation and Reply* and not a few other poems.

was reported exceptionally obedient to his officers, yet he repelled his fellow soldiers. But from the age of 30 onwards he filled out both in body and in character. He acquired self-confidence and sociability. He enjoyed taking his meals in a crowd; at the Brown House, before he was Chancellor, he would lunch in the large basement canteen side by side with the packers and porters. Even to-day at Berchtesgaden he likes to have a dozen guests and henchmen round his table—in curious contrast to the Italian Dictator, whose custom it is to lunch and dine apart.

Supreme Power

It may, perhaps, be said of Hitler as of Napoleon that he 'possesses ordinary qualities in extraordinary mass and momentum'. He sways the masses, because it is natural to him to think as crudely as they do. But of his force and mastery there can be no doubt. The Nazi revolution has thrown up a number of able men, and attracted distinguished outsiders. Some have rebelled, but none has ever been able in the Führer's presence to dominate the Führer. He has always led and not followed. As Field-Marshal Goering once told the British Ambassador: 'When a decision has to be taken, none of us count more than the stones on which we are standing. It is the Führer alone who decides.' The power of the movement has lain in his hand. Its responsibilities lie at his door.





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No. 21

THE
NAZI CONCEPTION
OF LAW

BY
J. WALTER JONES

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1939

THE conception of law in Germany has been radically altered since Hitler came to power in 1933. In the last resort, as a German writer has stated, law in Nazi Germany is nothing more nor less than what the *Führer* decrees. In this Pamphlet Mr. J. W. Jones (Fellow of the Queen's College, Oxford) describes the principles and theories on which Nazi law is founded—the Leadership principle, the racial theory, the 'revolutionary' character of Nazism, the notion of *lebensraum* and so on—and their application to the different branches of law, including international law.

For the Nazi conception of 'Race' and the theory of *lebensraum* see No. 5 in this series, '*Race*' in *Europe*, by Julian Huxley, and No. 8, *Living-space*, by R. R. Kuczynski.

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THE NAZI CONCEPTION OF LAW

The Regimentation of the Lawyers

FOR a proper appreciation of the Nazi attitude to law it is necessary, first of all, to take into account the conditions in which those whose particular business it is to expound and work out legal ideas have been living since 1933. In Germany every lawyer has been compelled to join what is called the *Rechtsfront* as a member of the BNSDJ, the *Bund* or Union of German National-Socialist Jurists, which has superseded all the former professional associations. There is also the Academy of German Law, legally incorporated in July 1934 for the purpose of supervising the application, administration, and teaching of the law. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that the law teachers have contributed their full share to the long list (well over 1,000 in number) of university professors and lecturers who have been dismissed or compulsorily retired on grounds of race, or faith, or of general 'political unreliability'. Those teachers and writers who have not come under the ban have escaped only because their views could not by any stretch be interpreted as conflicting with the political doctrines which have been in favour with the régime.

The position of the judges is equally precarious. It was regarded as a great triumph for democratic principles when, in 1919, the young German

Republic adopted Articles 102 and 104 of the Constitution of Weimar. The first declared that 'Judges are independent and subject only to the law'; the second that 'The Judges of the ordinary Courts are appointed for life. They may be removed from office, permanently or temporarily transferred to another position, or retired, only on the authority of a judicial decision, and only upon grounds and by methods of procedure fixed by law.' Less than nothing now remains of these principles. In all cases involving questions of public policy the Judiciary has become simply a creature of the Executive, a mere branch of the Government.

Some Nazi writers have openly proclaimed that it is the function of all lawyers, whether judges or jurists, to adjust their standpoint to the surrounding political atmosphere. All law, they urge, must be openly and frankly political. To endeavour to approach the law without any political bias seems to them so far from being praiseworthy as to amount to a declaration of bankruptcy by the lawyers. Unfortunately for the German lawyers, their rulers have been much more concerned to meet the exigencies of the moment than to remain loyal to their published professions of faith. Since the seizure of Czechoslovakia voices have been heard asserting that all earlier doctrine has become out of date, and it will certainly call for considerable agility on the part of the German legal and political writers to bring their former pronouncements into line with recent developments. But it can be said that up to March 1939 the National-Socialist theory of law on

the whole followed a fairly consistent course. Like National-Socialist political theory it was based upon two principles: the leadership principle and the racial principle.

The Leadership Principle

In Nazi Germany, as in Fascist Italy, the essence of the new creed is believed to be contained in the words 'unity' and 'integration'. The very notion of the State is held to imply strength, and the State, it is believed, can only be strong where the executive power is untrammelled by the checks which in a democracy it is the purpose of legislative assemblies to provide. Parliaments are taken to mean parties, and internal party divisions are assumed to be a source of weakness by expending national energy without a compensating return in motive power. The efficiency of all political and legal machinery is judged by the smoothness and speed which it brings to the functioning of the Nation-State. Action, instant and overwhelming, must be the primary purpose of the State. But the State is a group. Therefore, State action is dependent on the existence of a Leader (*Führer*) and on unquestioning faith in the creed of leadership.

But if the position is accepted that a group cannot act promptly without a Leader, it is said to follow that leadership is thwarted unless the group is homogeneous. This homogeneity is secured by the process of *Gleichschaltung*, a term which has no exact counterpart in English but which has been defined by one German writer as 'the method

which secures, at first perhaps only outwardly (a significant reservation), a political homogeneity of public life'. Its justification is said to lie in 'the necessity for removing all conflicting social and political forces which may, in the slightest degree, impair the domination of the unified Executive'.

First of all, there must be unity of race, and this involves the driving from public position and public influence, i.e. from all share in government, the professions, education, and the press, of everybody who by reason of race can be branded as 'non-Aryan', according to the terminology now in vogue in Germany. As a logical consequence of this principle, German law, in theory at least, admits to the assembly of the Reichstag men of German blood, even if they are citizens of a foreign State. It also allows Germans by race to give their votes when plebiscites of the whole population are held, provided the voters are temporarily in Germany or on a German ship on the high sea. Jewish blood makes German citizenship impossible, although, at least as late as 1936, it seems to have been held that it did not deprive a man of his German nationality in the wide sense, i.e. of having many of the duties, if not the rights, of German citizens.

Secondly, such remnants of Federalism as existed under the Republic before 1933 have vanished. Individual 'States', if we may use the term, such as Bavaria, have lost whatever independence they formerly enjoyed. The Weimar Constitution expressly recognized that there were certain affairs which fell within the province of the States com-

posing the Republic, and outside that of the central government. Now the component units have no autonomy whatever. They are little more than administrative areas within a unitary system, under governors who are answerable to the Leader alone. And, as in other despotisms, the Nazis' determination to reduce to a common level of subjection all who are under their sway has shown itself in hostility to all groups which may come between the absolute State and the individual citizen. Even when the groups exist for religious, social, or educational purposes, having no connexion with politics, their rights are regarded as existing simply by the grace of the State, by a concession which may be withdrawn at will. In addition, trade and financial corporations have to face the charge of having usurped State functions and of having used the notion of corporate personality to provide a German cloak for the manipulations of foreign and 'non-Aryan' speculators.

The Leader

In the person of the Leader the two notions of authority and representation are believed to have come together in a perfect unity. But the German idea of representation is not that which the democratic franchise seeks to realize through election of members of different parties and by entrusting the government to the party or group of parties which secures a numerical majority at the polls. And in their description of the attributes and functions of their Leader even the legal theorists surrender

themselves to a sort of mystical ecstasy. He is pictured as representing no concrete person or persons, nor again the collection of individuals forming the nation at any one specified time. He embodies some sort of transcendent unity which soars above the desires or interests of a transient majority. In and through his words and acts the Nation for the first time comes to real life. His decrees are to be respected as expressing eternal truths rather than a compromise between divergent views. And here writers employ an abundance of different analogies. Sometimes the Leader is the Nation's clenched fist in which are knit all the national strength and resolution; sometimes he is the father who stands for the family, not by vote or consent but by the authority inherent in fatherhood; sometimes, again, he is the Pope whose words are unquestioned truth for those who share the national faith. This, it is claimed, is still a democracy—an authoritarian as opposed to an atomistic democracy. The people as a whole, by plebiscite or through the Reichstag, may be called to endorse specific measures, but the essence of authoritarian leadership is that initiative as well as decision rests with the Leader, to whom all are answerable and who rules because he serves.

The Nazi Party

It need hardly be said that this attitude of mind cannot tolerate anything resembling the party system of democratic States. As in Russia and Italy

there is one Party only, and for practical purposes this Party is identified with the State. Therefore, the membership of another party, supposing one were found to exist, becomes a crime corresponding to the crime of treason elsewhere and punishable with death. In the Nazi Party, it is asserted, the German conception of State and Society finds its exclusive expression. Nevertheless, full membership of the German Nazi Party, as of the Russian Communist Party, is confined to a relatively small minority of the people. The members constitute the vanguard of the people; they are themselves leaders, and this status not only gives them peculiar privileges, but also imposes upon them special responsibilities and obligations. In their relations to one another the party members are regarded as bound by ties of the closest trust and intimacy. 'Theft from a comrade', it is explained, 'is not on the same footing as theft from a stranger', and it should be much more severely punished. To illustrate the leadership principle, German writers sometimes go back to the old feudal days. The feudal leader had his train of followers, which is believed to have formed a real popular aristocracy, and not an exclusive class of the *élite*; they were united to their leader and to one another by feelings of the most intense personal loyalty, and yet, so it is imagined, they were one in heart and mind with the people whose mouthpiece was the leader. This is put forward as a totally different conception from the 'essentially anti-democratic ruling class principle' of parliamentary government.

Applications of the Principle

Attempts have been made to give this principle practical effect in more than one direction. The National Labour Act, 1934, for instance, began the crusade against the 'class-war' by applying the leadership principle to industry. Just as there are to be no parties in politics, so there can be no trade unions of employers or workmen. Each factory or workshop becomes a 'works community'. The workers are described as the *Gefolgschaft*, or band of followers, who must work with the employer or 'leader' to promote the interests of the establishment. They act through a number of their fellows who, together with the leader as their president, form a confidential council. In the same way, what are called 'social honour courts' have been set up, consisting of a judicial official as chairman, with one leader and one worker member of a confidential council as assessors. Through these courts the Party exercises a stringent control of the liberty to work and to employ workers, and the dragooning of individuals is disguised under the cloak of the leadership principle. The penalties, which may be inflicted for breach of the social duties incumbent upon every member of an establishment, range up to heavy fines and may entail dismissal from employment.

Legislation concerning companies has also used the leadership principle to increase the powers of the board of directors at the expense of the general meeting of shareholders. 'Irresponsible' share-

holders, it is thought, should not have the power of interfering in matters of finance and management, which require training and experience.

The Nazi Attitude to Statutes

From the time when thinkers first began to discuss the nature of law, there has been much controversy as to the precise relation of the State to law. Is the State subject to law, or is law the creature of the State so that the rulers can make or unmake law at will? Recently there has been much support for the view that State and law are so inextricably bound together that it is meaningless to speak of either being above or below the other. This notion of the indissoluble union of State and law has been expressed in Germany by the term *Rechtsstaat*. The precise meaning of the word has varied from time to time and from writer to writer, but it has in general been used to denote that the rulers of a State are in some way, possibly through the existence of some constitutional machinery, bound by law, at least to the extent that they cannot simply annul it at their pleasure.

Can there be a State which is not a *Rechtsstaat*, and is Germany now a *Rechtsstaat*? It is significant that the Nazi lawyers have taken over the word from their predecessors and have never expressly denied that a true State must be based upon a certain respect for law. They have, however, fallen back on the distinction between law in general (*Recht*), and that branch of law known as statute law, consisting of rules laid down in general terms

for the future by a competent legislature (*Gesetz*). Germany, they say, is a genuine *Rechtsstaat*, but not a *Gesetzesstaat*—not a State in which law has been submerged by statute. They are fond of pointing out that, even in the democracies, statute law is having to give ground to regulations made by administrative boards, government departments, and subordinate officials. They argue that on some matters detailed and rigid legislative provisions are being found less adapted to modern conditions than elastic standards leaving room for discretion in their application. Are there not even codes, such as the Swiss Code of 1907, which have expressly admitted that it is impossible to foresee all cases which may arise, and that to fill up gaps the judge may often have to play the part of a legislator?

From all this the Nazis deduce that respect for statute as such is just another of the superstitions of old-fashioned Liberalism. They agree with the Soviet lawyers that the reverence paid to statutes is little more than a *bourgeois* fiction. And they have still less use for the distinction drawn in countries like the U.S.A. between constitutional laws, which cannot be enacted or repealed by the ordinary legislature, and ordinary statutes, which can. After all, when the law *in toto* is reduced to a mere expression of the will of the Leader, all such distinctions become insignificant. Thus one reputable German writer describes the German *Führerstaat* as *der deutsche Rechtsstaat Adolf Hitlers*—the German *Rechtsstaat* of Adolf Hitler—because, in the

last resort, law in Nazi Germany is nothing more or less than what the *Führer* decrees.

Since, however, even in Germany there must continue to be laws which can only be described as statutes, the lawyers urge that they should be general in scope and simple in wording. They believe that statutes should usually contain a preamble or introductory part setting out the general purpose of the statute, and that the details should be left to be worked out by judges and officials in the spirit of this preamble. The dictators of to-day, like Frederick the Great and Napoleon in the past, cherish the notion that, if laws were drafted in language intelligible to the layman, it might be possible to dispense altogether with professional lawyers; but it may be that they are thinking less of the difficulties which technicalities place in the path of the layman than of the checks they impose on the despotic acts of rulers and executive officials.

And the Nazis are far from being prepared to entrust to judges the powers they refuse to legislatures. The practice of judicial review of the constitutionality of statutes, such as it is found in the U.S.A., where the Courts may refuse to apply enactments which they hold to be contrary to the written Constitution, never found favour in Germany even before 1933, when Germany possessed a written Constitution; and there is less place for it now than ever. Since the Leader is accepted as embodying the will of the State, no one other than the Leader can give the final word as to the validity

of any particular statute or regulation or judicial decision. It may or may not be true that in the U.S.A. the Constitution is, in the end, what the Supreme Court says it is. It is certain that in Nazi Germany the Leader, and not any Supreme Court, is the 'guardian of the Constitution', if a Constitution can be said to exist. The most that writers will concede is that the judge may occasionally depart from a pre-1933 statute, but even here he is warned to proceed with the utmost caution, and when in doubt to leave the question for decision by the political authorities.

The Permanent Revolution

Part II of the Weimar Constitution is devoted to a declaration of the 'Fundamental Rights and Duties of Germans'. Among these rights are the right to change one's domicile within the Reich, to emigrate, to speak one's own language if it should not be German, to assemble peaceably and unarmed without special permission, to form unions and associations, and to practise one's religion undisturbed. All Germans are declared to be equal before the law. Their personal liberty, their place of residence, the secrecy of their correspondence, all are guaranteed as inviolable. If any German ever reads the Weimar Constitution nowadays, he must do so with mixed feelings. These rights were believed to be the results achieved by the revolution of November 1918. There has never been any place for them under the Nazi régime. It might be thought that, as the years elapsed after the Nazi revolution of

1933, the excitement which characterizes every such upheaval would have given way to settled conditions based on measures directed to the establishment of ordered security by respect for human personality. But it is the common feature of the despotisms of Russia, Italy, and Germany that they deliberately encourage the continuance of a revolutionary outlook, provided, of course, that it is not directed against themselves. Political expediency, and not legal stability, is the determining factor in all questions of law or rights.

Long after the uprooting of the old system, the rulers of Russia and Italy have persisted in asserting that their countries are still in a state of war. Although as early as 12 July 1933 the German *Führer* declared that the Nazi revolution was 'closed', he and his followers have continued to warn the people that the seizure of power was by no means the end of the struggle, and Germany has been constantly described by the Nazis as an armed camp. It is significant that the theory of politics most favoured in Nazi Germany seems to be that which regards political grouping as grouping according to the distinction between friend and foe. Internal politics should be aimed at exterminating the enemy within the gates. When this has been done, political leadership must be directed towards keeping the people constantly warned of the real or supposed enemies waiting to spring from without. When they are asked why in England government is possible without the oppressive measures which are claimed to be necessary in Germany, the

Nazis reply, somewhat contemptuously, that when a people lives on an island it can dispense with a State (as conceived by the Nazis). Since law is simply a 'political act', legal rules must be left to take their chance in the moving quicksands of political opportunism.

And yet the Nazis are quick to insist that their accession to power in 1933 was perfectly legal, as being within the framework of the Weimar Constitution, which indeed has never been formally abrogated. It is not the fact that it makes a breach in legal continuity, they say, which entitles a movement to be called a revolution, but the introduction by it of a new and positive outlook upon life and the world—a new *Weltanschauung*. The 'glorious' revolution of seventeenth-century England, and the French revolution a century later, seem to the Nazi writers hardly to deserve the name. The notions of the sanctity of individual personality, of liberty and equality, are brushed aside as wholly negative. The English are able to afford to cherish the ideal of liberty because they have the blessings of comparative isolation and internal homogeneity. The French ideal of equality is dismissed as barren Liberalism. The Nazis look in vain for any new idea in the Weimar Constitution; the disappearance of the Kaiser and his ministers was due to a revolt, not a revolution. The Revolution, they say, did not come till 1933, with the advent to power of men professing the new principles of leadership and race as the foundations of the State; and this Revolution has not yet reached its end.

The Racial Theory of Law

The German craving for political unity can only be properly understood when we remember that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Germany was divided into at least forty sovereign states. In the same way, the German racial theory of law has its psychological basis in the strange phenomenon of the reception into Germany in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries of a foreign system based on Roman Law.

One result of the German struggle against Napoleon was that certain German jurists, who came to be known as the Historical School, began to put forward the notion that law is essentially a national product, an emanation from what they called the *Volksgeist*—the soul or spirit of the people—a psychological abstraction which they, perhaps wisely, made little attempt to elucidate further. The Nazi lawyers have found this term admirably adapted to their somewhat nebulous ways of thought, adding the gloss that the *Volksgeist* cannot be a living reality unless the *Volk* itself is racially pure. The Nazi State, therefore, should not open its doors to all who may wish to enter; it must exclude those who are suspect on account of racial origin or sympathies. Unlike the Liberal State, it must be based on a nation firmly knit together by the tie of blood as well as of soil.

In 1900 Germany embodied in the great Civil Code, containing over 2,000 sections, the great mass of the law of property and of civil, as opposed

to criminal, liability. When the exponents of the racial theory look into this Code they find a state of affairs which they cannot possibly square with their creed. Here is nothing resembling a native body of rules, such as we have in England, continuously and almost imperceptibly developing through the centuries without any substantial foreign importation. Instead, what they see is a system founded in ancient Rome, worked out in detail by the Jurists under the Roman Emperors in the second and third centuries of the Christian era, digested and to some extent codified in the *Corpus Juris* of Justinian in sixth-century Byzantium, and which, after being modified to suit the conditions of medieval Europe by Italian commentators, was finally received into Germany in the sixteenth century through the agency of officials who had been trained south of the Alps and were indifferent to the customs and institutions of their native land.

Curiously enough, the founders of the Historical School, despite their belief in the *Volksgeist* as the source of law, seem to have had little curiosity as to the state of German law before the reception of the Roman system. They reconciled their creed with the fact of this wholesale importation of a foreign system into Germany, by dogmatically asserting that in matters of law the professional lawyers represent the people. In the second half of the nineteenth century, however, there appeared a group of writers who declared that the old Germanic law had not been altogether obliterated, though it may have been driven into obscure nooks

and corners. These Germanists devoted their energies to the task of revealing and, where possible, reviving and reintroducing, the native institutions and concepts. Although their work was not quite without influence upon the deliberations of those lawyers and others who finally completed the German Civil Code, many of them continued to look askance at this document as being far too Roman and un-German. As early as 1920 the programme of the National-Socialist Party included (in point 19) the demand for the substitution of German law for the 'materialistic and cosmopolitan' Roman law. And, since 1933, the watchword of those who have been urging the need for a pure law has been 'German law in place of Roman law'.

In a pamphlet which, though it was written before 1933, has been prescribed as a text-book in the law schools of Germany, so its author proudly tells us, there is an exposition of the racial philosophy in its application to law. 'It is due to the German people', says the writer, 'that it should have a German law: and a pure law can only proceed from a pure race.' In order to support the demand for as clean a sweep as possible of the rules in the present German Code, some of the Nazi lawyers make the period of the reception of the Roman law extend from the first half of the fourteenth century right down to 1933. They also attack the Roman law at its fountain-head by accepting the argument advanced by some Romanists, often more on a foundation of conjecture than of positive proof, that much of the *Corpus Juris* of Justinian, from

which the modern law proceeds, was the product, not of the Romans at all, but of the law schools of the Eastern Empire, particularly that of Beyrout in Syria. Thus most of the so-called Roman law, they say, was not even Roman; it was Byzantine and to some extent Oriental. And not content with this, they go on to hint that the late Roman law had become degenerate under Jewish influences. Thus it is not uncommon to find the Nazi lawyers tacking on, in the German fashion, to the term 'Roman' a long string of other adjectives. The Code of 1900, they complain, is called a German Code, but in addition to being Roman, it is abstract-materialistic-cosmopolitan-Oriental and, of course, Jewish.

At the time of its introduction, some of the critics of the German Code declared that it was less genuinely German than even the French Code of Napoleon; and more recently the Swiss Code has been extolled as providing a model in some respects of what a Germanic Code might be. Indeed, we sometimes find Nazi writers casting envious glances at our own law for its comparative freedom from Roman influences and for the close contact it has maintained with practical life. On the other hand, the doctrine of precedent, according to which every English Court is bound by the decisions of Courts superior to itself, and the highest Court, the House of Lords, is bound by its own decisions, is a favourite subject of sneers among the Germans as a superstitious cult cramping our national development. One writer traces what he calls our 'realistic' approach to legal problems to the fact that England,

as he sees it, is essentially a *Führerstaat*, and that the English 'gentleman' is a true *Führer* type. The absence of a written Constitution in England and the dislike of English lawyers for the academic treatment of constitutional questions, he holds, bring England into line to some extent with Nazi doctrine.

During the past six years the lawyers of Germany have been persistently urged to root out an alien legal system and to put a People's law in place of a Jurists' law. But, none the less, even the Nazis have to admit that many parts of the existing Code are so firmly based in reason and common sense that to remove them would produce complete chaos. These the Nazis hope to extricate from the 'wholly Roman' parts, for just as the theologians have apparently found it possible to save some of the Psalms by attributing them to 'Nordic Persians', so the lawyers have found signs of Germanic influence even in the law of ancient Rome.

The Socialist Aspect of Nazi Legal Theory

Ownership. So far at least, the purely racial approach to law has not produced many constructive achievements; it has been mainly directed towards weakening the hold of the Code upon German theory and practice. But since the beginning of the régime some of the Nazis have tried to give some significance to the 'Socialist' as well as to the 'National' half of the title adopted by the Party. Here, again, the Roman system, owing to its strongly marked individualism, has offered an easy target to

those who think that the State is everything and the individual human being nothing. And they have been able to cite in aid the many criticisms which have been levelled against such definitions of the notion of ownership as were current in France and Germany during the hey-day of *laissez-faire* economics, and which have been followed by the German Civil Code in the section (903) which speaks of an owner as being 'free to dispose of his property at his free discretion'.

Of course, the lawyers who framed these definitions knew very well that no system of law has ever been able to dispense with restrictions placed on individual ownership in the interests of the community at large or of other adjacent owners. But it has simplified exposition and discussion to leave out of account public, i.e. statutory or municipal, limitations upon 'private' ownership. To the Nazis, however, the principle of leadership makes the term 'private ownership' abhorrent; to use it is to fall back once more into 'Liberal' errors. They have given effect to this view by agrarian legislation restricting free disposition of farms, punishing bad farming, and relieving good farmers of debts incurred through no fault of their own. In the case of the so-called 'incorporeal' forms of property, such as copyright and patent rights, this standpoint means that the author or inventor may only expect what the State is pleased to allow him, and that he must be satisfied that the community should reap where he has sown.

Possession. Advancing legal systems find it neces-

sary to draw a distinction between ownership and possession and, within certain limits, to protect possession as such without inquiring whether its origin has been in accordance with law. At its highest, this separation of the notion of physical control from that of legal title can perhaps be justified on philosophical and even ethical grounds; at its lowest, it can be defended as a practical necessity. To the Nazi lawyers, however, it is just another instance of the tendency of individualistic Liberalism to see in the State nothing more than an umpire or 'night-watchman', whose function it is to remain quiescent until there is some compelling reason for active intervention.

Contracts. It has come to be recognized as a condition of ordered social life that, in principle, contracts, freely entered into, are binding on the parties until dissolved by mutual consent. On the other hand, it is undeniable that, with the best will in the world, a party may sometimes find that circumstances have made it impossible for him to carry out his undertaking. Social stability depends upon the extent to which this plea of 'frustration', as the lawyers term it, is allowed to weaken the general belief in the sanctity of contracts. In the realm of treaties, as all the world knows, Nazi Germany has put the exception in the place of the rule, and has found no difficulty in finding some sort of reason for unilateral denunciation of its agreements. Its general attitude to international law, as will be seen later, is incompatible with respect for international engagements. But, even

in the sphere of private as opposed to public contracts, the Nazi emphasis on the fluidity of legal relations has tended to make the doctrine of 'impossibility of performance' the corner-stone of the law of obligations.

The traditional theory has been that the terms, if not the binding force, of contracts depend upon the intention of the parties. Where this intention is express, there is usually little difficulty. It is chiefly where the parties have thought insufficiently, or not at all, about the matter, that the law, which in general means the judge, is called on to supply the deficiency. In doing so, the Courts have hesitated to declare openly that they have made a contract for the parties; they have preferred to speak of an 'implied' intention attributed to the parties by the law. This fashion of speech has deceived few, but the Nazi lawyers include it in their indictment of non-Nazi law. It is true that the German Code contains two sections requiring that the performance and interpretation of contracts should be such as good faith demands, but it is alleged that, owing to their 'Liberal' proclivities, the pre-Nazi judges made too little use of these provisions.

Collective agreements in industry, so far as they are allowed, are naturally interpreted as enacted rules of law rather than as agreements. But it is the contract of marriage, if it may be called a contract, which offers the Nazis most scope for expatiating upon the interest of the Nation-State in keeping watch over the 'private' lives of individuals. Here as elsewhere the intentions of the parties are

allowed only a secondary place. German marriages are, in principle, assumed to be indissoluble, and their purpose to be primarily to promote racial purity and vigour. Therefore those who are held to be incurably weak in body, mind, or character should be debarred altogether from contracting a German marriage, and the law must refuse to recognize mixed marriages involving a mixture of 'Nordic' with other blood; and not only must future marriages satisfy the test, but existing unions are to be declared void without regard for the happiness of the individuals who are wrenched apart.

Nazi totalitarianism also expresses itself in its attitude to arbitration. It is a feature of modern legal systems that, even when they do not actively encourage resort to an arbitrator, they at least put no positive obstacles in the way of those who wish to save the cost and avoid the recrimination often involved in litigation. Apart from their general aversion from conciliatory methods of settling disputes, whether between individuals or States, the Nazis look with suspicion on arbitration as removing from the watchful eye of the judges, and therefore of the Party, matters which may affect the interests of the State.

International Law

As with national, so with international law, the Nazi doctrine starts from the assumption that the validity of any legal system implies a certain community of outlook on the part of those whose conduct is to be regulated by it, and that this, of course, can only

arise through kinship of blood. Some of the German writers accept the conclusion that the only international system which could be binding on Germany would be one confined to 'Nordic' peoples. Among the many criticisms they make of the League of Nations is that it jumbles together advanced and semi-civilized, Christian and heathen, Western and Oriental peoples. Any talk of a World-Union seems to them a betrayal of national faith in the interests of 'Jewish free-masonry'. Until quite recently, reputable text-books current in Germany were declaring that Soviet Russia could not be a loyal member of the international community, because its ideal was not the Nation-State based on race but a proletarian world-State based on class. Its outlook made it not merely a stranger in the family of nations, but an enemy within the gates, and its entry into the League of Nations was seen as a transparent device to promote the world dictatorship of the proletariat.

Within this select circle of nations there is to be equality of rights; those outside it will have no rights at all. Thus the Covenant of the League of Nations is reviled as conflicting with the basic principle of equality; so far is it from making law, it is itself contrary to law. And naturally the Treaty of Versailles is repudiated as a *Diktat* rather than a freely negotiated treaty. But Nazi Germany has also flouted treaties which were not concluded under compulsion. To justify these breaches of faith, the Nazis resort once more to the doctrine of race and its corollary, the doctrine of *Lebensraum* (living-space).

Though they have no room for the natural rights of the individual, the Germans make much play with the natural rights of the State—by which they mean the German Nation-State. Hitler in *Mein Kampf* speaks of frontiers being defined by the 'eternal law' rather than by man. When, however, we look into this law, we find it simply a euphemism for 'the good old rule, the simple plan' of the robber. For if the natural right of Germany is to prevail over similar natural rights of other States, it can only be by virtue of some peculiar superiority inherent in the German race as such. And indeed German writers have not scrupled to proclaim that the German theory of the State, and therefore of international law, rests ultimately on the belief in the 'special divine mission of the German people'. But at this point it becomes clear that what the Germans respect is not race as such, nor even a racial mission, but simply a race strong in arms. Superior races, it is said, have the right to force their will upon inferior races; and their superiority is proved by the very act of overcoming opposition. The better is the stronger, the stronger is the better.

Some colour is given to this identification of right with might by the doctrine of *Lebensraum*.¹ The Covenant of the League, the Briand-Kellogg Pact, and all treaties which limit German expansion are branded as static, while the doctrine of *Lebensraum* is extolled as a dynamic principle giving due recognition to changing conditions. Article 10 of the

¹ See *Living-space and Population Problems*, by R. R. Kuczynski, Oxford Pamphlet No. 8, in this series.

Covenant, by which the Members of the League undertook 'to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League', is condemned as merely crystallizing the *status quo* in the interests of the 'haves' against the 'have nots'. The members of the League, say the Germans, have never made any attempt to apply Article 19 of the Covenant, providing for the peaceful revision of treaties or conditions which have become inapplicable or dangerous to peace; therefore Germany has no alternative but to secure alteration by force. Law, to the Germans, is something essentially fluid; legal relations must always be moving—provided, of course, that they move in a direction favourable to Germany. Thus a war for racial ends, such as to bring within the Reich people of German race on foreign soil or to protect their interests, is not a breach of law but a method of executing the law. The official Nazi exponent of the racial theory joyfully proclaims that whether races live or die depends on their strength. 'Against weaker races the strong can claim the right to take the land they need for a home for themselves and their descendants.'

The Attack on Rationalism and Humanitarianism

Legal systems can never be entirely stable nor even approximately complete and definite. Nevertheless, democracies have always cherished the ideal of a reasonable degree of certainty in the rules of law. To the Nazis such a goal seems not merely

unattainable but undesirable. It smacks too much of an objective and rational attitude to human relations to make it acceptable to men who fear that their own position would be jeopardized by any relatively stable political and legal order.

This is clearly shown in their treatment of the criminal law. If the aim of the criminal law, say the Nazis, is to protect the community against any one who threatens to break the peace, which, so they assume, is the same as threatening the existence and power of the State, there is no reason for treating the criminal differently from a foreign foe. The struggle against crime must therefore be waged as ruthlessly as if it were a war. The Nazi lawyers, with their love of the dramatic, compare the State, when administering the criminal law, to a soldier facing an enemy. Even an official report describes the Nazi attitude to crime as 'heroic'. All crime is anarchy, and if anarchical elements are to be rooted out, there must be no half-measures, for attack is always the best defence. The intent is almost as dangerous as the deed, and the terror of State retribution must be present in the man's mind at the moment of temptation. And once the wrong is done, the aim must not be reform but revenge. The Nazis have no patience with the doctrine that wrongdoing is the result of environment. 'The body of the murdered man cries aloud for vengeance.'

It is impossible for any legal system to remain constantly in such a state of high tension, and the greater part of the German criminal law is in detail not very different from that of the other Western

States, but Nazi emotionalism frequently makes itself felt. Modern criminal law, more than any other branch of law, has come to be associated with statute. 'No punishment', said the Weimar Constitution, 'may be inflicted for any act, unless the act was designated by the law as punishable, before it was committed.' Closely allied to this are the other principles, that any new addition to the list of criminal offences should have express statutory sanction, and that, in interpreting a statute against an accused person, the judge should not in general go beyond the literal meaning of the words. Although occasionally departed from, these checks upon judicial and executive extension of the criminal law continue to furnish citizens of democratic countries with an effective safeguard against arbitrary power. The Nazis, however, deride such regard for statute as weak squeamishness and all three principles were explicitly abrogated by a law of June 1935. If the Court can find no statute directly in point, it is still to convict, if the accused's act seems to be covered by the general idea underlying some statute and ought to be punished 'according to sound popular sentiment'.

The modern judge is urged to take as his model the old German popular Courts whose function was to express popular or racial rather than rational or technical notions of law. Why should duelling be punished, it is asked, when refusal to accept a challenge is looked on by general opinion as cowardly and shameful? On the other hand, since popular sentiment is only 'sound' when it commends itself to

the Party and in the last resort to the *Führer*, the whole process in political crimes is based on the assumption that the accused is guilty until he proves his innocence. And even after he has obtained a verdict in his favour, he may find the Gestapo waiting on the steps of the Court itself to spirit him off to a concentration camp, where he may linger for years after he has proved himself guiltless of the crime charged against him. His personality may be such, it is said, that there can be no other guarantee for his future good conduct; or the 'protective custody' may be defended as necessary to protect him from popular hatred, for the question is not whether the public is in fact indignant but whether it ought to be. In the same way, political motives may excuse what would otherwise be criminal. 'It is not theft', says one university professor, 'for the Hitler Youth to seize the banner of the Catholic Youth Organization and to keep it as a trophy', and this is not because such an act may be little more than a childish prank but because it shows an aggressive enthusiasm which is commendable in the eyes of the Party. And that obnoxious person, the 'common informer', as we call him here, flourishes mightily in a land where every one is encouraged to spy upon his neighbour and where the Secret Police are an indispensable wheel in the machinery of government.

It is not surprising that the Nazis, who have called for a new and specifically Nazi form of art and even of humour, should have claimed that they

have introduced an original conception of law. Law, they say, is not a matter of logic, nor of reason, nor of morality, nor again of instinct; it is not a string of paragraphs, nor a theory of State and Society. It is a new way of life. Science, in law as elsewhere, is conceived by the Nazis in terms of race. Law is something living in the blood, and at the same time something lived by a people.

In their use of the terms 'Nordic' and 'Aryan' the Nazi lawyers have clearly abandoned the realm of legal science for another in which they cannot claim to speak with authority. They have become ethnologists and biologists. They have, none the less, asserted that their racial assumptions will stand the scrutiny of the natural scientists. And in this they stand self-condemned, for outside Germany the biologists have unanimously and decisively pronounced that, whatever else it may be, the racial doctrine is bad biology.¹

¹ See *'Race' in Europe*, by Julian Huxley, Oxford Pamphlet No. 5, in this series.



AN ATLAS OF THE WAR

NOTE


THE present war has shown that many problems of political geography are of recurring importance to Europe. The maps and text in this pamphlet have been designed to help towards an understanding of these problems, in which geography has so large a part. The compilers are aware that much has been omitted, but they hope that within the space available enough information has been given to help readers to follow the events of to-day and to formulate correct views about the future.

My thanks are due to Mr. D. F. L. Brown for help in planning this pamphlet, to Mr. C. F. W. R. Gullick, Mr. E. W. Gilbert, and Mr. R. W. Steel for their large share in the work of compilation, and to the officials and draughtsmen of the Clarendon Press for their friendly co-operation.

J. N. L. BAKER.

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I. CENTRAL EUROPE, 1914-1918


1. CENTRAL EUROPE, 1914-1918

THE World War resulted in the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, leaving only the small States of Austria and Hungary. A new State, Czechoslovakia, was created and the Polish State was restored. Romania and Serbia (now Yugoslavia) received large additions to their territory.

Germany, which had tried to dominate Central Europe, was compelled to restore to Poland the Polish Corridor which she had seized in 1772, while after a plebiscite Poland gained part of the mineral area of Upper Silesia. A similar procedure restored part of North Slesvig to Denmark. A strip of territory occupied by Lithuanians, and its German port of Memel, was added in 1923 to the new State of Lithuania. The greater part of the courses of the rivers Niemen, Oder, Elbe, and Danube were internationalized for a depth of 30 miles.

lized to help inland States. Czechoslovakia was given special rights in Hamburg and Stettin.

On the west Belgium acquired the districts of Eupen and Malmédy, of strategic importance. The Saar coalfield, with about one-tenth of Germany's coal, went to France for fifteen years. A large part of Lorraine, with its iron deposits, and Alsace, with its potash mines and some oil, were surrendered permanently to France which now had important interests in Rhine navigation through Strasbourg. Her eastern frontier was strengthened strategically by the recovery of this territory taken from her after the Franco-German War of 1870 and by the demilitarization of the lands on the left bank of the Rhine and those on the right bank for a depth of 30 miles.




2. CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918-1939

2. CENTRAL EUROPE, 1918-1939

The Locarno treaties and conventions signed in 1925, involving Germany, Belgium, France, Britain, Italy, Poland, and Czechoslovakia, promised peace for Central Europe. The Nazi rulers accepted them after 1933, and the Saar plebiscite, which resulted in the return of that territory to Germany on 1 March 1935, was in accordance with their spirit. But the new German nationalism showed itself by introducing military conscription in March 1935 while apparently abandoning claims to sea-power in the Anglo-German Naval Treaty of that year. In March 1936, using the French ratification of the Franco-Soviet Pact as a pretext, Germany denounced the Locarno treaties, and occupied with her troops the demilitarized zone, while in November she denounced the clauses of the Versailles Treaty relating to the German rivers.

The Anschluss with Austria, proposed


periodically since 1917 and forbidden by the treaty, was accomplished by force in March 1938, and gave Germany nearly seven million people and valuable resources of timber, iron ore, and hydro-electric power. The Munich agreements of September 1938 added nearly four million inhabitants of Czechoslovakia, mostly Germans, to the Reich, disrupted its industries, and removed its strategic mountain frontier. The destruction of this State was completed by Germany in March 1939. Bohemia, with its important armaments industry and rich resources, became a protectorate, Slovakia was left nominally independent, while Ruthenia, already partly occupied by Hungary, was wholly transferred to that State. Lithuania was compelled to cede Memel, her only port, to Germany. Danzig and Poland alone remained obstacles to German expansion to the east.




3. GERMANY

GERMANY is the most industrialized country of continental Europe. She has a good system of communications and a supply of well-trained labour, but, except for coal (25 per cent. surplus), possesses few natural advantages. Her supplies of iron ore are so limited that more than two-thirds of Germany's peace-time requirements have been met by ores imported from other countries, especially from Sweden. She is deficient in copper, tin, and bauxite, and, except for magnesite, in all the metals used in the making of special steels. Germany's output of natural oil is negligible, a fact which explains her desire for Romanian supplies; synthetic oils have, however, been produced from coal in quantities sufficient to satisfy about one-third of her peace-time wants. The map shows that the principal industrial regions,

especially the Ruhr, are close to the frontiers; this proximity was even more marked before the annexation of Bohemia. German agriculture can, in normal years, supply most of her need for cereals, and also for meat and livestock, provided that imports of maize and fodder can be maintained. Butter is mainly home-produced, but Germany is very short of vegetable oils and all tropical products. Climatic limitations on agriculture are very marked in the scarcity of textile-fibres. Cotton is entirely lacking, and, even with home-produced wool, flax, and synthetic products, the textile industry is only 25 per cent. self-sufficient. Germany is accordingly greatly dependent on imports: of these more than half normally come from overseas or from distant countries.



(a) Africa



(b) The Pacific


Kiaochow (leased from the Chinese Government until 1914) and Samoa (now under New Zealand Mandate) are omitted.

4. FORMER GERMAN COLONIES

4. THE FORMER GERMAN COLONIES

THERE have been insistent Nazi demands recently for the return of the colonies which were taken from Germany in 1918 and entrusted to Mandatory Powers responsible to the League of Nations. The particular demands have been for those in Africa under British and South African mandate, even though these offer only very limited possibilities for European settlement, while economically they would have been of almost negligible benefit to the Reich. Indeed, the total exports of all the mandates during 1936 amounted to less than 1 per cent. of Germany's total imports, the only important products being sisal in Tanganyika, vanadium in South-West Africa, cocoa and palm oil in the West African Mandates, and phosphates in the Pacific island of Nauru. Coal, iron, oil, cotton, rubber, and copper, which Dr. Goebbels has described as 'the basic materials of modern industrialism', are almost unknown in the former German Empire.

The main motives behind these demands have been military and strategic, for had the mandates been restored, their native populations could have been militarized and air and naval bases established. Then, in the event of war, Britain would have found that nearly all her important air communications in Africa had been cut, whilst shipping would have been exposed to submarine attacks from harbours on both the east and west coasts of Africa. If it should be necessary to divert merchant shipping from the Mediterranean Sea route to the longer, but more secure, route round the Cape of Good Hope, this latter menace would have been particularly serious.



(a) Languages of the Population of Poland
(generalized after Romer)



(b) Historical Divisions
5. POLAND

5. POLAND

THE Polish kingdom grew up between the tenth and twelfth centuries, and by the union with Lithuania, finally accomplished in 1569, became one of the largest States in Europe. By the terms of three agreements, known as the Partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795), the whole country was divided between Prussia, Russia, and Austria. The State of Poland was reconstituted in 1919 from territories which formerly belonged to Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia.

Two principles were observed when the boundaries were fixed: Poland must include the lands inhabited by a predominantly Polish-speaking population and it must obtain access to the sea. In 1919 a line was drawn as the eastern limit of the territory that was indisputably Polish-speaking, and this line, which was later called the Curzon Line, was accepted by the Supreme Council as a minimum frontier. Poland took possession of lands to the east of the line, where the population is very mixed, and a frontier was not finally settled with Russia until 1921.

According to the Census of 1931 about 69 per cent. of the population of the whole State was Polish, and out of the remainder about 14 per cent. were Ukrainians or Ruthenians in the south-east of the country and 3·1 were White Russians mostly in the Pripet region. About 9 per cent. of the population were Jews and 2·3 per cent. were Germans, and both these groups were widely dispersed; there were in addition small numbers of Lithuanians, Russians, and Czechs.



6. THE RESOURCES OF POLAND


6. THE RESOURCES OF POLAND

POLAND lies in the middle of the great European plain which stretches from France to the Ural Mountains. Its central position between the Great Powers of Germany and Russia has exposed it to danger, particularly because it possesses no satisfactory natural frontiers. The Pripet Marshes on the east and the Carpathians on the south are the only barriers against attack.

Poland is essentially an agricultural country: only twelve towns have a population exceeding 100,000. Over 60 per cent. of the total population of nearly 35 millions are engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, while only 15 per cent. are employed in mining and industry. Rye and potatoes are the principal crops and occupy about 40 per cent. and 16 per cent. respectively of the total area sown.

Poland has a first-class coalfield in Upper Silesia producing 38 million tons of coal, a figure which could be increased. The oilfield at the foot of the Carpathians yields about half a million tons of petroleum annually. An important cotton-manufacturing region is situated round Lodz, but the heavy metal industries are mainly concentrated in Upper Silesia, where there are local supplies of zinc, lead, and iron ore. In the years before the war the Poles were attempting to develop a Central Industrial District where war industries might be less exposed to German attack.

The Vistula basin, which gives geographical unity to Poland, has its natural outlet at Danzig, which was created a Free City in 1920. Since that time Poland has built the flourishing port of Gdynia.



7. THE BALTIC

7. THE BALTIC


THE long struggle between west and east in the Baltic had, by 1914, left Russia dominant in the east, with remnants of Swedish influence in the Åland Islands and Finland, and many German cities along the south coast. The German defeat of Russia produced the new States of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania in the north and east.

Geographical conditions do not favour a dense population and confine most settlements to the coastlands: the total population of the new States together with Norway, Sweden, and Denmark is only about 22 millions.

The new States inherited economic difficulties from Russia and severely restricted her seaboard. Their solution of these problems by agricultural development enables them to export food to Germany and especially to Britain. They are, however, far surpassed by the similar products of Denmark.

The northern States, with extensive forests, are large exporters of wood or wood-products (Norway 24 per cent., Sweden 43 per cent., Finland 81 per cent. of their export trade). Sweden supplies about half of Germany's imports of iron ore, while Norway sends zinc, sulphur, and pyrites. Norwegian fisheries provide the bulk of Germany's fish and whale oil.

Britain receives one-tenth of her imports from the Baltic. Enemy action there or off Denmark would restrict or even stop that trade, though all products received from the Baltic can be obtained elsewhere.



8. THE U.S.S.R.

THE U.S.S.R. is the greatest continuous area under one government, and the only larger political unit is the British Empire. Although Russia's population (about 170,000,000) is exceeded only by that of the British Empire and of China, it averages only about 25 persons per square mile. The Russian army is the largest in the world, its peace-time strength being estimated as twice that of any other country. It is difficult to obtain any definite idea of Russia's resources, but undoubtedly they are very great. The severe climate of much of the country imposes a strict limit on the types of its crops; small amounts of cotton and tea are grown, but almost all tropical products have to be imported. Nevertheless, Russia claims to be the world's greatest producer of barley, rye, oats, potatoes, sugar

8. THE U.S.S.R.

beet, flax, and hemp. She is the second greatest producer of wheat, and yields large quantities of wool and of wood and wood-products. Her mineral wealth is vast. She is the greatest producer of manganese and phosphates, and the second greatest of petroleum and iron ore: she ranks third in steel and fourth in coal. Russia lacks many of the steel-hardening metals, and so far produces no tin. Her production of gold is very considerable, but reliable statistics are not available. Russia's greatest industrial region is the Donetz basin of the Ukraine, but recent policy has encouraged the growth of the centres farther east. Her exportable surplus is smaller than the greatness of her resources would suggest owing partly to the recent development of her own industries.




9. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

9. SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE

THE Balkan peninsula lies between Central Europe and the Mediterranean. It is open to foreign land influences on all sides save that of the Adriatic where mountains isolate the coastlands. Penetration by peoples differing widely in origin and in religion has been easy. Great historical movements have taken place along the important international routes which cross the peninsula: Asiatic influences have reached Vienna; Central Europe has tried to expand to the Bosphorus. The Great Powers seeking to control these route-ways have used Balkan rivalries to further their purpose. The German drive to the south-east before and during the World War of 1914-18 is one example. To check this agelong tendency the Balkan Entente (which excluded Albania and Bulgaria) was formed in 1934 to ensure that the Great Powers leave the Balkan States alone.

Geographical and historical links are strengthened because the resources of the Balkans, largely raw materials such as food products, tobacco, timber, minerals, and oil, are complementary to those of Central Europe. Latterly Germany tried to influence Balkan policy by an exchange of manufactured goods for these raw materials, and steadily increased her economic hold over the peninsula. Half her tobacco, bauxite, chrome ore, and hemp, one-third of her nickel, and one-fifth of her petroleum come from the Balkans.

The rivalry of Italy and Yugoslavia in the Adriatic, intensified by Italy's domination of Albania, and the control exercised by Turkey over the Bosphorus give added importance to this region in the political geography of Europe.



10. MEDITERRANEAN ROUTES


Note. Egypt has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany but has not actually declared war (Dec. 1939)

10. MEDITERRANEAN ROUTES

In normal times the Mediterranean is one of the world's greatest trade-routes. For Great Britain this sea is a 'main arterial road', and among the goods she imports by it are petroleum from Iran, jute from Bengal, tin and rubber from Malaya and the East Indies. But Great Britain can, if need be, use the longer routes either round the Cape of Good Hope or through the Panama Canal as alternatives for this traffic. However, Great Britain imports large quantities of materials from the Mediterranean region itself, notably cotton from Egypt, phosphates and iron ore from French Africa, and Iraq's oil from Haifa. British interests in the Mediterranean are manifold; apart from her possession of the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, and Cyprus and of the Mandate over Palestine, she has

agreements with other Powers. She is bound to Egypt by the alliance of 1936, and Egypt has broken off diplomatic relations with Germany. Greece was guaranteed by Great Britain in the spring of 1939, and an Anglo-Turkish treaty was ratified in November 1939.

The Duce has said that for Italy the Mediterranean is 'life itself', and it is true that she receives 85 per cent. of her imports by sea, and only 10 per cent. of these come from within the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Half of Italy's oil comes past Gibraltar. For the French the routes from Marseilles to Algeria and Tunis are the most important Mediterranean sea-ways, as along these routes the man-power of the North African Empire can be mobilized.



THE EMPIRES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE


11. THE EMPIRES OF GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE

The British and French Empires are two of the greatest empires of the modern world, both in size and population. The area of the British Empire is 14,000,000 square miles, and its population over 500,000,000, of which 44,500,000 live in the United Kingdom. The corresponding figures for the French Empire are 4,336,000 square miles and 107,000,000 people. France itself has a population of 42,000,000.

The economic resources of these Allied Empires are enormous. This is particularly true of the British Empire, which produces more than three-quarters of the world's supplies of jute, nickel, and mutton, and more than half of the gold, asbestos, rubber, and wool. It also produces large quantities

of such vital commodities as vegetable oils, dairy produce, and sugar, and of the important minerals lead, tin, zinc, copper, and coal. There are, it is true, certain deficiencies, notably of wheat, cotton, iron ore, and petroleum, but ample supplies of these can still be readily obtained from neutral countries.


The French Empire is far less productive, some parts being barren and only sparsely populated. Nevertheless, it is of supreme importance at the present time because of its production of food, which enables France itself to be almost self-sufficient as regards its food supplies, and because of the large number of trained native troops which are available in all the French colonies.



12. THE WESTERN FRONT
(Neutral States are shown by vertical lines)

12. THE WESTERN FRONT


FRANCE is separated from Germany on the north by the three neutral States of the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. The Netherlands and northern Belgium form a low-lying plain offering easy access to France from Germany. Here canals and rivers provide the principal defensive positions. Southern Belgium and Luxembourg comprise the forested plateau of the Ardennes, a difficult region to cross except by the Meuse Valley. From the south-east of Luxembourg France and Germany are conterminous as far as Switzerland, the neutral State which terminates the frontier on the south. Between Luxembourg and the Rhine the Franco-German frontier traverses hilly, forested country and for a considerable way follows the deeply trenched Saar Valley with its coal-field. Farther south and for nearly half its length the common frontier is formed by the River Rhine, and the French side is additionally strengthened by a series of hills; these run parallel to the Rhine and are at their highest in the Vosges. There are only two easy routes round or through these hills. To the north of the Vosges the Col de Saverne leads from Strasbourg to the centre of France: in the south the Belfort gap between the Vosges and Jura Mountains leads directly from the Rhine Plain. Farther south, in Switzerland, there is a more difficult passage-way between the Jura and the Alps. The natural defensive features throughout the zone are strengthened by the Belgian and French Maginot lines and by the German Siegfried line.



13. FRANCE

13. FRANCE

FRANCE, although one of the great industrial countries of the world, has not been industrialized to the same extent as either Great Britain or Germany. This is largely due to her comparative lack of good-quality coal, but the intensive development of hydro-electricity is leading to the establishment of industrial areas in the mountain regions of the east, centre, and south. On the other hand, the return of Alsace has enabled France to become Europe's largest producer of iron ore; she is also the world's largest producer of bauxite from which aluminium is made. Except for Paris, the greatest industrial regions lie near the frontiers, especially the north-eastern, but recently there has been a tendency to establish many of the key industries in the mountainous central plateau, where Le Creusot is one of the principal armament centres. French manufactures, particularly those of Paris, are notable for their high quality rather than for their quantity. France's greatest strength is in her agriculture. She has the most varied topography and climate of any European country, and hence the greatest variety of agricultural products. Aided by her North African possessions she is largely self-supporting in cereals, and to a considerable extent her colonies supply those commodities which she herself cannot produce. The foreign trade is well distributed and shows no excessive dependence on any one region or route. Petroleum, coal, and textile-fibres form her principal imports, and iron and steel goods, bauxite, and luxury articles are her chief exports. France possesses the best-balanced economy of any European country.



14. GREAT BRITAIN

Food & Drink	Raw Materials	Manufactures
£432,000,000	£315,000,000	£274,000,000

Total imports of the United Kingdom, 1937, £1,029,000,000, including Bullion


14. GREAT BRITAIN

SUPPLIES of food and raw materials bulk very largely in the import trade of the United Kingdom to-day, because ever since the eighteenth century industry has been intensively developed, whereas agriculture has been relatively neglected. The map shows the position of the leading mining and manufacturing centres in this country. Many of these, it will be noted, form those districts from which children have been recently evacuated: the remaining 'evacuation areas' are either ports or naval bases, such as Southampton, Portsmouth, or the Medway towns.

The map also shows the sources of British imports. A large proportion of these is obtained from European neighbours, including Germany, but nearly two-thirds of the total come from non-European sources, particularly from the British Empire and the United States of America. These supplies from overseas are of particular importance at the present time, since their arrival should be comparatively little affected by the war, so long as the British Navy maintains its command of the seas.

German overseas trade, in contrast, has almost entirely ceased since the outbreak of war, as a result of the establishment of the blockade of the German coasts. This has been greatly facilitated by Britain's position athwart all the sea routes into the North Sea. The only entries to this sea lie between southern Norway and the east coast of Scotland or through the Straits of Dover and, since both of these are narrow, they can be quite easily controlled.

15. THE AMERICAS



15. THE AMERICAS

With the exception of Canada, Newfoundland, and the small British and French colonies, all the countries of North and South America are at present neutral. Figures are given on the map for the export trade of six American countries to the United Kingdom, France, and Germany during 1937, in order to emphasize the dependence of these European States upon the New World. Some of the more important products and the larger industrial centres are also shown.

The considerable German imports from the South American Republics and the United States are noteworthy, especially in view of the fact that these supplies are no longer available to the Reich. Greatest of all, however, is the British trade with the United States, and this will have a new significance now that the Neutrality Law has been amended to permit the export of arms, on the 'cash and carry' basis, to belligerents. Normally the Americas supply Britain with nearly one-third of her total imports, particularly wheat, meat, coffee, wool, cotton, petroleum, nickel, and other minerals. It is, therefore, impossible to exaggerate the need to safeguard the shipping routes across the Atlantic Ocean. Of almost equal importance are the routes through the Panama Canal to the west coasts of the Americas, Eastern Asia, and Australasia, particularly as these Pacific routes are increasingly used by merchant shipping in preference to the routes via the Suez Canal or around Southern Africa.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

FOR those who wish to read in more detail about the background and causes of the present state of the world, the following notes may be of some assistance.

The best and most up-to-date general picture of England as she was from the rise of Germany in 1870 to the outbreak of the First World War is given in Mr. Ensor's book *England 1870-1914* (15s.), which is Volume 15 of the new *Oxford History of England*. A reliable German account of German foreign policy during the same period is given in E. Brandenburg's *From Bismarck to the World War* (trans. by A. E. Adams, 15s.). Mr. C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *History of the Great War 1914-1918* (15s.) may be recommended as the standard one-volume work on the subject. Mr. G. M. Gathorne-Hardy deals with the period between the two wars in his *Short History of International Affairs, 1920-1938* (8s. 6d.), a book issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

The two volumes of *Speeches and Documents on International Affairs*, edited by Professor A. B. Keith (World's Classics, 2s. each), and the selection of political writings in Sir Alfred Zimmern's *Modern Political Doctrines* (7s. 6d.) illustrate the conflict of doctrines so much in evidence to-day.

(Mr. Ensor, Mr. Gathorne-Hardy, and Sir Alfred Zimmern are authors of Oxford Pamphlets, see back of cover.)

The prices quoted above held good in December 1939, but are liable to alteration without notice.

